


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NEMESIS!
Three mutincers on gallows in the streets, April 1909

REGILDING THE CRESCENT

BY
F. G. AFLALO

WITH TWENTY-FOUR ILLUSTRATIONS
FROM PHOTOGRAPHS AND A MAP

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“ To innovate is not to reform ”

Edmund Burke

PREFACE

THE title of this book, for which the author is indebted to a friend, is not intended as any cynical allusion to the superficial nature of Turkey's effort at rehabilitation, but expresses merely an open mind on the probability of her success, with a sincere wish that it may be accomplished.

The book makes no attempt to tell the thrice-told tale of the Turkish Revolution. Mr. E. F. Knight, the brilliant correspondent of the *Morning Post*, has done this in *The Awakening of Turkey*; and more recently Mr. Francis McCullagh, whom the author last remembers seeing in that memorable street fight in April, has thrown new light on those interesting events in his *Downfall of Abd-ul-Hamid*. Both books should be read by the student of the most amazing revolution in history, that of Portugal not excepted.

The present volume, which compresses those events into a single chapter, most of which is devoted to such episodes of the "Affair of April" as the author saw for himself, has been

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planned rather as a first attempt at a “Who’s Who?” and “What’s What?” for newspaper readers at home, giving some idea of the races, religions and politics, of the resources and the difficulties, which are of supreme interest in the working out of Turkey’s salvation.

Among the essential reforms discussed in its pages are the divorce of the Koran from the Statute Book, the crying need of more liberal education, the exclusion of army officers and priests (or their equivalent in Islam) from the arena of politics, the emancipation of women, the financing of public works, the development of Anatolia, the maintenance of friendly relations with the Powers and with lesser neighbours, and the pacification of outlying provinces. These are a few only of the problems which lie between revolted Turkey and the accomplishment of her legitimate ambitions. Her task is no light one. With fanatical Arabs and Syrians on the one hand, wedded to the Sacred Law, and regarding every reform as a concession to the Giaour, and, on the other, Hellenes and Albanians dreaming of independence, she has, even within her frontiers, difficulties that might daunt more experienced statesmen than those entrusted with the helm. The dishonesty of Abd-ul-Hamid divided Kurd against Armenian and made both

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easy to rule. The honesty of the Young Turk has united them against himself and made them impossible of control. Its financial liabilities, though not insignificant, need not trouble a nation which has such an asset as the province of Anatolia. So far as the plans of the "Committee" for reform are likely to meet with opposition, there is a want of cohesion, not only among the reactionary elements within the empire, but also among self-seeking neighbours over the border, which should afford a sufficient respite to a strong Government honestly determined to push on with inexorable purpose to its goal.

In writing this short account of the outlook in Turkey, the author has been guided mainly by information acquired at first hand in the country, but he has also consulted the following works, to which the reader may be referred for fuller information :

- Azoury, N. *Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe.*
Bérard, V. *La Révolution Turque.*
Carles, G. *La Turquie Economique.*
Chiha, H. K. *La Province de Bagdad.*
Denais, J. *La Turquie Nouvelle.*
Fesch, P. *Constantinople aux derniers jours d'Abdul-Hamid.*
Heidborn, A. *Droit public et administrative de l'Empire Ottoman.*
Kraelitz-Greifenhorst. *Die Verfassungsgesetze des Osmanischen Reiches.*
Ular and Insabato. *Die Erlöschende Halbmond.*
Young, G. *Corps de Droit Ottoman.*

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The author is also indebted for information to the *Quarterly Trade Journal* of the British Chamber of Commerce of Turkey, to the files of the *Osmanischer Lloyd* and *Levant Herald*, and to several native newspapers.

Mr. Edwin Whittall, though unable to read the whole of the proof sheets, kindly looked over chapters vii. and x., and made some very valuable additions and corrections to both.

The author's thanks are also due to his father for much assistance with the chapter on the political aspects of Islam, a subject which the author of *The Truth about Morocco* has made a lifelong study.

Most of the photographs in the volume are by Messrs. Sébah and Joaillier, of Pera, though a few are by Bonfils of Beyrout. Every apology is offered for errors in the English rendering of Turkish names and other words which, owing to the author's ignorance of the language, are probably numerous, and for the many other imperfections of which he is only too conscious.

F. G. A.

Christmas, 1910.

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CHAPTER I

PERSONS AND POLITICS

"Quales sunt summi civitatis viri, talis est civitas"

Glamour of Politics in the Near East : False News :
The Personal Side : Enver Bey : Prince Sabaheddin :
Prince Yussuf Izeddin : Prince Mejid : Kiamil
Pacha : Djemaleddin Effendi : Hilmi Pacha : Ahmed
Riza Bey : Ahmed Ihsan Bey : Tewfik Fikret Bey :
Ismail Kemal Bey : Carasso Effendi : Abd-ul-
Hamid—His Double : His Guiding Principle : Mode
of Ruling : Cruelty : True Character : Story of his
Birth : Love Affairs : A Turkish Fable

THE glamour of the Near East can only with difficulty be dissociated from its seething politics. Out in the country districts, it is true, fishing or rambling in the wilds far from the capital, it is, as I have related in another book, possible to find quieter interests. Yet only the blind, deaf and dumb could live long in Constantinople without being drawn into the excitement of the ever-changing political situation. When I say that the political excitement through which England has passed during the last twelve months is the normal condition of affairs in the Turkish capital, I shall

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hardly be accused of exaggeration. Disraeli was not perhaps wrong when he regarded Eastern politics and dissimulation as synonymous, yet the same might be said of Western politics, and in neither case does it lessen their interest. In Constantinople, either something is happening or going to happen. It may be only in the heated imagination of the Levantines, but it is none the less exciting at the moment. Episodes which take up only a few lines of print in the morning paper at home assume very different significance when they are enacted under your window, and the city on the Bosphorus is in a permanent state of excitement owing to any of several causes, a panic in the bazaars, the fall of a Ministry, or the public hanging of those on the losing side. Here, as at sea, the apprehension of coming disaster is sometimes strongest in the calm between the storms. Every one has his own ideas of what is going to happen next, and the babel of tongues only aggravates the confusion. It is no uncommon sight to see a European newspaper correspondent, zealous for the latest rumours, buy a catchpenny Greek supplement from an Armenian newsboy and take it into the nearest shop, where an obliging Italian translates its untruths into his own version of French, whereupon the correspondent

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
wires it in German to his editor in Leipzig. Two hours later, perhaps, the same correspondent has to send a second cable utterly repudiating the first. Such is the life, and it is bracing, for the shifting kaleidoscope of Turkish politics makes the pattern-drawers of the press see strange visions about. It is impossible to live long amid the raw material out of which the next morning's news will be manufactured for readers in suburban trains at home, without acquiring the same taste for gossip as those coffee-house politicians of whom Hazlitt tells us.

Of the many aspects of this complicated game none, perhaps, is more attractive to the visitor than the personal one. Public men are more approachable in a democratic land like Turkey, that has just promulgated new ideals of popular government for which it is anxious to have the approval of Europe. The "Who's Who?" of Turkey will doubtless have to undergo constant revision in the future, since, in the present state of unrest, new men must of necessity come to the front. Nevertheless there are a few who, having played their important part in recent events, must long remain in the public eye, and a short account of these, of whom the present writer had the good fortune to meet several during his stay in the country, may serve as a

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convenient introduction to the more general topics dealt with in subsequent chapters.

Of all the figures that filled the political screen before and after the downfall of the old *régime*, none (with one baneful exception) was more conspicuous than that of Major Enver Bey, who, even more than his brother-officer, Niazi, was the popular hero. Indeed, to see the faces of the gaping multitude whenever one or other of these gallant objects of its simple homage rode through the streets with their troops was to realise Carlyle's definition of hero-worship as transcendent wonder. Not the face of Ezekiel, son of Buzi, could have been more transfigured when he looked upon the two-faced cherubim than were those of the unsophisticated Asiatics when they gazed upon these brave soldiers. Enver is the correct young officer, making the most of his inches, dapper, alert of eye, with a pleasant manner; and when the writer met him just before his departure for Berlin to take up the duties of military attaché, he was full of enthusiasm for his profession and all but indifferent to politics. It is said that he is changed, and this, if true, is matter for regret, since Turkey has enough men to do the talking, but of capable officers none too many. Yet it would be unfair to credit all the fantastic



A POPULAR CARTOON, APRIL 1909
(*Enver Pey and the Dawn of Liberty*)

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opinions which interviewers have published as the Major's pronouncements on current politics. For one thing, interviewers in the Near East resemble those in the Far West (and everywhere between) in their readiness to put words in the mouths of men reluctant to talk. In the second, it is possible that, jealous of his popularity, Enver Bey has now and again been moved to say the pleasant thing. There are moments in this renascent Turkey when the bare, unvarnished truth is unpopular.

It is, indeed, to his frankness in criticising his countrymen that we must attribute the small part played in public affairs by Prince Sabaheddin. At one time he looked like assuming the leadership of affairs, and one of these days he may yet do so, but he has played the part of candid friend too often to please the Turks, and his honest criticism has not been welcomed by a nation that was first patted on the back by Europe for its orderly Revolution, and that has since patted its own back when the praise from outside grew fainter. Though earnestly attached to the popular cause, Prince Sabaheddin is twice related to the reigning family. His patriotic father, Damad Mahmoud Pacha, was the son of a widow of Sultan Mahmoud, and his mother was a sister of Abd-ul-Hamid. Damad Mahmoud,

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after vainly endeavouring to make Hamid rule constitutionally, died in exile, and his son returned to Turkey only after the Revolution. His programme of decentralisation is admittedly, in view of dissensions at home and abroad, somewhat premature, but it will have to be adopted when the time is ripe. Meanwhile, Sabaheddin is the Lord Rosebery of Turkey, ploughing his lonely furrow and periodically fluttering the doves by publishing his views on current politics. Between him and the "Committee of Union and Progress" there is little sympathy.

The next Sultan, if he lives, will be Yussuf Izeddin, eldest son of Abd-ul-Aziz and a prince regarded, rightly or otherwise, as being more Hamidian than Hamid, which offers a cheerful outlook for the rising generation. Still, the times have changed, and the heir apparent may find that, in the interval, his cousin's peculiar interpretation of the divine right of kings is out of date. Also, the reports of his character may be exaggerated. After Izeddin come Suleyman and Vahideddin, brothers of the present Sultan, and after them Selaheddin, a prince of the highest intelligence. Fifth on the list stands Prince Abd-ul-Mejid, a handsome and agreeable man, forty-two years old. As he spent thirty of

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these in prison, or at any rate in a confinement which can hardly be otherwise described, he looks ten years older. Mejid Effendi Hazetleri has one little son, who is being coached by an English tutor for Cambridge. The Prince speaks French fluently and has sufficient German for purposes of conversation. During the long and weary years of his imprisonment, he taught himself painting, and several of his works may be seen on the walls of his villa at Scutari, notably a pathetic allegorical study of a man sitting on the seashore and gazing hopefully at the rising sun, his own attitude before the Constitution set him free. He is heart and soul with constitutional government, and hopeful of the regeneration of his country.

“I can assure you,” he once said to the writer, “that I was not a prince by choice. It is not the life one would choose !”

There was no difficulty in believing this when he went on to say how, in his youth, he was passionately fond of outdoor sport until circumstances (the ex-Sultan was the “circumstances”) made him a library recluse. How sad was this confession of an outdoor man forced to live under cover. Fortunately he is free to send his only son to an English university to be made a man of.

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Few of the makers of recent Turkish history can have greater interest for English students of the Near East than the venerable Kiamil Pacha, who, like Palmerston and Gladstone, has reached a great age, with his mental powers unimpaired. He was many times Vizier under the ex-Sultan, and he also had the dubious distinction of having been the only individual who ever received him as a guest, as Abd-ul-Hamid once drank coffee with him after the Friday Selamlık. The keen face of the aged Cypriote, with the white beard and piercing eyes, is by now familiar to readers of the illustrated papers. His strong predilection for England and things English may in some measure have resulted from his lifelong acquaintance with the language. The actual causes of his downfall were many. The reason alleged at the time was his dismissal of two popular Ministers, though it is now generally believed that this was a mere pretext for getting rid of him before he had time to make public the contents of documents implicating Moukhtar Pacha and other public men in relations with Yildiz. It is difficult, if not impossible, to get at the truth in these stories, and all that can be done is to weigh the relative probability of many versions. Another of these was to the effect that he favoured a risky and unpopular scheme for

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mobilising troops in order to obtain a rectification of the Bulgarian frontier. In any case, it is certain that he lost much prestige by declining to dismiss his son Said, a Gilbertian admiral of personal charm but public inefficiency, who was moreover openly known to have business relations with a band of brigands in the neighbourhood of Smyrna. Sooner or later, Kiamil must have fallen, so impatient was the veteran of surveillance on the part of the youthful emissaries of the all-powerful Committee, which had only retained his services so long in order to enjoy the benefit of his experience.

With Kiamil fell the ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam, Djemaleddin Effendi, who, smarting under the same resentment of the Committee's high-handed action, resigned the office that he had so ably filled for nineteen years. A broad-minded churchman, in no land a very common object, but in the Mohammedan world a rarity indeed, His Highness had a familiarity with European politics which might astonish any one unacquainted with the curiously dual nature of the office of Sheikh-ul-Islam. Like others who could not stomach the supremacy of the Committee of Salonika, Djemaleddin Effendi has been freely accused of sympathy with the *régime* of Abd-ul-

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Hamid, but no one who has had the privilege of conversing with him can entertain any doubt of his liberal principles. In Turkey, however, as elsewhere, there is more than one kind of liberalism. The extent to which he is opposed to the reactionary element may be measured by the fact that, prior to resigning his office, he elaborated a plan, with all necessary precedents from the Koran, for the abolition of polygamy. He is a deep thinker and a careful talker, weighing each sentence and conversing in paragraphs. The writer once asked his opinion quite frankly on the burning question of the emancipation of Turkish women. After a characteristic pause, he declared himself to be wholly in sympathy with such a movement if effected gradually and not so suddenly as to offend popular prejudice. There is every reason to suppose that he may one day be Grand Vizier. He must be Kiamil's junior by twenty years and more, and when some of his hot-headed countrymen have had time to realise that experience in public affairs counts for a little more than enthusiasm, they will call him to the council board. It is impossible to say what kind of Vizier he would make, for the Sublime Porte has been the grave of as many reputations as South Africa. Yet he has many qualities that would make for

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DJEMALEDDIN EFFENDI
(Formerly Sheikh-ul-Islam)

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success. As the writer listened to his brilliant arguments and picturesque illustrations, the whimsical thought came to him that it would be worth hearing a discussion on some congenial subject between this enlightened Mohammedan and some of our own Lords Spiritual, who have their own ideas on the subject of the "unlettered" Turk. Their lordships might find a surprise in store for them !

Hussein Hilmi Pacha, who was Vizier after the fall of Kiamil, was even better known for his strong work as Inspector-General of the Vilayets of Macedonia. Thanks to long residence in Paris, he speaks perfect French and has much of the French charm of manner. Of his ability in the high office to which he was called, and from which he fell, owing to a variety of causes, which were, however, less complicated than those which overthrew Kiamil, one heard many opinions, but of his patriotism only one. Ordinarily somewhat cold in manner, he could speak passionately if a subject moved him to resentment, and the writer once, when drinking coffee in his private room at the Porte, saw him so excited that he walked up and down the room as he talked. His opinion had been asked on the then pending Law of the Press, and he pushed back his chair and declaimed bitterly

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against the cowardly libels published in the newspapers of his own country, imagining apparently that our statesmen were safe from the attacks of lampoon and caricature.

“Oui, monsieur,” he said, “votre M. Asquith et Sir Edward Grey sont beaucoup plus heureux que nous autres. On attaque chez vous la politique d’un Ministre, mais on en respecte au moins la vie privée !* Chez nous, ce n’est pas une liberté ; c’est un abus ! Figurez-vous : un homme demande à un Ministre une poste quelconque. Le Ministre la lui refuse pour des raisons légitimes. Or, le lendemain, il demande un permis pour produire un journal, ce qui lui coute dix francs. Et, dès ce moment, il commence une guerre de diffamation afin de se venger. Autrefois, c’est vrai, il n’y avait qu’une quinzaine de journaux, mais vaudrait mieux n’en pas avoir que plusieurs parmi eux que vous voyez ici aujourd’hui. Moi, lorsque j’étais au Ministère de l’Intérieur, j’avais préparé un loi encore beaucoup plus libérale que celle de la France. On n’en voulait pas. Mais enfin une commission considère actuellement la question entière, et vous verrez bientôt une amélioration. Comme à present, c’est insupportable.”

* Do they ?—F. G. A.

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Ahmed Riza Bey,* then President of the Chamber, was a very different personality. Originally a schoolmaster at Brousa, he was prominent in the councils of the Young Turks for many years, but, for some reason or other, was unpopular with foreigners and with many of his own countrymen, one of whom described him as "just the hole in the gruyère." He was always credited with having an unnecessarily high opinion of his own abilities, and when he appropriated the historic pen with which the Sheikh-ul-Islam had signed the *fetva* deposing Abd-ul-Hamid, some of the remarks made about him were unprintable. None at any rate, even among his bitterest enemies, can accuse Ahmed Riza of having sought popularity ; and if the number of a statesman's enemies are the correct gauge of his honesty, then Ahmed Riza should be a very pillar of the State.

Ahmed Ihsan Bey, formerly editor of the *Ittihad* and *Servet-i-Funoun*, native papers of much weight, was one of the four members of

* The word *Bey* is a title. Our "Mr." is rendered by the Turkish *Effendi*, which is also applied to the Princes, much as "Sir" is used in addressing our King. Turks of the lower class usually address foreigners as *Tchelebi*. The family name is not used in Turkey, which sometimes causes confusion. There are, for instance, two well-known Enver Beys, the other being in the Navy.

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the Committee domiciled in Constantinople prior to the Revolution. These patriots worked in secret and were not even known to each other. It was a very different thing, being a member of the Committee in the days when every knock at the door might be the dreaded summons to Yildiz, from the same distinction later on, when beardless youths from Salonika were freely enrolled and openly boasted of the honour. Ihsan is a clever Turk with a nervous manner, convinced at once of the necessity and difficulty of grafting Western ideals on the traditions of his native land. He speaks excellent French and a little English. In his young days—he is not yet forty-five—he supplemented his slender earnings as a Government clerk by translating the romances of Jules Verne into Turkish and publishing them in parts at his own expense. With the proceeds of this enterprise, he realised his ambition of establishing a printing press and newspaper, with himself for editor. So far, Ihsan has simply displayed that enviable faculty of knowing what he wanted and getting it, which Meredith likened to the force that carries rivers to the sea. But the stirring events of 1908 tried him sorely and left their mark on him. During that fateful summer, he and his son-in-law wrote the whole of the paper, day

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after day, and all the while he was momentarily expecting betrayal by the Palace spies. His office might at that time be regarded as the Sublime Porte of the revolutionaries. For six days and nights before the end came, he took no rest and little food. Then, when success was assured, he had a nervous breakdown, which rendered a long holiday in the south of France imperative. When the writer last sat with him, on the deck of his yacht, on a three days' cruise to his country cottage at Deirmenderé, in the Gulf of Ismidt, he was working less strenuously, and it seemed doubtful whether he would again be drawn into the vortex of politics. He was not in sympathy with the Committee of Union and Progress, but, with a shuffle of the cards, he might easily come to the front once more.

Tewfik Fikret Bey is a poet and dreamer, with a passion for the higher education of his countrymen, a passion which more reformers of Turkey might indulge with advantage in a country where the standard of education is lamentable. When the writer met him, he was principal of the *lycée* at the Galata Serai, but he resigned the post after the affair of April and retired to his pretty cottage at Bebek, overlooking the Bosphorus, there to mature his plans for an ambitious public school, which have since

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taken shape. He, like the majority of educated Turks in the political movement, converses in fluent French, and his countrymen have a high opinion of his poetry.

Ismail Kemal, who, at the time of Abd-ul-Hamid's downfall was one of the Albanian deputies in the Turkish Parliament, is a man of whom much will probably be heard in the near future, unless he should suddenly succumb to one of those accidents which, in the Near East, occasionally remove troublesome people. Suspected of complicity in the April revolt, he fled to Athens, but he was subsequently acquitted on all counts, an act of justice in which not a few critics of the Committee saw a confession of weakness. At any rate, he came back to the arena with the prestige of injured innocence. His is one of the shadows which coming events cast from time to time on the Turkey carpet, and his future activity is said by those who know him to depend on which party butters his bread thickest. It is never safe to predict which side an Albanian may espouse, and Ismail Kemal is as clever as any of his countrymen and may not be much more scrupulous.

Carasso Effendi is one of the zealous deputies for Salonika. He has his double in our own House of Commons, for he is a keen politician



TRIUMPHAL ARCH, SALONIKA

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whose motto is "Carasso and Turkey," and he has the knack of keeping in the public eye. Not a day of the earlier parliamentary sessions passed without his name being in the debates, nor can he be accused of leaving the dirty work to his colleagues, since it was he who moved the impeachment of Kiamil, and he it was also who, at his own request, formed one of the deputation that waited upon Abd-ul-Hamid at Yildiz to announce his deposition. It is always Carasso. It is always Salonika. There are many people in Turkey who are a little tired of both.

Yet there was one of whom Turkey grew even more weary. Nations are said to have the ruler they deserve, but the Turks at last threw false modesty to the winds and put a term to the long and inglorious reign of Abd-ul-Hamid, the reign of espionage and torture, of secret police and strangling, and of such Armenian massacres as made Turkey a byword throughout the world. Yet even he who ruled Turkey from 1876 to 1909 has his admirers, who have sought to prove that he was a patriot, a constitutional monarch by choice, and the assassin of unarmed Armenians not from inclination, but solely from force of circumstances over which he had no control. For somewhat obvious reasons, the majority of his later apologists were German,

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but they include also a Frenchman* and an Englishman,† which is more to be regretted.

It was left for those who saw the misguided victims of his bribery dangling from gallows in the streets of Constantinople, as we saw them more than once in April and May, to realise the way in which this man broke his most sacred pledges down to the last week of his reign. But for that last mad plot—by which, even if he did not instigate it at first hand, he hoped to regain his former power, while careful that others should pay the last penalty of failure—he might be Sultan of Turkey to-day, instead of being a prisoner in a city which, of all those in his brother's dominions, must, from its associations, be to him the most hateful.

So unkingly was the last act in the drama of his reign that those who cherish the divinity that hedges kings should find comfort in a wild story which, for all its improbability (improbability is never an obstacle to belief in that country), is accepted by many as the truth. It seems that the ex-Sultan had a foster-brother named Ismet Bey, so exactly like him in manners and appearance that the two were by many regarded as actual brothers and could be distinguished only

* Louis Rousseau : *L'Effort Ottoman*.

† Allen Upward : *The Eastern End of the Mediterranean*.

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with considerable difficulty. Ismet therefore had his uses. When the Padishah, obsessed by the phantom of assassination, dreaded the ordeal of having new clothes tried on by the tailor, it was Ismet who took his place. When the Padi-shah felt unequal to attending the Selamlık, again, Ismet drove in his stead, in a closed carriage, and received the homage of the crowd. In the spring of 1906, Ismet died suddenly, and a little mysteriously, and it has been rumoured ever since that it was in reality Abd-ul-Hamid who died, the camarilla, for very good reasons of its own, putting Ismet in his place with a view to keeping Mehmet from the succession.

It has generally been given to the ingenuity of historians to discover some redeeming feature in the most debased of tyrants. One loved his mother, another patronised the arts, a third displayed bravery in battle. Yet Abd-ul-Hamid will tax their utmost resources. He despised his mother and lost no opportunity of persecuting the race to which she was said to belong. As for his children, he shot a little girl in the palace (the evidence as to whether it was a child of his is unsatisfactory), only because he found her playing with his coffee cup and thought she was putting poison in it. His patronage of the arts was restricted to the engagement of stars from

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the houses of entertainment in Montmartre for his private theatre. As for bravery in battle, he did not once take the field, and rarely indeed showed himself outside of Yildiz. When he did, it was in a coat of mail and with his faithful Albanians about him.

That he was astute in foreign politics may to some extent be claimed for him, but the difficulties from which he extricated his country by cunning were only those into which he had first plunged it through weakness. The philosophy by which this monarch governed his realm was based upon a profound distrust of men and a conviction that every one, even Bismarck, must have his price. Doubtless the chosen councillors with whom he surrounded himself confirmed him in this unflattering estimate of his contemporaries.

Divide et impera was his motto in public as in private affairs, and by way of illustrating the devilish ingenuity with which he ruled others by sowing distrust, I may here tell a story which I had from one attached in those days to the Court and which has not been previously told in English. It was always his custom to confer military rank on the little sons of pachas and favourites on the occasion of their entering the Galata Serai as cadets. He would make one

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lad of fourteen a captain, another of thirteen a major, and so on, not, of course, with any reference to their own merits, but solely according to the favour in which he held the father of each. These ranks were afterwards retained on their entering the army. Among the newly joined cadets one term was the small son of one Yussuf Bey, brother of the then all-powerful Tahir Pacha. On this lad, despite his affection for the uncle, Abd-ul-Hamid conferred no rank. The father presented frequent petitions on the subject, for the boy, teased on his ill-luck by his comrades, took it to heart, but these were all disregarded. At last, choosing the occasion of a religious holiday, when his royal master was likely to be in good humour, Tahir personally asked the Sultan to give the boy his coveted rank.

“No,” was the reply, “I shall not do so.”

“But why?” asked the amazed favourite. “You confer these honours on all the rest and not on this lad, who is even as my own son.”

“Listen to me,” said the Sultan. “You tell me that the boy is teased by his schoolfellows. Good. That he already regards them as his enemies. Good. It was precisely to be teased and to make enemies that I sent him there. For, look you, the others are majors and captains,

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eh? Well, the day he leaves the school I make him a full colonel. *Now* do you understand?"

The secretary did understand, for the policy was as old as Hamid's reign.

As an instance of the ex-Sultan's cruelty, the writer had a curious story from an ex-agent of police, which, without vouching for its truth, he gives only for what it is worth, but much stranger stories of him are believed in that amazing country. It seems that a gang of workmen were summoned from a distant quarter of the city to dig a hiding-place in the grounds of Yildiz in which Abd-ul-Hamid desired to bury some treasure or ammunition unknown to others. The work was satisfactorily done under his own eyes, and he then had a good meal provided for the men. Then, in a freak of his fiendish humour, he ordered double pay and had the money handed to them on the spot. They never spent it. A few minutes later they were mustered in another part of the grounds and filed into an outhouse, the flooring of which suddenly gave way beneath them. Thus they died, and the secret went with them. Whether there is any truth in this gruesome story or not, the ex-Sultan certainly had a mania for hiding both valuables and ammunition in the precincts of the palace. Early in 1909 a number of rifles

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and a million rounds of ammunition were found in a cellar, and next morning's papers contained a significant paragraph to the effect that the Minister of War had ordered the immediate removal of this material to a spot where it would be "more useful to the military authorities than if buried away in the dark corners of the Palace." It is notorious that during the last weeks of his reign he was kept under very strict surveillance, so much so that, after one of the Selamluks, he is said to have asked for news of the outer world from one of the Ambassadors.

"These people," he complained querulously, "do not even let me know what is going on in Turkey!"

The true character of Abd-ul-Hamid needs no perspective. Historians already know it. It is classic even before his death. In his youth, he is said to have had some glimmerings of those liberal principles which endeared his father to the nation, but these soon disappeared when he came to power. A story is told of how he and his unhappy brother, Murad, were shivering one cold night in the royal apartments, in which Sultan Abd-ul-Aziz, their uncle, did not permit fires.

"If ever I come to the throne," said Hamid, with a fine contempt for such discipline, "I shall rule very differently!" This was the man who

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afterwards forbade the installation of dynamos, because, in his ignorance, he associated them with dynamite.

Political zoologists, who like to find parallels among the lower animals, have exhausted the carnivora in their caricatures of Abd-ul-Hamid, and he has been likened to Nero, Caligula and every crowned butcher in history. Among the names coined for him were "Great Assassin" and "*Sultan Rouge*." The title that he himself always preferred above all others was *El Ghazi*, the "Conqueror": he who never saw a battlefield and who, in little more than thirty years, ceded Thessaly, Batoum, Kars, Servia, Roumania, Montenegro, Egypt, Crete, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria! With a little longer licence, he might cheerfully have yielded the rest, keeping only a few private acres round the walls of his harem at Yildiz. Only two excuses can reasonably be alleged for his crimes. The first is that he was not in his right senses; the second that he was surrounded by the most iniquitous cabal of vampires known to history.

The one reproach brought against him for which he cannot be held responsible is that he may not have been his father's son. The story goes that Sultan Mejid was walking in the Palace grounds one day on the arm of Riza Pacha, his

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favourite *seraskier*, in the best of tempers, when a courier dashed up on horseback, dismounted, and, with a low obeisance, announced the birth of a son.

“And who,” asked the Sultan, “is the mother?”

The messenger named a beautiful inmate of the harem, a Georgian or Armenian (opinions are divided as to her nationality), who had been abducted as a child and forced to embrace Islam. The Sultan’s brow grew black as thunder and, having curtly dismissed the bearer of these tidings, without the present which he had good reason to expect, he turned to his favourite and said, “By Allah! It must be two years since I set eyes on that woman!”

Indeed, the pedigree of Abd-ul-Hamid is not the least interesting part of him, for he is also said to have European blood in his veins. His great-grandmother is supposed to have been a French-woman, seized by Algerine pirates on a voyage from Marseilles to Martinique. The girl, whose name was Du Buc de Riory, was sold in the Tripoli slave market to the agents of Abd-ul-Hamid I., to become in due course the mother of Mahmoud II., grandfather of Abd-ul-Hamid. Whatever these stories are worth, the Turks are fond of denying the purely Turkish origin of

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their late ruler, and this was the significance of the nickname "Bedros" (Armenian for Peter), which so enraged him that many a student went to die in exile for having thoughtlessly uttered it in the hearing of his spies.

This brief notice of the character and antecedents of Abd-ul-Hamid may conclude with a glimpse of him in the softer rôle of wooer of the fair. I am indebted for an amusing story in this connection to Ali Nouri Bey, who, if I mistake not, took it from a very entertaining brochure written by his wife, the Princess Hairî Ben Aïad, under the title of *Die Türkische Frau : Ihr Soziales Leben und der Harem*. It appears that the wandering fancy of the ex-Sultan had been captured by a fastidious young Circassian beauty in the Court circle, but she had succeeded in declining the honour of an alliance, giving as her pretext that she could not love a man who wore a beard. Turkish Sultans do not marry like their subjects. Technically, the women of the royal harem are slaves, though the sons they bear the Sultan are legitimate by Islamic law. The excuse served as well as any other, and, being compelled by usage to wear a beard, Hamid had to forgo the object of his desires. But his evil mind was soon at work on the best way of punishing her, and, having married the lady out of hand to one

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of his suite, he forthwith commanded Benedick to grow a beard. It was a stupid trick and met with its deserts, for when Beatrice next bowed to her liege lord, it was to thank him, with her sweetest smile, for having taught her the error of her ways, since she now found a beard a charming fashion !

The reign of Abd-ul-Hamid came to a timely end, none too soon for Europe and his own country. He stood for the worst type of Pacha, for the armed bully whose pleasure lay in terrorising an unarmed *rayah*.*

The question next arises : Is Turkey much changed without him ? Perhaps it is too soon to expect any great difference, and it must be remembered that Turkey is a land which changes only slowly. The Turks themselves have a good story that illustrates the point.

It takes the form of a conversation between Allah and the Archangel Gabriel, who were looking down on Europe. Allah declared that England, France and Germany were changed beyond recognition, but when he looked on Turkey he said :

“ Ah ! this, at any rate, is the same as when I

* *I.e.*, cattle, the word formerly applied to the unarmed Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

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created it. But who are the men in the red caps?"

"Softly, Sire," answers Gabriel, "if we speak so loud they will report our conversation to Hamid!" They were the Palace spies.



ARABS

CHAPTER II

THE SULTAN'S SUBJECTS

“ United, we stand ; divided, we fall ”

Countries with a Mixed Population : Decentralisation : Contrast between Turkey and the United States : A Lesson for Turkey : Ottoman Patriotism : One Language : The Greek Difficulty : Proportion of Turks : Physiognomy and Character of the Turk : His Critics and Admirers — Carlyle, Gladstone, Lamartine, Metternich, Gibbon : Arabs and Syrians : Their Fanaticism and Pretensions : Kurds and Armenians : Independence of the Bedawin : Kutzo : Vlachs : Armenians : Their Champions in Europe : Their Timidity in Cities : Adana : Unrest of the Greeks : Patriarch and Generalissimo : Jews in Turkey : Character of the Kurd : His Patriotism : Laze and Pomak : Druse and Maronite : Persians : Gipsies : Tripoli in Africa : Population of Macedonia : Albanians : Ghegs and Tosks : Albanians as Statesmen and Soldiers—Crispi, Ali Pacha, Alexander the Great, Diocletian, Scanderbeg, Mehemet Ali : Their Feuds : An Albanian Vizier : Ismail Kemal : Hassan Fehmi : Decentralisation : Turkish Difficulties in Macedonia : Germany and Britain in Turkey : Patriotic Deputies from the Yemen : Emigration of Armenians to America

THE Ottoman nation has been compared, for variety of ingredients, to an omelet. Yet, unless the political epicures are sadly at fault, it lacks the first essential of that dish, for, though stirred

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and beaten for centuries, the ingredients still refuse to mix. The latest recipe dispenses with the stirring and beating, and there is some prospect that Europe may find the result more digestible.

Passing reference was made in the previous chapter to the decentralisation programme of Prince Sabaheddin, and few, who dispassionately contemplate the centrifugal races and religions of the Balkans, will entertain the least doubt that some day, perhaps when the affairs of Empire are more settled, decentralisation will have to come. Indeed, it is expressly provided for in the Constitution, of which Article 108 is worded thus :

“The system of provincial administration shall be based on the principle of a far-reaching decentralisation . . .” &c.

Turkey is not, of course, the only country peopled by many races or torn by rival religions. The rulers of India have to keep the peace between nearly fifty different races, subdivided into approximately two thousand castes, speaking one hundred and fifty languages, and professing nine different creeds. The Far West also bears some resemblance to the Near East, but progress counts for more than tradition in the New

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World, whereas in the Old their values are reversed. Between the subjects of Mehmet V. and the citizens of the United States there is the same difference as between conscripts and volunteers. The Greeks, Armenians and Albanians are Turkish subjects because they have to be. American citizenship is a voluntary change of state conditional only on immigration. Thousands of Greeks and Russians leave the homes of their childhood without a pang of regret, and are fervent with loyalty for the new flag, under which they hope to better their condition, before they know a dozen words of their adopted language. America's race problem is concerned only with the negro, and when it comes to a decision between fusion with the black or his segregation from the white, these aliens make common cause against him, though he has been in the land for centuries. Where the new-comers have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by patriotism, a nation so recruited has no use for disloyalty. The Turks would do well to bear this in mind. If they can but make the vast but underpopulated territory of Anatolia (*i.e.* Asia Minor) so attractive as to induce Mohammedans to migrate from Macedonia, they will secure for the empire a new lease of industrial prosperity. Under the old *régime*, patriotism, as

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we understand it, was an impossibility in Turkey, for Abd-ul-Hamid governed his subjects only by making bad blood between them, and a united Turkey was the last thing desired by Yildiz. It is now hoped that the Constitution will inspire Ottoman patriotism in the Greeks, Albanians, Syrians, Kurds, Armenians and Jews, from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Under the banner of Liberty, elements hitherto less fusible than oil and water are to mingle for all time as they did in the wild rejoicings of the memorable summer of 1908. Hitherto the Ottoman nation has been no more than a mechanical mixture, but the political alchemists hope that, from the spark then kindled, it may become a chemical combination. Unfortunately, recent events in the provinces can hardly be said to warrant so sanguine a conclusion. The cities are solid for the Constitution, but in such a country the cities count for less than the villages, and it is alike to Macedonia and Anatolia that the Young Turks must look for most of the trouble.

The ideal of an Ottoman nation, with Turkish for its official language, is a tempting one. Unfortunately it takes for granted the allegiance of the Albanians in Macedonia and of the Arabs in Anatolia and Mesopotamia. The Turkish language is indispensable for Parliamentary

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debate and for official business generally. It is as much *de rigueur* as the *tarboosh* or *fez*. For everyday use, however, it is current only among the minority of the Sultan's subjects. Early in the present year, instruction in the Albanian language was for the first time permitted in the State schools of Albania. Then, in characteristic fashion, the Albanians fell out among themselves, the North against the South, over the rival claims of the Latin and Arabic alphabet. Here was a deadlock which resulted in the new privilege being in abeyance, a complication which will give some slight idea of the gigantic task which the Young Turks have assumed in their desire to please every one. Undoubtedly the most troublesome element in the nation is that of the Levantine Greeks. They resent the prospect of military service, the increase of taxation, and the better education of Turks, which will make the latter candidates for many of the professions hitherto open only to the more astute Hellenes. They even resent the settlement of old grievances under the Constitution, since these grievances alone kept alive the spirit of pan-Hellenism.

Anything in the nature of an accurate census must be dispensed with by the student of Turkish affairs. All that can with certainty be

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said is that the ruling race, the Turk pure and simple, is numerically insignificant when compared with the aggregate of the rest. Various estimates of their relative strength have been published. One of these, which has some appearance of documentary evidence, computes the Turks in Europe at not more than three per cent. of the total population, which indicates a total of less than three-quarters of a million. In Asiatic Turkey, on the other hand, more particularly in the vilayets of Broussa, Konia and Angora, the Turk is in the ascendant. If, indeed, we include all that call themselves Turks, ignoring the strain of Greek, Albanian, Slav, or Kurd, we shall have to admit a total of not less than six millions. In many of these, however, the true Turkish strain is very thin.* Curiously enough, the negroes of the Sudan, who hate the memory of Dervish rule, with its accompanying slave-hunting, use the word "Turk" to this day of the Egyptians, or, indeed, of any pale-face, a prejudice which it is extremely difficult to overcome.† It must at once strike the visitor that a large number of

* It should be remembered that the *mother's* blood does not count.

† See *Fighting the Slave-hunters in Central Africa*, by A. J. Swann.

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Turks, particularly in Constantinople, have curiously European features and complexion. They are not, of course, pure Osmanli Turks, and three possible sources of the western strain suggest themselves: the janissaries, the marches on Vienna, and the harems of pachas in Bosnia. In fact, the traveller will find no little difficulty in distinguishing the Turk from his neighbour. Only to the expert eye does even the dress suggest the difference, and language is not always a guide, since the Karaman Greeks speak only Turkish (which they write in the Greek character), and many of the Turks in the islands know no language but Greek.

The Osmanli Turk is an Asiatic. He won his footing in Europe by the sword, and kept it first by the sword and then by diplomacy and the jealousies of his neighbours, though of late years in ever-decreasing limits. He is a brave, if undisciplined, fighter, and an honest neighbour, though both lazy and a fatalist, the two besetting weaknesses that have been his ruin. If he has had the Government that he deserves, then his merits cannot hitherto have been very great. Yet the nation was sound at the core, even when the sickness in the ruling classes was most apparent. Unfortunately, more than thirty years of one-man rule not only sapped the

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strength of the empire, but also deprived rising statesmen of all chance of either gaining experience or displaying initiative. This is why the Turk in Europe has so long been regarded as a dwindling factor in international politics and scarcely considered a permanent resident in a continent not his own by birthright of race.

Even before the Sick Man threw off his lethargy, he had warm admirers in Europe. Righteously incensed by the outrageous massacres of Armenians and of other subject races, and blind to his better qualities, Carlyle pronounced him to be "unspeakable," and Mr. Gladstone said even harder things of him. On the other hand, we find Metternich calling the Turks a "good people," and Lamartine, though a warm advocate for the partition of Turkey, referring to them as "*les premiers et les plus dignes parmis les peuplades de leur vaste empire.*" Gibbon's praise was rather for the Arab, of whose courage, patience, sobriety and self-command he had the highest admiration.

The Arabs and Syrians of Asiatic Turkey, who probably number approximately fifteen millions, are absolutely distinct from the Osmanli Turk, dark of complexion and aquiline of feature. The Arab, fanatical and reactionary, wedded to tradition and suspicious of reform, considers him-

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self superior to the Turk, whom he regards as a bully and an upstart. He loves to recall a passage in the Koran in which the Archangel Gabriel vowed that, in all his wanderings east and west, he had found no worthier race. He loves to recall also the fatal fights of Homs, Konia and Nezib, where, ignoring the great part played by Mehemet Ali's Albanians, he points out that the Syrians routed superior numbers of Turks. He even declares that the Arabs would have repulsed the Russians at both Kars and Plevna, had not the Turks sold their honour. The intelligence of the Arab is undeniable, yet it is against his record that of late the Turk has shown himself in sympathy with western institutions, whereas the Arab prefers to remain in the condition of ignorance to which he has fallen from the proud position he occupied in the days of the Crusades and his kingdoms in Spain. There is a considerable population of Christian Syrians in the Lebanon and elsewhere in the Holy Land, but, compared with the Mohammedans, these count for little in politics. It is the fanatical Moslems of Asia who will, more than any nation in Macedonia, wreck the hopes of the Young Turks. The unfriendly bearing of the natives towards Europeans must have struck any one who has visited the smaller

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streets and bazaars of Damascus, though in the main thoroughfares, which dragomans stage-manage for tourists, these signs of the times are not in evidence. The recent massacres in Adana illustrate what may, let us hope, be the last outbreak of feeling against the Armenian, whom the fanatical Mussulmans hate more than they did before, since he is now protected not only by the foreign consuls, but also by the Turks themselves, who, in their honest endeavour to assure religious equality to all, have made themselves irretrievably unpopular with their co-religionists in Asia.

Surprise is sometimes expressed that the Mohammedans should have singled out the Armenians from all the native Christians as the special objects of their hatred. The reason is to be found in the Armenians themselves, as, in addition to being the least likely to defend themselves if attacked, they also excite the jealousy of the slower Turk by their cunning in commerce. Everywhere in the empire, from Constantinople to the frontiers of the Caucasus, they have ousted the Mohammedan from all the most profitable employment. Over and above this race-hatred, however, there can be no doubt that Abd-ul-Hamid detested them on his own account and never lost an opportunity of launch-

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ing his brutish Kurds at them. As the Armenians were not allowed to carry arms, they were slaughtered like sheep. According to one version, which was given in the preceding chapter, the ex-Sultan's mother was an Armenian. According to another, it was not his acknowledged mother, but his nurse, whom a scandal of that time credited with being actually his mother. Yet a third story has it that his hatred of the Armenians dates only from the independent action of their Patriarch in attending the Berlin Congress, an act which he regarded as a breach of his prerogative.

In Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia the Sultan has some three millions of homeless subjects, free-born, nomad, tent-dwelling Arabs, with but a nominal allegiance to any overlord other than their own Sheikhs. There is a strong nonconformist element among these wanderers, as some 20 per cent. of the Bedawin (including 350,000 belonging to the Muntefik clans) are Shiahs, observing the same ritual as the Persians. They keep camels, sheep, cows and horses, and a few of the tribes have even abandoned the wandering life and taken to agriculture, growing rice and cereals. These Bedawin have their true home east of the Jordan, but in time of drought many are to be encountered nearer to Jerusalem. They

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are occasionally restless, sometimes even threatening solitary travellers, but generally to be got rid of by firmness. When the drought is of long duration, they even turn their cattle loose in the fields, for, they say, the crops will not grow to be of use and the beasts may as well eat what there is. Although these homeless people would acutely feel the discomfort and restraint of a more settled existence, theirs is a life of hardship in a thankless land, and there is no difficulty in accounting for an old tradition of theirs that Allah forgot them at the Creation! There are nomads in European Turkey as well, the Kutzo-Vlachs, a race of uncertain origin, regarded by ethnologists as survivors of the people that inhabited Macedonia prior to the Bulgar invasion.

Something has been said incidentally of the Armenians. Those domiciled under Turkish rule may number perhaps two and a half millions. Lord Curzon once made an estimate of their shrewdness in trade which may flatter them, but they certainly excel in the commercial instinct, and this has not endeared them to the slower Turk. They are not, however, only traders, but are also farmers and fishermen, and their intelligence makes for success in both industries. Readers of the newspapers at home

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know and pity them only as the victims of revolting massacres, but others, who have had opportunities of seeing them in a different light, say that the pity very properly excited by their terrible sufferings has so far misled public opinion in Europe as to endow them with virtues that they do not possess. Yet were they even worse than their critics declare, no excuse is to be found for the brutal butchery that has decimated whole districts and annihilated villages. Physical cowardice is perhaps their strangest attribute, though even here it is necessary to distinguish between the effeminate Armenians of the cities and the hill Armenians, who, particularly in Russia, are exceedingly brave. It was as impossible to estimate their want of courage in the old days, when they had to go unarmed, as the bravery of the Kurds, who could use their revolvers on helpless victims. Yet even now that they can carry arms with the best, they show a curious reluctance to defend themselves, and the writer heard of one case in which, after fourteen of these unfortunate people had been shot down in a loft by a single Turkish soldier, who stood on a ladder and fired through an open window, it was found that their bodies were lying *across loaded rifles*! This sounds incredible, but it was given

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on the best authority. With the dawn of a new era of liberty, the Armenians, like other of the subject races, have not been slow to realise the value of reprisals, but the newly accorded privileges have unfortunately made them a little wild. It is said to be a fact that one of them, completely losing his head in the recent tragedy at Adana, fired point-blank at the gallant British vice-consul, Captain Doughty-Wylie, who was doing everything in his power to stop the butchery, and broke his arm. Without any wish to underrate the terrible sufferings of the Armenians in Turkey, I think it only fair to add that these people are not always the inoffensive victims. Further information on this subject may be gathered at Tiflis, where, on one occasion, they bribed the Russian Governor to withdraw his troops while they massacred unarmed Turks, driving nails into the heads of old women and stabbing babes at the breast. The corrupt Governor was replaced by a Mohammedan, who, by way of reprisal, embarked on his own account on a little "pacification" of the Armenian quarter.

The Greeks of the Turkish Empire form a large proportion of the population. They claim an immense number, which is, however, so far at variance with the official returns that it is per-

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haps best to give no figures. It is quite certain at any rate that the twenty-three deputies who represent them in the Turkish Parliament cannot be in proportion to their numbers. Of this they have complained bitterly, but their restlessness in politics left the Young Turks no alternative at so critical a time, and they therefore took the necessary measures to ensure an only moderate number of Greek successes at the polls. There are Greeks in every walk of life, some with palaces on the Bosphorus, and others with small shops in Stamboul ; all absorbed in trade. They also represent much of the culture in the resident population. Yet they claim just a little more than their due. They claim, for instance, the splendid quays of Smyrna as due to their initiative, but, quite apart from the very considerable English colony of that port, the quays of Salonika are little inferior, and the wealthy class here consists almost wholly not of Greeks, but of Jews. The wealth of Smyrna moreover rests on its geographical position, which enables it to tap half the produce of the enormous province of Anatolia. On the other hand, the islands, in which the Greeks predominate, have fallen into hopeless stagnation. The dream of the Hellenes to unite Macedonia with Greece will always command sympathy in some quarters, but that


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seems no ground for handing over to that kingdom the whole of Turkey, as advocated by a writer in an English newspaper.* The Turks hoped much of the Greeks when the Constitution was proclaimed. The Greeks hoped much of the Constitution. Both were disappointed, and it can hardly be said that the prolonged altercations between the Patriarch and Mahmoud Shevket, over the vexed question of instruction in the schools, during the whole of last summer (1909), foreshadowed the promise of Ottoman patriotism.

Of the total Jewish population in Turkey, which does not in all probability exceed one million, eighty thousand are domiciled in the city of Jerusalem, and a large number are natives of Salonika, which is represented by two Jews in Parliament. Turkish Jews are not, like some elsewhere, reputed for their wealth, possibly because they have to compete with Greeks and Armenians, their masters in commerce.

The Kurds are Mohammedans of Aryan origin, adroit horse-stealers, savage, brutal and cowardly in the cities, yet tractable and diligent in the agricultural districts. Many of the *hamals*, or porters, whose strength excites the admiration of tourists in all the cities, are, so far as Con-

* *Pall Mall Gazette*, May 14, 1909.



A LAZE

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stantinople at any rate is concerned, Kurdish, and it was said at the time of the April rising that they were on the point of looting the city and were restrained only by the mutineers, who maintained admirable discipline. They were always the willing tools of the ex-Sultan whenever he planned an Armenian massacre. Even in the affair of April, two of them, evidently with the connivance of the Palace party, endeavoured to make trouble at Derinjé, on the Gulf of Ismidt, but the local garrison was apprised in time, and the agitators disappeared without effecting their purpose.

Among other minor elements of this complex nation, passing mention must be made of the Lazes and Pomaks. The Lazes, who come from Lazistan, were originally famous as pirates in the Black Sea round Trebizond. Hundreds are settled at Constantinople as *caïquejis* and *mahonajis*, otherwise watermen. The Pomaks are Mohammedan Bulgars. They are found in the districts round Adrianople. They have as bad a name as the Kurds, but the writer was informed by a gentleman who employed many of them on a farm near that city that they are efficient labourers and very trustworthy at their work.

Besides Ottoman subjects proper in Asiatic

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Turkey, there are several enclaves. One is that of the Lebanon, with half a million Maronites, mountaineers professing Christianity, in endless conflict with the neighbouring Druses, who are unorthodox Mohammedans, without mosques. These Druses, a continual source of unrest under the new order, broke into serious revolt during August and September (1910), and it needed the prompt despatch of troops from Damascus, with a large expedition under Samy Pacha, to compel the submission of Atrash, their leader. Their chief, and not unreasonable, objection to lay down their arms was the risk of exposure to the attacks of hostile Bedawin, but the Turkish Commander met this with an undertaking to establish garrisons in the Hauran for the maintenance of law and order. The Maronites live under consular protection, and the Sublime Porte appoints a Christian Governor. Of the last five Governors of the Lebanon, one was an Italian, one a Pole, and three Christian Syrians. Persians are found scattered in the cities, and there is a considerable colony of them in Stamboul, round the Valideh Han. In the early part of the year, Persian horse-dealers visit Damascus in numbers. The Gipsies of Turkey are found mostly in its European territory. There is a small colony



DRUSES

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near the Adrianople Gate of Constantinople. Some of them appear to be of East Indian extraction, and as such they claim protection of the British Consulate.

Of all her once considerable African empire (excluding Egypt, still nominally a part of Ottoman territory), Turkey retains only the vilayet of Tripoli in Barbary (so called to distinguish it from Tripoli in Syria), with an Arab population estimated at one million. The Tripoli troops, easily distinguished by their green turbans, used to make a picturesque feature of the Friday Selamlık. A few weeks before the downfall of the ex-Sultan, they were suspected of disloyalty to the Constitution and were removed from Yildiz in the company of the equally disaffected Albanians.

Macedonia provides an even more confusing and heterogeneous population than even Asiatic Turkey. An approximate analysis gives 1,000,000 Greeks, 1,200,000 Bulgars, 1,500,000 Albanians, 280,000 Kutzo-Vlachs, and 250,000 Serbs.

The Albanians surpass all the rest in political interest. They are regarded as the oldest stock in the Balkans, possibly directly descended from the ancient Illyrians. In addition to those resident in European Turkey, 250,000 live in

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Greece and 150,000 in Sicily and Calabria. Of the Turkish Albanians, rather more than the half are Mohammedans, the rest being either Orthodox or Roman Catholics. Yet this is not division enough. It is necessary to recognise at least six categories, of which three, each subdivided into Christians and Mohammedans, are the Ghegs, of the north, with Austrian sympathies, the Tosks, of the south, who lean towards Italy, and the Albanians of the centre, who favour either north or south, according to which is stronger at the moment. The Mohammedan and Christian Albanians are plunged in everlasting feud, and Abd-ul-Hamid well knew the art of keeping them divided that he might rule them the better. Traditional hatred of Russia has on more than one occasion thrown these fearless and independent people into the arms of Turkey, but they are Turks only as a choice between two evils, and it is said that many of those who from time to time embraced Islam took this step only in order to better their position under a *régime* which did not favour Christianity. Like all mountaineers, they are born fighters, but they are at their best in guerilla warfare, which instinctively appeals to hillmen all the world over. The German instructors of the Turkish Army, whose opinion

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on the subject is entitled to respect, have long formed a high opinion of the Albanian as raw material, but it is almost certain that they could do little against an equal force of disciplined troops.

Their fighting qualities are not equalled by their intelligence, and they have continually been the victims of political intrigue among their neighbours. The only statesmen of note who traced their origin to this nation were Crispi, the Kiuprilis and Ali Pacha. On the other hand, it can boast such generals as Alexander the Great, Pyrrhus, Diocletian, Scanderbeg, and Mehemet Ali. Like the Kurds, to whom they bear some resemblance, they regard a vendetta as more sacred than a treaty. With unity of purpose, they would have had more than one opportunity of regaining their independence, but the undying feuds between Moslem and Christian, and even between Moslem and Moslem, destroy all sentiment of nationalism among them. These internal schisms make the Albanians, as a whole, incomprehensible to any one unacquainted with them. Thus, during the last days of the ex-Sultan's reign, Europe saw, on the one hand, a faithful Albanian bodyguard at Yildiz, vowing to die in defence of the Padishah, and, on the other, Albanians marching on the revolted capital

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with the Salonika army, swearing that they would put their own countrymen to the sword, surrender or no surrender, if they offered the least resistance to the champions of liberty. It was, in fact, the declaration of Albania for the popular cause that brought about the downfall of the Albanian Vizier, Ferid. Early in 1908, it was said, Ferid was prepared with an Albanian rising at Ipek, with a view to supporting Austria against France and England, which were at that time regarded as equally hostile to Vienna and the Porte. At the eleventh hour, this was, for political reasons, countermanded, and Ferid himself was dismissed. Another prominent Albanian, who was conspicuous all through the year 1909, was Ismail Kemal Bey, deputy for Berat. Implicated in the April affair, he fled to Athens, but was subsequently acquitted and recalled. Yet another Albanian, who was unconsciously the cause of the troubles at that time, was Hassan Fehmi, a journalist, whose murder was the first tragedy of the *coup d'état*. The recent dispute about the alphabet, to which allusion has been made, indicates that we are as far as ever from a *rapprochement* between Mohammedan and Christian Albanians, and it would indeed be a strange irony of fate if these conflicting elements, successfully kept apart by

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their late ruler, should fraternise under the flag of the Constitution and rally to a cry of "Albania for the Albanians!" a development hardly included even in Prince Sabaheddin's programme of home rule. The latest Albanian rising, early in the present year, was a half-hearted affair with which the Porte was able to deal with little loss of life, though at one time it seemed to assume serious proportions. Still later, the Khimariotes threatened revolt, but a prompt despatch of artillery drove them to the hills.

As the writer is concerned in this book mainly with the resources and difficulties of Turkey within her own borders, and apart from her relations with the Great Powers, little more need be said of the peoples of Macedonia, since the theme is rather Turkey in Asia. How long Turkey is to be allowed for her interesting experiment of reform from within remains to be seen, but there have lately been signs of impatience. Of those who are marking time and watching events, some are prompted by an honest desire to abstain from adding to her difficulties at a trying crisis; others are inactive because they are either unprepared, or have obtained their desires. Bulgaria has her independence. Russia is still convalescent after a recent indisposition. Austria is resting on her laurels after breaking treaties and

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annexing territory, subsequently paying an indemnity under pressure of a general boycott of her trade. She is as covetous as ever of Salonika, but for the moment further aggression would be distasteful to Europe. Italy likewise conserves a neutral attitude, though not without a benevolent interest in Southern Albania. Of the two other Powers concerned, one, which, in the zenith of the ex-Sultan's power, regarded an Absolute Turkey as a pocket borough, has lost something of its prestige under the Constitution. The other has regained some of her old influence, and should, with tact, retain the friendship of the Young Turks.

For the moment, then, Turkey is free to follow her experiment of making one nation out of many. She is more likely to deserve success than to command it. Trouble will come from Anatolia. Trouble will come from Syria, from Albania, from Crete. Everywhere within the Empire, trouble will come from the Greeks. It is not difficult to understand why these pan-Hellenes should be bitterly hostile to the nationalist programme so courageously outlined by the Young Turks. They hoped much from the new era of liberty, and the new era has brought them Dead Sea Fruit.

Yet, now and again, it looks as if this Consti-

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tution had about it some subtle magnetism capable of drawing together the most inharmonious elements from the remotest frontiers of the Empire. Nothing could have been more surprising than the declaration of the deputies from the Yemen, a province which had never before taken the slightest interest in Western affairs, that the cession of Crete would be an insult to the whole of Arabistan, and that the Arabs would shed the last drop of their blood rather than lose it. Unfortunately, there are other developments which must be set against this evidence of patriotism, and among them the fact of thousands of Armenians having emigrated to America during the summer of 1908, evidently in despair of seeing any amelioration of their hard lot under the new *régime*.

CHAPTER III


THE TURK AS RULER

“Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are
Cæsar’s”

The *Régime* of Abd-ul-Hamid : The New *Régime* :
A Military Nation : Character of the Turk : The
Ruling Race : Temptations of Power : Discipline
among the Troops : Career of Midhat Pacha—His
Mistakes and Good Work at Bagdad ; His Assassina-
tion : Reforming Sultans ; Selim III., Mahmud II.,
Abd-ul-Mejid ; Their Invariable Fate : Persecution
of Mohammedans : Religious Tolerance in Turkey :
Greek Aloofness : Neglect of Public Works :
Miserly Behaviour of Abd-ul-Hamid : Tithes and
Method of Levy : Militarism and the *Shéri’at* :
Janissary Rule : Respect for Koranic Law :
Statistics of Area and Population in the Ottoman
Empire : Proportion of Mohammedans : Other Re-
ligious Sects : Form of Government : Position of
the Sultan : His Titles : Order of Succession : The
Grand Vizier : The Sublime Porte : The Turkish
Cabinet : Functions of the Sheikh-ul-Islam : A
Native View

I. HOW HE RULES

THE fall of Abd-ul-Hamid marked a new era,
not only in the affairs of Turkey, but in the
history of Europe. For more than thirty years,
that remarkable man followed an iniquitous



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policy with undeserved success. Not merely did he play one Power off against the other, a plan previously adopted with success by more than one other Mohammedan ruler, but he continually incited Albanian against Serb and Kurd against Armenian.

We have already seen how even the ex-Sultan had his admirers, and to these may be added an Albanian noble, who endeavoured to prove that he was not the monster the world has been led to believe him, but a progressive monarch inspired with the good of his people, though badly advised by an unscrupulous camarilla.

At any rate, the old order, which was not finally overthrown until the summer of 1909, left the Young Turks a legacy of suspicion and hate that will tax all their resources. The country had been so long governed by *keyeff* and *baksheesh* that it seemed to many that such traditions could not lightly be renounced. The Turkish nation is essentially a military one. The Sultan is not crowned, but is invested with a sword, as emblem of militarism. Former Sultans girded on the sword of Osman for conquest, and drew it under the walls of Vienna. Future Sultans will gird it on for defence. There is, there can be, no question of further extending

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the Ottoman Empire. The problem is how to prevent more loss of territory.

Even his friends must admit that the Turk has hitherto shown himself a poor statesman. Gleams of statesmanship occasionally showed, but they only made the darkness seem blacker. So corrupt, indeed, was the ruling class, that the private Turk has suffered from confusion with the official. In private life, the better class of Turk is a gentleman. He has his faults—procrastination, indolence, fatalism, suspicion of his countrymen and contempt of his neighbours—but he himself is the victim of them. Turks of the lower class compare favourably with non-Mohammedan subjects of the Empire. They are cleaner in their person, more abstemious in their habits, more honest in their commerce, less addicted to gambling, more domestic, kinder to animals.

Under the old *régime*, the pacha of the worst type possessed all the faults of those of humble station, with others bred by the enjoyment of unlimited power. The Oriental temperament is such as usually to unfit it for the enjoyment of absolute authority over millions of natives of other races and religions. Power of life and death over subject races, with responsibility only to a headquarters remote from the scenes of his

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activity, involves temptations which have at times proved too strong for even British officials in India. Is it then to be wondered at that many Turks, when set in unquestioned authority over *pachaliks* and *vilayets*, should have yielded to the opportunities of amassing treasure and of gratifying other tastes at the expense of unarmed taxpayers dominated by a brutal soldiery and described in the official documents of those days as *rayah*, or cattle? Is it surprising that under conditions so favourable to abuse of power, the majority of Turkish officials gave but a poor account of themselves in the high places to which they were called?

It cannot, in view of the slow changes alone possible in that country, be fairly said that the new order has yet had time to prove its worth, but there are welcome signs that some of the worst practices of the old are discredited for good and all. A great improvement is noticeable in the soldiers, a matter of no little importance, since such a country is frequently under a military dictatorship. During that trying week of April, when Constantinople lay at the mercy of thousands of revolted troops, whose officers were either murdered or in hiding, the writer had many opportunities of observing the wonderful discipline maintained by the mutineers,

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who not only restrained the brutish Kurds from loot and massacre, but (what must have been far harder) restrained themselves as well. In Stamboul, even at the height of the excitement, with the rabble shouting itself hoarse for the *Shéri'at* (*i.e.* Koranic law), he found the rebel soldiers invariably courteous to foreigners and quick to thrust their more importunate countrymen on one side to make way for them. Those who never have a good word for the Turk were fond of saying at the time that their solicitude was merely dictated by fear lest harm should befall a European at their hands. This consideration might, no doubt, have applied to European residents of position, or even to such tourists as went abroad with the gold-laced *kawass* from the Consulate, but the writer went without such protection, and, being an obscure individual with only a handful of acquaintances in the city, might have gone under in the crowd without inquiry being made for days. Why, then, grudge these men the credit of honestly recognising that he had no part in the causes of their discontent and of determining therefore to protect him from insult? It is not to be denied that their hopeless revolt against the Committee of Union and Progress involved some hatred of foreigners generally. The *softas* assiduously spread the

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report that the new *régime* was pledged to the Giaours. Yet this inspired no desire for brutality against individuals, and there were cases in which frightened women were respectfully escorted out of the crowd and helped on their way.

It must not be supposed that there have not been model pachas in the history of Turkey. The administration of the famous Midhat Pacha, while Governor of Bagdad, might serve as a model for all time. It was not perhaps free from error. Midhat made one serious blunder when he hanged Sheikh Abd-ul-Kerim, head of the rebellious Chammar tribe, which had more than once attacked the city of Mossul. It seems that orders were sent from Constantinople to convey the imprisoned sheikh under guard to the capital. These instructions arrived too late, but Midhat should not on his own responsibility have decreed so degrading a penalty for a personage of such standing among the tribesmen, and his high-handed action bore bitter fruit for Turkey for years after he himself was no more. Another folly was his cession of a strip of territory to another sheikh in exchange for an old steamboat, which broke down after her second excursion on the river, a blunder which subsequently gave Persia a foothold on the banks of the Shat-el-

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Arab. This recalls the obsolete steam-launch which is still to be seen lying on the shores of Galilee at Samach. The Turkish Government purchased this relic in Germany for £800, with a view to establishing a regular service between Samach and Tiberias, but it, too, ceased running after the second trip.

On the whole, however, Midhat's administration in Bagdad was above all praise, even realising in some measure his favourite dream of restoring that wonderful city to its ancient splendour. He effected many improvements. He built the line of tramway still in use between the city and suburbs. He established a printing press and founded a newspaper. He reorganised the steam-boat service to Bussorah. He initiated other important schemes which he had no time to carry to fulfilment, among them the dredging of the Euphrates, the construction of railroads, and the establishment of a direct steamship line to London. Unfortunately these projects were still unmatured when a jealous master recalled him. Before leaving, he contrived to put the enlistment of troops on a better footing, to open civil and military schools, and to subdue the rebel tribesmen round Bussorah. Then fate overtook this patriot, who lived in an age when Turkish patriots were rarer than they are to-day. On

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perjured evidence, he was condemned to death for complicity in the death of the Sultan Abd-ul-Aziz, who was generally admitted to have committed suicide by opening a vein with a pair of scissors, which some one is said to have discovered lately in the palace on the Bosphorus where he died. Saved from public execution by the intervention of the Powers, Midhat was deported to Taïf, where he was ultimately strangled in his bed, it is said by order of Abd-ul-Hamid. They say that his head was then sent to the palace in a case marked "*Objets d'art. Ivoire japonais.*" Such was the reward of patriotism in the Turkey of another era. A rumour that his skull had been discovered in a box last summer, during an inventory of the ex-Sultan's effects, was proved to be false. There is a report that Abd-ul-Hamid had on one occasion prepared a similar ending for Kiamil, and that the veteran was saved only by an autograph letter from the late Queen Victoria, who is known to have held him in high esteem.

Of all the twenty-seven Sultans who have reigned over Turkey since Mohammed the Conqueror rode into San Sophia only three can emphatically claim to have been sincere reformers. The history of Turkey has been that of continuous struggle for power between strong Sultan

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and weak Vizier, or *vice versâ*, though now and again we find cases of the yet more disastrous accord between Palace and Porte for the more effectual robbery of the people. Moreover every student of Turkish history is familiar with another fact that is little to the credit of Europe. Although the other Sovereigns repeatedly remonstrated with the Grand Seigneur and bade him set his house in order, they invariably timed their attacks on his dominions at the moment when he was honestly endeavouring to carry out the suggested reforms. Thus Selim III. (1786-1807) strove to free every department from corruption, and Napoleon seized Egypt. Mahmoud II. (1808-39), well named "The Reformer," reigned as few Sultans have reigned before or since. He put an end to the odious tyranny of the janissaries, raised the social status of his Christian subjects, strengthened Turkish finance, promoted commerce and encouraged education. His reward was singular. He lost Greece; saw his fleet annihilated at Navarino. Russia took Georgia. France occupied Algeria. Mehemet Ali made himself master of Syria. His son, Abd-ul-Mejid (1839-61), father of Abd-ul-Hamid, accorded, in his famous *Hatt-i-Humayoun*, many new privileges to Christians throughout the empire. He was

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forced into the Crimean War, in condemning which Buckle regards the Turk as still more uncivilised than the Russian. Technically, with the help of his allies, he was victorious, but diplomacy won the day for the Cossack where arms had failed, and the victory bore no fruit.

After these came three more Sultans: the extravagant and ill-fated Abd-ul-Aziz, the unhappy Murad, and the last, Abd-ul-Hamid, who terrorised Christian and Mohammedan alike. That brings us to the present reign, which is too young to invite criticism, and which, moreover, was inaugurated under very different relations between the Sovereign and his people, with the result that neither rivalry nor agreement between Palace and Porte will ever again be possible.

Under the Constitution the Turk has entered on a new era of rule. With the equality prescribed by the new *régime* he is no longer interesting merely as the overlord of subject races, but rather as ruler of his own people. Formerly, though their sufferings were no concern of the consuls and missionaries, of the Balkan Committee, or of philanthropists who arrange the affairs of the universe in the columns of an august newspaper, it was often upon the Mohammedans themselves that persecution fell heaviest. They were robbed and tortured, but could look

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for no redress to either their co-religionists or the foreigner. So far as the Christians were concerned, the Turk, though he sometimes massacred them and always subjected them to petty persecution when he could do so with impunity, invariably left them free to exercise their own religion. True, he held out certain advantages to those who would embrace Islam, but they were free to decline the bargain and to derive consolation from their self-denial. Under the old *régime* this policy of tolerance was dictated not only by the express injunction of the Prophet—who decreed religious liberty for the “people of the Book” (Christians and Jews)—but also by the consideration that the *rayah* (non-Mohammedans) offered a convenient source of revenue in the shape of additional taxation. Such freedom, moreover, when allowed to Greek, Latin, Copt, Armenian and other sects, encouraged that convenient dissension which persecution might have induced them to forget. It is not, however, at any time true that the Mohammedan stalks abroad with sword and Koran, in the spirit of the Crusaders. After the fall of Constantinople, it was the Conqueror himself who crowned the Greek Patriarch and conducted him in ceremony to his palace, according those privileges on which the Greeks have insisted ever since. It



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can hardly be claimed that the Greeks have reciprocated. It is said that the children in their schools are taught as follows: "If the Patriarch asks what you are, reply, 'I am a Christian.' If the Consul asks, reply, 'I am a Hellene!'" How can Turkey hope to construct an Ottoman nation out of such material?

With the exception of the few reforming Sultans referred to, and of such rare conscientious Governors as Midhat Pacha, the ruling Turk has hitherto had no proper sense of his obligations. The obligation was all with the taxpayer, and no attempt was made to develop the country, to make new roads or repair old ones, in short, to encourage commerce and increase prosperity. Should the traveller strike a good road in the Empire, it is almost certainly a relic of Byzantine times. The quays of Smyrna are due to pressure brought on the public departments by the Greek and English merchants; those of Salonika are due to the initiative of resident Jews. Whenever the Turks constructed roads, it was not with a view to opening up new markets or tapping new agricultural districts, but solely that the pachas might penetrate more easily into the interior, extorting where they could, and otherwise ravaging and laying waste as some earnest of their

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powers. The people of the plains were always at the mercy of the Sultan's troops. With the hillmen he drove the best bargain he could, usually repudiating his side of it as soon as occasion offered. The administration of Abd-ul-Hamid was at least single-minded ; its one object was the making of revenue. He was millionaire and miser in one. There was a story—possibly it was a fabrication, but it is one of many with the same moral—that when he remarried one of his daughters after divorcing her first husband, a son of the “Lion of Plevna,” he vowed that he was too poor to find a suitable dowry for the princess and forthwith issued an imperial *irade* for the Anatolian Railway to levy a tax of one hundred paras (5*d.*) a week on the wages of every porter. Such was the generosity of a monarch who counted among his official titles that of “Generous Benefactor” ! (*Veli nimet bin minnet !*)

As regards the internal taxation of the Empire, the grievance has been not so much that it is excessive as that the manner of levying it favours untold abuse. All live stock is taxed. As a matter of fact, the Law of *Shéri'at* expressly forbids the taxing of cattle, but this was overruled by an *irade* of 1903, since which all animals over the age of two years have been taxed. Donkeys pay three piastres (the piastre is equiva-

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lent to twopence), pigs ten, sheep and goats four on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus and four and a half in European territory. For the more valuable Angora goat, there is a special tax of six piastres. Tithes, payable in instalments with confiscation in cases of default, are levied on olives, dates, vegetables, honey, silk, tobacco and other produce of the country. The old system of farming the tithes was iniquitous. To some extent it was done away with when the famous *Tanzimat*, or *Hatt-i-Sherif*, of Abd-ul-Mejid (1839) took the monopoly out of the hands of the pachas, though even since then the system, with all its attendant abuses and its heavy pressure on the small farmer, has been in vogue in the country districts.

Militarism, together with the *Shéri'at*, has always been the dominating factor in the government of Turkey, and from this national ideal the Young Turks, with all their theory and enlightenment, will not easily free the country. The proletariat hold nothing higher than a preaching *hoja*, with bayonets to support him. This worship of armed authority sometimes manifests itself in unexpected quarters, as will be appreciated from the following fragment of a conversation in a Stamboul coffee-house, between two irregular firemen, on the day of the Investiture of the

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present Sultan. "Now then," said one of these rogues to his fellow, "we shall have a Government at last. You always know, when you are up to any mischief, that there is a bayonet behind you. It is well!"

If these are the sentiments of the unruly element, what of those who have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by the maintenance of law and order? The drawn sword stands for security, and, as such, the Turks honour it. Throughout the history of the Empire, it is the army which has been the controlling factor. It can hardly be said, in view of the history of the past two years, that we have appreciably improved on the days when Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1716) wrote:

"The Grand Seigneur . . . trembles at a janizary's frown."

The janissaries were annihilated and exist only as a memory, but once again it was the army that decided the destinies of Turkey, and there was, it can hardly be denied, some foundation for the bitter protest made by Kiamil Pacha, when he resigned the seals of office for the last time, that the country had returned to janissary rule. On the other hand, it would be utterly untrue to suggest that the army betrayed the trust reposed

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in it. All through the troubles of 1908-9, it showed extraordinary and unexpected moderation. It held itself well in hand on occasions when more than one European army would have ravished and looted, and the marvellous mobilisation of the "Army of Salonika" was hardly more admirable than the severe discipline maintained within the city by revolted regiments under non-commissioned officers.

In view of such successes, a little occasional elation on the part of the "Army of the Constitution" is surely pardonable. It was complained at the time of Kiamil's downfall, not without reason, that the President of the Chamber, Ahmed Riza, would have shown better taste and firmer control had he ruled out of order one or two fanfaronades which military deputies permitted themselves, but the Turkish Parliament is young, and when it has outgrown its youth, it will receive such heroics more coldly.

As so many of the Turk's shortcomings as ruler arise out of his deeply implanted reverence for sundry anachronisms in the Koran, it has been thought desirable to devote a chapter to the relations between religion and politics, one of the greatest difficulties which will confront the new rulers. On the one side we have the Reaction-

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aries, gravely suspicious of every suggestion for reform until it has stood the test of the law of *Shéri'at* ; and on the other are the Radicals, who, imbued with the very latest ideas of popular government, would probably go too fast. Here, as in some other countries, the ideal lies between these extreme courses ; and it is only when he has found a way of wedding progress to tradition that the Young Turk will prove himself capable of ruling all that is left of his empire.

II. HIS TERRITORY AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT

It is necessary to give some idea of the extent of Turkish territory, of its population, and of the Constitution by which it is governed ; but any reader who shares the late Lord Goschen's passion for statistics must be warned at the outset that, particularly as regards population, exact figures cannot be obtained. Among other sources consulted in compiling the following Tables, mention must be made of the admirable summary given in the *Statesman's Year Book*.

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A. TURKEY IN EUROPE (Immediate Possessions)

	Area in sq. m.	Population.
Vilayet of Constantinople	1,505	1,203,000
„ Adrianople	14,822	1,028,200
„ Salonika	13,510	1,130,800
„ Monastir	11,000	848,900
„ Kossovo	12,700	1,038,100
„ Scutari	4,170	294,100
„ Yanina	6,910	527,100
Mutessarifrik of Chatalja	733	60,000
	<hr/> 65,350	<hr/> 6,130,200

B. TURKEY IN ASIA

Asia Minor	193,540	9,089,200
Syria (with the Lebanon)	114,530	3,675,200
Mesopotamia	143,250	1,398,200
Armenia and Kurdistan	71,990	2,470,900
Arabia	170,300	1,050,000
	<hr/> 693,610	<hr/> 17,683,500

C. TURKEY IN AFRICA

Vilayet of Tripoli	398,900	1,000,000
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GRAND TOTAL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Area: 1,157,860. Population: 24,813,700.

[In the foregoing no account has been taken of the partly tributary States like Egypt and Cyprus, occupied by Great Britain, or Crete, which is under a High Commissioner appointed by the Powers.]

The proportion of Mohammedans can be given only approximately. Generally speaking, they

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form about one-half of the population of Turkey in Europe, and of these the Turks proper do not far exceed 700,000. In Turkey in Asia, on the other hand, the Mohammedans form more than two-thirds of the total population, being in the minority only in the Lebanon, where they number only 30,400 against 319,300 Christians and 49,800 Jews.

Something has been said of religious tolerance in Turkey. The Government recognises nine sects: Latins, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Syrians (and United Chaldeans), Maronites, Protestants, Jews and Nestorians, or Assyrian Christians.

Of the great cities, one only, Constantinople (with its suburbs), has over a million inhabitants; Damascus has 250,000, Smyrna 201,000, and Aleppo 200,000.

It is not proposed to devote much space to the actual machinery of government in the Turkish Empire, for, with the changes coming over the country, more of the subject is daily acquiring only historic interest. With a brief interlude of popular government (1876-8), Turkey was always an absolute monarchy, although the law of *Shéri'at* expressly provides for a popular form of government. This was repeatedly brought to the notice of the ex-Sultan

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by Midhat, Damad, and other patriots, but only in 1908 did the nation, with the help of the army, succeed in securing a Constitution with something in the nature of a permanent guarantee.

The Sultan is both temporal and spiritual head of the nation, though not, as some writers think, the head of Islam, for he has no official status outside of his own dominions beyond being respected as Guardian of the Holy Places (*Khadim-ul-haremein*).^{*} He is both Commander of the Faithful and *Khalifa* (*i.e.* Lieutenant), not of God himself, but of Mohammed, his Envoy (*ressoul*). The title of *Sultan*, like those of *Khan* and *Emir*, is purely secular. He is also entitled to call himself the Shadow of God (*Zilloullah*) and the Conqueror (*Ghazi*), a distinction which, as has been said above, the ex-Sultan, who never once led his soldiers in battle, preferred to all the rest.

The order of succession to the Osmanli throne enacts that it shall pass to the eldest living male of the reigning house. This has been evolved after many other schemes. Thus, Ebu Bekr, successor of Mohammed, was elected, and he named his own successor. Later in the history of the Khalifate the throne passed from father to son,


^{*} This is more literally to be rendered "Servant of the Holy Places."

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usually to the eldest son, but in some cases to a younger, such as Orkhan, son of Osman, if he showed greater aptitude for war. It was, in fact, in the days of the fighting Sultans that the present order of succession was established, not merely to put an end to the practice of fratricide, too common in the royal family, but also to provide against the throne devolving on a minor who could not lead his army in the field.

The Grand Vizier (*Sadr-i-azzam*) is the First Minister of the Crown, and in former times enjoyed unlimited power, being, in fact, the Sultan's other self, the *Sirdar* of the battlefield, President of the Council, intermediary with the Embassies. Nowadays he is practically equivalent to our Prime Minister. His official residence is an ancient building in Stamboul known as the Sublime Porte, a name in common use among newspaper writers to symbolise the Turkish Government in the same way as they employ Downing Street, the Quai d'Orsay, and the Ballplatz. It is not an imposing building when we consider the part it has played in European history, and it looked more tumbledown than ever after a shell had shattered the masonry of one of its front windows in the disturbances of April.

The Turkish Cabinet (*Mejlis-i-vukiela*) over



THE SUBLIME PORTE

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which the Vizier presides, consists of the following :

Sheikh-ul-Islam

Minister of the Interior

President of the Council of State

Minister of War

„ Marine

„ Foreign Affairs

„ Finance

„ Justice

„ Public Instruction

„ Public Works

„ Mines and Forests

„ The *Vakuf*, or Mosque Properties

Under Secretary of State

Among those who have no seat in the Cabinet are the

Minister of Police

„ Posts and Telegraphs

„ The Civil List

„ The Hejaz Railway

As Viziers and their secretaries now speak excellent French, the dragomans at the Embassies are obsolete, their services being no longer needed as in the old days. Of all these dignitaries, incomparably the most important is the Sheikh-ul-Islam, a high ecclesiastical personage, whose position is constantly misrepresented. Formerly, and previous to the changes which

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tend to secularise authority, his position was a sacred one, but to-day he is practically a Minister of the Crown, responsible, like his colleagues, to Parliament and compelled to answer interpellations on matters connected with his department.

The errors made about the exact nature of his high office are many. He is neither Pope of all Islam nor is he the Turkish Archbishop of Canterbury. As has been said, he is regarded to-day more in the light of a political official, as may be gathered from a paragraph here transcribed from a native newspaper, the *Bejan u Hakk* :

“The Sheikh-ul-Islam is a member of the Cabinet and Executive. He can never be regarded as the spiritual head. Any particular respect with which he is treated is merely a part of the honour which we, in Islam, accord to religious orders generally, and no more. The Sheikh-ul-Islam is, in fact, nothing more than a Government official.”

It is very doubtful whether this is the view taken by the majority of the Turkish nation, but it illustrates, at all events, the change of feeling which has come over the more advanced thinkers. That he retains very considerable political influence in a land like Turkey, which

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still insists on submitting every proposed reform to the test of Koranic law, is unavoidable, since he is the highest authority in the land on all matters connected with the Law of *Shéri'at*. There is something anomalous in his position with regard to the Sultan, for, although it is the Sultan who appoints him, he alone has the power, if consulted by the representatives of the nation, to issue a *fetva*, as he did recently, for the Sultan's deposition.


CHAPTER IV

RELIGION AND THE STATE

“No Mohammedan nation has attained, or ever can attain, constitutional freedom while the same man is Pope and Cæsar, and while the same book is Bible and Statute Book ”

Present Position of Mohammedan States : Spread of Islam and its Loss of Power : Islam at The Hague Conference : Reason for its Decadence : Distribution of Mohammedans in the World : Freeman's Theory : The Koran Inapplicable to Modern Statesmanship : Need of Excluding the *Ulema* from Temporal Affairs : Parallel Cases in European History : Algiers a Lesson for the *Ulema* : Liberal Churchmen in Turkey : The Menace of Pan Islam : Reverence for the Law of *Shéri'at* : The West judges hastily of the East : Freeman's Unfairness : Position of the *Ulema* : Uselessness of the Koran as a Statute Book : Goethe an Admirer of the Koran : Deutsch on Arab Supremacy : Tyndall on the Arab Intellect : Need of Broader Education : Great Arabic Teachers of the Past : A Suggestion for Turkish Schools : Liberal Conduct of Haroun al Raschid : Need of Greater Tolerance : Obsolete Penalties of the Koran : Decline of Islam : Its Territorial Losses : Its Awakening : Speech of an Egyptian Official : “Bahrein” : Need of Keeping Church and State Apart : An Optimistic Forecast

THE late Professor Freeman was no friend to the Turk, nor was his account of the nation



THE SPLENDOR OF SAN SOPHIA

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always marked by the fairness and lack of bias which are to be expected of eminent historians. At the same time, it must be admitted that the above quotation contains much truth ; so much, indeed, that the Young Turks, who have already admitted it in principle, would do well to honour it in practice. Turkey is the last hope of autonomous Islam. Persia, only recovering from the throes of revolution, is wedged, like Afghanistan, between two Powers with their own interests to serve. Morocco, though declared independent at Algeciras, is torn by rival factions, the exchequer empty, the nation ignorant of such a word as patriotism. Turkey alone remains. If her Constitution falls, Islam must fall politically as well.

Already, it is fallen low enough. Numerically, it is not to be denied, Mohammedans are stronger than at any period in their history. Thanks to some unexplained glamour, which is lacking in some other creeds "harsh and bitter as their skies," Islam always makes fresh converts. It dominates races ranging from Java to Morocco. It flourishes amid the snows of Siberia and amid the mangroves of Ceylon. Politically, however, compared with what it was in the past, it has almost ceased to count. Of all the Moslem States in existence, two only, Turkey and Persia (together numbering a

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population of some 32,000,000), were represented at The Hague Conference of 1907. The delegates of the forty-two States represented at that Conference were the spokesmen of but 700,000,000 people, and the Mohammedan population of the world probably exceeds 250,000,000. Puny States like Costa Rica (with 350,000 inhabitants) and Montenegro (with 230,000) were summoned to the Conference, but no such invitation was extended to Morocco, with a population of 10,000,000, or to Afghanistan, with 5,000,000. Such is the present status of Islam. For eight centuries it stood for the learning, culture and science of the world, pushing the frontiers of its dominions to the shores of the Atlantic and to the banks of the Indus, and with its fleets scouring the Indian and China seas and holding the Mediterranean at its mercy. It carried civilisation to the wilds of Malaysia. It made its cities homes of learning, the goal of students from every land. Undaunted by the panic of invasion, the Moslems drove millions of Crusaders off their lands. Less than four centuries ago, in an age of great rulers, Suleyman the Magnificent of Turkey was worthy to rank with the greatest of the Tudors, with Charles V., with Francis I., and with the Great Mogul. Here is a fall indeed.

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To what are we to attribute the decay of Islam ? Assuredly not to any lack of fighting material, since leading military experts in both Europe and India have agreed that Mohammedans make superb soldiers. Not to lack of intelligence, for the Arab descendants of the men whose learning dazzled Europe before the dawn of the Renaissance only need the advantages of education. Not to lack of fertile territory, since Anatolia alone would, in the right hands, be one of the agricultural wonders of the world. Not to lack of numbers. As has been pointed out, the Mohammedan population of the world is enormous. It exceeds, in fact, one-sixth of the whole. Moslems are domiciled in three continents, in approximately the following proportions :

Ottoman Empire	{ Turkey in Europe 3,000,000 " " Asia 17,000,000 }	*20,000,000
Bosnia and Herzegovina		600,000
Other Independent Balkan States		100,000
Russia	{ in Europe 14,000,000 in Asia 10,000,000 }	24,000,000
India		60,000,000
China		40,000,000
Persia and Afghanistan		20,000,000
Java and other Dutch Islands		25,000,000
Philippines		500,000
Africa		(probably) 70,000,000
Total (about)		260,200,000

* The official Turkish estimate is 30,000,000, but the statistics are unreliable.

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Why, then, with soldiers, intelligence, numbers, and rich possessions, is Islam fallen from its high estate? The answer is to be found in the quotation from Freeman given at the head of this chapter. Until politics be divorced from religion, once and for all, there can be no hope for the Star and Crescent, or for any other State within the pale of Islam. The Young Turks have already complied with one of Freeman's two conditions. One man no longer rules the Empire, spiritually and temporally. The new Sultan is pledged to uphold the Constitution, and has neither the desire nor the occasion to break his pledges as his predecessor did. The affairs of the nation are entrusted to two hundred and sixty of its elect.

The second condition laid down by Freeman as the essential of success has yet to be fulfilled. Unless the Young Turks rebind that strange and wonderful book, the Koran, in two volumes, all their efforts to build up a constitutional Turkey will end in failure. The care of a nation's spiritual welfare is a task of sufficient magnitude for its holy men. The same has been said before now of the English lords spiritual. Thanks, however, to the condition of thought in modern England, as well as to their own comparatively small number, they have not the same

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power to do mischief, even had they the inclination, as the *Ulema* of Islam. Time was when they had the power and showed the inclination. For fifteen centuries, Europe too had its *Ulema*, who meddled in politics, and it was precisely during the Dark Ages, during the time when Roger Bacon languished in prison, and Giordano Bruno burned at the stake, that the Arabs surpassed their contemporaries in science and in culture. Who does not recall the heartfelt cry of Philip Augustus, when he writhed under the penalties of the Interdict : " Ah, happy Saladdin ! He has no Pope over him. I, too, will turn Mohammedan ! " Then, at length, Europe threw off the tyranny of the cowl, and in the four centuries which have since elapsed more progress has been made than during the twelve centuries preceding its emancipation. Nor let us lose sight of the fact that the two nations which were the first to throw off their allegiance stand to-day in the forefront of power and of progress.


This is the very serious lesson which the Young Turks must take to heart and which, by force or otherwise, they must bring home to the reactionary element in the *Ulema*, compelling their recognition of the certainty of European intervention, and with it the end to all ambitions

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of a Free Turkey, if there should be any recurrence of the horrors of Adana, or, in fact, any sign of return to the malpractices of the old *régime*.

If only on purely selfish grounds, the reactionary ecclesiastics should, without great difficulty, be made to see the best policy for them to pursue. They should be made to realise the ignominious position of their *confrères* in Algeria, where the French Government has taken over the *Habous* (*i.e.* the *Vakuf*, or Mosque property), administering it and paying the *Ulema* out of the proceeds. Even if patriotism be a somewhat rare virtue in ecclesiastical corporations, such an example should warn these foolish *hojas* to abstain in future from all interference in the work of Parliament. They would not lose respect by mending their ways. On the contrary, they would gain power more properly their own.

It must not be supposed from what has been said above that all the *Ulema* are fanatical and reactionary. As a case in point, the ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam, Djemaleddin Effendi, of whom something has already been said, was, during his tenure of office, a zealous reformer, upholding the Constitution and speaking frankly and fearlessly to the tyrant who did his utmost to strangle it. His successors have held the same



THE MOSQUE OF OMAR, JERUSALEM

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liberal views. Another of the *Ulema*, Ismail Mahir Effendi, urged, during one of the parliamentary debates, that four hundred youths be sent to foreign schools, half the number to Europe, and the rest to America and Japan, to acquire modern ideas.

While it is no part of the present short chapter to offer anything in the nature of defence of the practice or ethics of Islam, it would be evading a very interesting factor in modern politics to ignore the strong hold which this faith has taken on millions of Orientals. To admit this is not necessarily to lend ear to the panic-mongering menace of a Pan-Islamic rising, for any common bond, any union in a common cause among the scattered Mohammedan peoples, is inconceivable. It is as a proselytising religion rather than as a political danger that Islam is to be recognised. As the Bishop of Stepney said on one occasion, it may become "a very serious rival to the Christian faith." It is therefore important that those entrusted with the reform of Turkey from within should not give too free a rein to their own emancipated ideals and drive Islam to fight in its last ditch, for it would prove a terrible foe. While anxious to fall in line with more progressive nations, the Young Turks must carefully avoid outraging the established religion in its

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ancient strongholds. Progress should be their motto, but progress should be reconciled with tradition, not divorced from it. The dangerous reverence in which the millions of Asiatic Turkey still hold the obsolete law of *Shéri'at* must be gradually weakened by education of the rising generation. It cannot be removed by force, and it is impervious to ridicule. The fanaticism of the countryfolk on the Asiatic side is deep-rooted, though the foreigner does not always appreciate it, as it does not necessarily take the form of unfriendliness to himself. I lived for two months in a sparsely populated district of Asia Minor, without once meeting with incivility. These reactionary folk are not so hostile to the European as to the Europeanised Turk, who is their bane. Not long ago a broadsheet was circulated throughout Asia Minor complaining bitterly that the new *régime* had held the reins of government for many months without having carried out a single reform. The new officials, it is said, were worse than the old, and unless the law of *Shéri'at* were forthwith adopted, it threatened a rising of fifteen hundred Fedajis, who would murder every official in the *vilayet* of Aidin.

When the West judges too hastily of the East, it is a precocious child laughing at the

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old-fashioned ideas of its parents. When Freeman objected to the Asiatic Turks as interlopers in Europe, he carelessly forgot, or as deliberately ignored, the theory that the nations ruling in Europe to-day are for the most part descended from Asiatic Aryans. Indeed, Freeman is at least consistently unfair when he writes of the Turk. Thus, even he could not withhold praise from the way in which Mohammed treated his slaves. Yet he loved to harp on the evils of polygamy, though Mohammed merely tolerated a practice recognised before he was born, knowing himself powerless to suppress it, while travellers repeatedly assure us that it is confined to 5 per cent. of the Mohammedan populations of Turkey and India.


Now, the *Ulema* cannot be regarded as equivalent to our clergy, since there is no recognised priesthood in Islam. At the same time, the analogy is close enough for them to be acquainted with the fact that in England clergymen of the Established Church are not permitted to sit in the elected Chamber of the "Mother of Parliaments." They are even liable to a fine of £500 for every day on which they sit or vote in it. The *hojas* should find ample occupation in expounding a creed which, though it does not appeal to the western temperament, is always

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making converts in the East. Statecraft and the fomenting of reactionary plots are no part of their duty. When once they are made to realise their limitations—and the most strenuous means of persuasion would be justifiable—the Young Turks will have little difficulty in insisting on the inadequacy of the Koran as a modern Statute Book and the futility of attempting to govern a modern State by laws made for desert Arabs thirteen centuries ago. As well might they apply it to the equipment of their army, dispensing with the Mauser and the howitzer, because it makes mention only of the sword!

While admitting the patent unfitness of the Koran as a modern legal code, we need not on other grounds disparage a book which has profoundly impressed some of the world's greatest minds. Goethe, in translating the second *Sura*, which he calls the "Kernel of the doctrine of Islam," alludes to the Koran as "this sacred volume, which to us, as often as we approach it, is repellent anew, next attracts ever anew and fills us with admiration and finally forces us into veneration." The late Emanuel Deutsch, of the British Museum, wrote even more enthusiastically of its influence on history:

"By its aid the Arabs conquered a world greater than that of Alexander the Great, greater



A VERSE OF THE KORAN

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than that of Rome, and in as many tens of years as the latter had wanted hundreds to accomplish her conquests; by the aid of which they, alone of all the Semites, came to Europe as kings, whither the Phœnicians had come as tradesmen, and the Jews as fugitives or captives; came to Europe to hold up, together with these fugitives, the light of humanity, they alone, while darkness lay around, to raise up the wisdom and knowledge of Hellas from the dead, to teach philosophy, medicine, astronomy and the golden art of song to the West as well as to the East, to stand at the cradle of modern science, and to cause us later Epigoni to weep over the day when Granada fell."

To quote only one further tribute to the Koran and its followers, Professor Tyndall, referring to Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*, wrote :

"During the drought of the Middle Ages in Christendom, the Arab intellect was active. With the intrusion of the Moors into Spain, order, learning, and refinement took the place of their opposites. When smitten with disease, the Christian peasant resorted to a shrine, the Moorish one to an instructed physician."

Yet, for all that is admirable in it, the Koran fails as a twentieth-century legal code. The only remedy for this tyranny of Koranic teaching is education on European lines. Here is the

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keystone of the bridge between yesterday and to-morrow. The so-called "education" by religious instructors, ignorant men for the most part themselves, must be superseded by a wider curriculum. Yet, even here, there should be compromise between the old and the new, a constructive, rather than a destructive, programme. Though taught on modern lines, there is no reason why Mohammedan children should be made to forget the past glories of Islam. When, in the course of time, they seek the hospitality of European universities, let them be reminded of the days when Europeans were glad to enter themselves as students at the ancient foundations of Cordova, Seville, and Toledo. It was at Toledo that Gerard of Cremona, dissatisfied with the schools of Italy, studied, with the result that his translation of the *Kanun* of Avicenna became the standard medical text-book of the day. There seems to be some uncertainty as to whether Gerbert (afterwards Pope Sylvester II.), Adelard of Bath, or Roger Bacon actually studied at Cordova, but all three may have enjoyed that privilege, and it is from that university that Adelard, disguised as a Mohammedan student, is said to have obtained his copy of Euclid's *Elements*, his translation of which was the basis of every edition before 1533.

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Italy's eminence in many of the applied sciences can be traced to the successful introduction of the germs of Mohammedan science into that country by Pope Sylvester. As Dr. Draper says :

“In all this we see the beginning of the struggle between Mohammedan learning and morals and Italian ignorance and crimes.”

Roger Bacon did not meet with the same success. The authorities of Oxford rejected his proposal to found a chair of Oriental languages ; and the priests, alarmed by the spirit of inquiry awakened by his scientific researches, caused him to be imprisoned. Giordano Bruno, for his defence of the Copernican system of astronomy, was burned at the stake. This was in 1600. Centuries before then the Al Raschids, Almansors, and Almainuns were so eager to encourage learning that we read of caravans of camels laden with books entering the gates of Bagdad every day. When he had vanquished the army of the Greek Emperor Michael III., Almansor asked no spoils of victory beyond copies of the best Greek authors. Before the end of his reign, the Arab thus had excellent translations of the works of Hippocrates, Galen, Ptolemy, Euclid, and Aristotle. In astronomy and geography, the Arabs were supreme.

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Whereas, on the one hand, few of the Oxford students of Roger Bacon's time had progressed beyond the fifth proposition of the first book of Euclid, we know that in the ninth century Almansor ascertained the size of the earth from the measurement of a degree taken on the shore of the Red Sea, and that in the ninth and tenth Al Batani and Abu Wefa accurately determined the obliquity of the ecliptic. At a time when Rome was still asserting the flatness of the earth, the Spanish Moors were using globes in their common schools, and there is the interesting possibility that Moorish globes may have found their way into the University of Pavia, there to inspire Columbus with his dream of going westward to find the East . . . "*buscar el levante por el poniente!*" Certainly he could not have owed the inspiration to the flat charts that were his daily occupation. It was an Arab, Al-Khwarizmi, who brought our numerals from India and Bagdad to Europe, thereby superseding the barbarous and cumbersome Roman capitals.

It has, perhaps, already occurred to the reader that these traditions, though Mohammedan, are not Turkish. This is true; nevertheless the rising generation should be inspired by the triumphs of its co-religionists. It should be

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made to realise that the Koran does not condemn the pursuit of knowledge. It should be kept mindful of the glorious memories of the old Mohammedan universities of Cordova, Seville, Toledo, Saragossa, Granada, and Cairo, of the *Beit al Hikma*, "House of Knowledge," of Bagdad, and of the ancient foundations of Damascus, Meragha, Bussorah, and Gundeshapur. It would be no bad plan to erect in the new schools mural tablets in memory of the old scholars, among them the following :

ABU-L-FEDA (Prince Ismaïl Ibn Ali), born at Damascus, 1273. Historian, geographer, and liberal patron of literature. His *Annals* are a recognised source of the history of the Saracen Empire.

AL BAKRI (Abu' Ubaid), born at Cordova, 1040. Geographer and historian. Wrote a geographical dictionary, a geography, and a history of the tribes of North Africa.

AL BATANI (Mohammed Ibn Jabir), born in Mesopotamia, 880. Astronomer. Known in Europe as "Albategnius" and considered the most distinguished astronomer between Hipparchus and the Copernican era. The French Astronomer Royal, Lalande, who valued his astronomical tables highly, refers to him as "au premier rang parmi les astronomes."

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AL BIRONI (Abu Raihan), born in Khiva, 973. Astronomer, historian, and traveller. He studied medicine and mathematics, wrote a complete history of astronomy entitled *Kanun al Masudi*, and a history of India.

ALBUCASIS (Abu-l-Cassem Khalaf), born in Spain, end of tenth century. A great surgeon, who successfully performed the most daring operations. His works on surgery and surgical instruments were translated into Latin. There is a street in Cordova named after him.

AL HASSAN (Abu Ali), born at Bussorah, end of tenth century. He is known in Europe as "Alhazen," and was the greatest physicist of Islam. Among his discoveries were the reflection and refraction of light and the weight of the atmosphere. He was the first to offer an acceptable explanation of the phenomenon known as "twilight." He knew of the doctrine of gravitation and thus, in a measure, anticipated Galileo, Toricelli and Newton.

AL IDRISI (Abu Abdallah Sharif al Idrisi), born at Ceuta, 1099. Geographer and traveller. Is said to have studied at Cordova. His great geographical work is entitled *Nuzhat al Mushtak*, and was written for King Roger II. of Sicily, to whom he presented a terrestrial globe of silver.

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AL KHWARIZMI (Mohammed Ibn Musa Abu Djaffar), born in Khorassan, about 800. It was he who introduced to the western world the Hindu numerals, now known as Arabic numerals, which Europe slowly adopted three centuries later, supplanting the cumbrous Greek and Roman notation. His works on arithmetic and algebra were translated into Latin by the name of *Algorithm* (which should have been *Algorism*), and took the place of the earlier arithmetic of Boëthius. His name is the origin of the word "logarithm."

AL SADI (Abdurrahman Ibn Abdallah), born in Timbuctoo, 1596. Historian of the Soudan.

AVENZOAR (Abu Merwan Ibn Zohr), born near Seville, 1073. Physician, chemist, and botanist. Wrote a famous *Pharmacopœia*.

AVERROES (Abu-l-Walid Ibn Roshd), born at Cordova, 1126. Physician and philosopher, professor at the University of Cordova; said to have discovered the spots on the sun. His works, which were read at Oxford, include the *Kulliyat*, known in Europe as the *Colliget*.

AVICENNA (Abu Ali El Hosein Ibn Abdallah Ibn Sina), born in Bokhara, 980. Physician, mathematician and philosopher. His is considered the highest name in Arabian medicine. His *Kanun fi-l Tibb*, a medical treatise translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona, was used in the universities of Louvain and Montpellier as late as 1650. The effigy of an Arab in the arms of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain is intended to represent Avicenna, the opposite figure being Galen.

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DJAFFAR, a Mohammedan chemist. The first to describe nitric acid and *aqua regia*. The strongest acid known previously was concentrated vinegar.

IBN AL AWAM (Abu Zakariyya), born at Seville in the sixth century of the Hegira. Agriculturist. His *Kitab al Falaha* was recognised as a standard work on agriculture.

IBN BATUTA (Abu Abdallah Mohammed), born at Tangier, 1304. Geographer and traveller. Wrote an account of his travels during thirty years through Morocco, Timbuctoo, Persia, India, and China.

IBN JUNIS, born in the tenth century. A celebrated astronomer. Determined the obliquity of the ecliptic (about 970) to be $23^{\circ} 35'$, and observed the great inequalities of Jupiter and Saturn. Laplace, the great French astronomer, makes use of his observations.

IBN KHALDUN (Abu Zaid Abdurrahman), born in Tunis, 1332. One of the greatest of Arab historians. Wrote a history of the Arabs, Persians, and Berbers, and another of the Sicilian Arabs.

IBN KHALLIKAN (Shems eddin Abbas), born at Arbela, 1211. Biographer. Professor in the University of Cairo. Wrote a biographical dictionary of the celebrities of Islam.

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MASUDI (Abu Hassan Ali), born at Bagdad, end of ninth century. Historian, traveller, and geographer. Travelled from Spain to China. Author of a delightful work entitled *Murudj Ad' Dhahab* (i.e. Meadows of Gold). Sprenger, the orientalist, styles him "the Herodotus of Arabian history."

'UMAR AL KHAYYAM (Abu-l-Fateh), born in Khorassan, middle of the eleventh century. Astronomer, mathematician, and poet. His father was a tent-maker (Khayyám), hence his name. He helped to reform the calendar. The translation of part of his *Rubáiyát* by Edward FitzGerald is a classic in English homes.

These are but a few of the great names in Islam. Most students have been generous in their praise. It was left for Freeman to declare that "whatever the Saracens knew they learned from the abiding home of civilisation at New Rome." The intellect of Islam dazzled the world from Khorassan to Cairo, and we have ample evidence that many of these learned men travelled far and wide in pursuit of knowledge, in an age when travel was neither safe nor comfortable.

The quality which most unfits the Koran for modern purposes of statecraft is its indifference to mundane affairs. Such unworldliness, though ethically admirable, is fatal to the conduct of

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practical business, for it can only encourage calousness to the declining prestige of Turkey. If the Moors in Spain, who were orthodox Mohammedans, had left everything to Providence, would they have made such efficient irrigation works, or would they have developed the silver mines? A sharp, if unpleasant, antidote might be furnished by decorating the walls of their schoolrooms with maps showing the past and present area of Turkey in Europe. This suggestion is not offered with any view to inflaming the rising generation with futile dreams of reconquest, for Europe is in unanimous accord with the diplomatist who declared that land once wrested from Islam must never again be permitted to return under its rule. What is needed is to inspire in Turkish youths the ambition to guard what is left, less by the sword than by good government.

In their illiberality on all matters of public education, the majority of the *Ulema* are sadly retrograde. Not thus did the great Mohammedans of olden time exclude western ideals. Harun Al Raschid made a Nestorian Superintendent of his schools, and the Universities of Granada and Cordova frequently engaged Jews as teachers, for the Moslems of those days held that a man's learning was of greater importance

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to his generation than his religious opinions. Once tolerant themselves, the *Ulema* would have no difficulty in inspiring tolerance in others. They should teach the masses of Turkey and Arabia the folly of using so contemptuous a word as "dogs" of the western nations who have wrested their fairest possessions, progressing in proportion as Islam has decayed, and now immeasurably superior to the Mohammedan States in both arms and learning. That the contempt has been reciprocal, and that Europe has been curiously backward in acknowledging its indebtedness to early Mohammedan culture, does not excuse this disastrous point of view. Yet not all European writers have forgotten these obligations, and excellent results might follow from Arabic translations of at any rate four of them :

Draper : *A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe.*

Burke : *A History of Spain.*

Lane-Poole : *The Moors in Spain.*

Huart : *A History of Arabian Literature.*

First and last comes the conviction that the Koran is not a digest of practical politics and that the Law of *Shéri'at* is not applicable to the present day. Penalties such as stoning a culprit to death are no longer permitted in Europe.


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This ancient code permitted evasions which, even in the East, are no longer admitted in law. Thus, the drunkard goes free if he will but swear on the Koran that the alcohol was taken medicinally! It takes time to remove these anachronisms. Even in modern England, religion and law are not kept distinct. Only recently Mr. Justice Darling, giving judgment in a case in which a clergyman refused to solemnise marriage with a deceased wife's sister, solemnly pronounced that what, until a year or two before, was against the law of God was now (by Act of Parliament) no longer so!

Even if we only take Kingsley's view of it, as a collection of notes for sermons, the Koran is a wonderful book. It made scholars and emperors of savage Arabs who, until Mohammed went among them, practised infanticide and fed on lizards. Yet the moral and civil code, which did so much to uplift barbarians in the seventh century, is wholly inadequate for the needs of an empire in the twentieth.

Here, then, is the fatal mistake that lowered the flag of Islam over two million square miles. What a picture for the thoughtful Mohammedan to contemplate. Spain and Portugal, Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, the Sudan, Aden, Muscat, Sokoto, Zanzibar, Bornu, all these Sultanates

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A DAMASCUS DERVISHRY

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and dependencies in the condition described by auctioneers as either "Going!" or "Gone!" One Power holds Timbuctoo and seemed recently within measurable distance of acquiring Morocco. Another dominates the Persian Gulf and either rules or protects the Mohammedan millions of India. A third has laid hands on Khiva and Bokhara and threatens Persia. Greece, the Danubian Principalities, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria are lost for all time. Yet, in face of all this ruin, there are still those among the *Ulema* who shake empty heads and cry scorn on the "Christian dogs." But for the wicked folly of keeping an impressionable nation in such suicidal ignorance, there would be something pathetic in this attitude. It is time that more capable teachers demonstrate that the "dogs" have eaten so much of what once was theirs, merely because they were shrewd enough to keep their Bible and their Statute Book apart.

As a matter of fact, the true spirit of Islam is not hostile to progress. The Constitution is, indeed, in conformity with the Koranic law, and at a meeting held for this purpose in August 1908, the *Ulema* and *softas* assembled in the Bayazid Mosque and expressly laid it down that the Koran not merely countenances, but actually prescribes, constitutional government.

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We see on all sides a simultaneous awakening of Islam, in Egypt, in India, in Turkey, and with various degrees of violence. Even in Morocco, most backward of all Mohammedan States, there have been faint signs of the same movement. The worst expression of these forward ambitions, in Egypt and in India, takes the form of political assassinations. The best may be read in speeches like that made two years ago, in opening a new Government school, by the Mudir of the Fayoum Province, himself a graduate of Oxford. His countrymen, he said, still thought nothing of going straight from their ablutions and the mosque to steal their neighbours' cattle and he attributed this callousness to their lack of education.

Once freed from the trammels of Koranic teaching, Mohammedans often show themselves far more receptive of western modes of thought than Brahmans and many other Asiatics. Even their most sacred traditions are not kept from the searchlight of intelligent inquiry. As a case in point, the Koran alludes to a place called *Bahrein*, a word which suggests that it lay in sight of two seas. Uneducated Moors assume that the Prophet referred to Tangier, which answers the description, and that this was clearly a case of Divine inspiration, since obviously Mohammed

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could not have heard of Tangier. Yet enlightened Mohammedans in India find a simpler explanation and, putting all idea of inspiration on one side, see in *Bahrein* nothing more mysterious than the islands of that name in the Persian Gulf, which he might have known either personally or by report, and which equally answered to the description.


The separation of Church and State is the first need of the new Turkey. Each has its part to play, but the parts are not the same. The future of Turkey in particular, and of Islam in general, is full of uncertainty. Dr. Deutsch was, perhaps, over-sanguine of the destiny of Islam when he wrote that :

“ Mohammed’s whole system is one of faith built on hope and fear. Nor did the word Islam originally betoken that blind and absolute submission which it afterwards came to mean, but rather the being at peace and living in accordance with good words and commands, leading the life of a religious man, in the sense in which the derivations of the Semitic word Islam occur in early Aramaic. The Koran, for a time, seemed to stifle all literature : it was God’s own word, and it was enough. But Arabic literature, quickened by the contact with Greek science and the enormous mental activity of the Jews, began to develop anew in Spain and became encyclopædic. The one branch in which it now and again excelled was poetry, yet here the old

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forms, so well suited to the desert, could no longer be used in luxurious city life; it soon, however, adapted itself to all this, retaining a vague, indefinable yearning after the infinity that is strangely beautiful. Its influences upon European literature—Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio—are easily traced, and not unnaturally, since studious youths flocked from all parts of the world to the schools and academies of Spain. It is thus that the Arabs, together with the Jews, stand, as it were, at the cradle of modern science. Yet there is certainly now a pause, or rather a retrogression, in the mental life of that great people; its causes will, however, most surely be amended, and the Arab Semite will once more take his share in the ruling of the world's destinies."

It is more probable, perhaps also more desirable, that the Arab empire of the future should be strictly confined to those regions of western Asia in which the religion had its birth. Yet, even if erring on the side of enthusiasm, his forecast is at any rate more charitable than the narrow-minded view taken by Freeman, who regarded the Turk as unteachable and unfitted to enter the community of self-governing nations. Moreover, it does not, like Freeman's estimate, ignore the age of Arab culture when, but for its science and its literature, all Europe would have been swamped by a wave of Huns and Visigoths, the apostles of barbarism.



BELFRY OF THE CHURCH OF THE HOLY SEPULCHRE

CHAPTER V

THE REVOLUTION OF 1908-9

“Not for Purse’ sake, but for Conscience’ sake”

The Beginnings of the Young Turks : Anecdote of a British Consul-General : A Revolution for an Idea : No Analogy with that of Japan : Its Immediate Causes : The First Constitution : Tyranny of Abdul-Hamid and its Effect on the Turkish Nation : The Last Council at Yildiz : An Impressive Scene : The ex-Sultan and the Constitution : His Speech at a Banquet : The Force of Example : Part Played by Niazi and Enver : The Telegram to Yildiz : End of Tyranny : Fall of Ferid : Abdul-Hamid gives way : Rejoicings throughout the Empire : Excess of Liberty : Europe’s Reception of the News—Pronouncements by Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey : Attitude of the Balkan Committee : Action of England and Russia : Moment chosen by Austria for Aggression : Difficulties of the Committee : A Constitutional Dictatorship : Soldiers should keep out of Politics : The Turkish Parliament : Much Talk and Little Work : Troubles on all Sides : Murder of a Journalist : A Military Revolution : Agitation by *Hojas* and *Softas* : Islam *versus* the Constitution : Revolt of the First Army Corps : Massacres at Adana : Flight of Hilma Pacha and Ahmed Riza : Murder of Ministers : Escape of Moukhtar Pacha : A Naval Officer bayoneted at Yildiz : New Ministry Formed : Constantinople Surrounded by the “Army of Salonika” : Arrival of Enver Bey : Visit to Camp at San Stefano : Parliament at San Stefano : Alleged List of Ringleaders

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furnished by Abd-ul-Hamid—A Forgery : The Last Selamlık of Abd-ul-Hamid : Panic in the Streets : Bombardment of the Taxim Barracks : Street Fighting : Accidents to English Correspondents : End of the Revolt : Rumours of the Sultan's Movements : Inspection of the Defences : Making Good : Capture of Deserters : Martial Law : Deposition of Abd-ul-Hamid : Rejoicings in the City : His Removal to Salonika

THE origin of the Young Turks is somewhat obscure. They themselves are not communicative on the subject of their early struggles, preferring to speak of their recent triumphs. Their founder is said to have been Mustafa Fazıl, and they are traced back as far as the eighteen-sixties. Not until at least twenty years later, however, were they a recognised political party, with its headquarters in Paris, though, in a sense, all reformers, including the ill-fated Midhat himself, may be regarded as "Young Turks" in so far as they are opposed to the abuses of the old *régime*. A member of the Turkish diplomatic service once told the present writer that he was present at one of their meetings in Paris fourteen years ago. Prince Sabaheddin was among those present, but, with the exception of my diplomatic friend, not one was in favour of action of any sort. He himself had suggested that the time was come, not, perhaps, to attack the person of the Sultan, but

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at any rate to assassinate some of his camarilla, those creatures that helped to make his name infamous throughout the civilised world. Yet even his *âmes damnées* were deemed beyond reach of these dreamers, who loved to discourse of liberty, yet forbore from any measure likely to secure it. About the same time, one of the few military deputies in the Turkish Parliament had, in company with two friends, also enthusiastic Young Turks, a curious conversation with the then British Consul-General at Constantinople. They asked him whether Great Britain would lend active support to a movement to reform Turkey from within, and he replied (as how else could he?) that there was no precedent for such interference on the part of a friendly Power. What he did suggest was that they should see what could be done in the way of disseminating a revolutionary propaganda from Macedonia. Here, indeed, is a strange forecast of the events of two years ago, and the story is herewith offered to our German friends (and more particularly to the *Kölnische Zeitung*) who ascribe to the baneful influence of perfidious Albion not merely the Revolution (which General von der Goltz attributed to the historic meeting between the late King Edward and the Tsar at Reval) but also the downfall of Kiamil,

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who was supposed to have been encouraged in his defiance of the Committee of Union and Progress by a reference to his statesmanship in King Edward's telegram to the Sultan.

Whatever or wherever their beginnings, the Young Turks contrived to keep in the background of politics until their dramatic appearance in the summer of 1908, when, having plotted for years in the dark, they came out into the daylight and startled Europe with the most thorough, most sudden, most peaceful revolution ever written in history. Recent events have proved that not until nearly a year later, when the fountain of all the evil was dammed, did the Committee of Union and Progress put the cornerstone to the structure of liberty. It is therefore more correct to regard the happenings of July 1908 as the first of two phases.

The Turkish Revolution was for an idea. It was not, as has been stated, a sudden mutiny on the part of a disaffected army corps, nor was it merely the natural revolt of a nation from the tyranny of Abd-ul-Hamid, though these were no doubt contributory causes. If not quite free from all thought of personal gain, those who engineered it were for the most part disinterested patriots, and the presence in their midst of a few ambitious place-seekers should not depreciate

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the selfless attitude of the majority, which was in strange contrast to the greed of almost every leader of the French Revolution.

The Revolution in Turkey has been carelessly compared with that in Japan forty years earlier, when the feudal prerogatives of the Samurai came to an end, and the admiration which the Turks have for the Japanese, the result of their defeat of the hereditary enemy, Russia, lends colour to this view. Yet few movements could be more distinct. The Japanese Revolution involved great loss of life, without any difficulties of race or religion, such as those which beset the Young Turks, and its initiative came from the Samurai themselves, who displayed a self-denial that we seek in vain in the pachas. The *Times* correspondent at Constantinople has happily termed this an upper-middle-class revolution. The immediate causes of the movement in Turkey were many. As has been said, the discontent in the army, and in the nation generally, played no small part, and of both the Young Turks were quick to take advantage. Successive bad harvests had caused unrest in the *vilayets*. There had been race troubles in both Macedonia and the Yemen. It seemed, indeed, as if the stars in their courses fought for the pioneers of liberty. Their hand was forced at the last. Many of the more

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cautious, anticipating formidable armed resistance from Yildiz, would have preferred to wait a little longer before striking the blow. If, on the other hand, these could have foreseen the invertebrate collapse of the Palace faction, the Turkish Revolution would have been sprung on the world even sooner. The moment was, however, propitious. The suddenness of the revolution was an accident, yet suddenness was, as it turned out, the one essential of success.

This was not the first time Turkey had enjoyed a Constitution, for an earlier attempt of the kind owed its inception to the genius of Midhat thirty years earlier, at the time when the country had just been brought to the verge of bankruptcy by the disastrous war with Russia, and when, although Berlin gave back a little of what was lost at San Stefano, Turkey's finances were low and her prestige nil. Midhat, seizing the auspicious moment, forced the young Sultan to grant a Constitution, but it must have been premature. Had the nation been ripe for self-government, the new liberty could not so easily have been withdrawn. It needed perhaps thirty years of such tyranny as Europe had not seen since the Middle Ages before the Turks could, once and for all, insist on liberty of body and of mind. Had Abd-ul-Hamid only used

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his unlimited power more constitutionally, the revolution would have been postponed, at any rate until his death. Eastern races often do best under an autocratic ruler and respect nothing like brute force. But he pushed his power too far. Served by hordes of spies, surrounded by a camarilla of Izzets and Melhamés, ruling his subjects only by setting one race at the other's throat, he sealed his own doom. Matthew Arnold somewhere says that tyrants make men good. At any rate the last tyrant of Turkey made them strong. Never has the nation displayed such energy, such honesty of purpose, such vitality, amazing to those who had long sat around the sick man's bed. It is a new birth.

I. 1908

On a memorable day of July 1908, Abd-ul-Hamid II., Khan-i-sani efendimiz hazretleri, ghazi, &c. &c., sat at the council table at Yildiz surrounded by his chosen confederates. It was his last appearance as absolute ruler of Turkey, and it would be interesting to know whether he more closely realised the bitterness of his downfall or its justice. His feelings cannot in any case have been enviable. He had come to the end of his rope and he knew it ; to the end of more

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than thirty years of infamous tyranny, an era in which, to its shame, Turkey was ruled by spies and eunuchs. The rope had been so long that he may be forgiven if he fondly imagined that it would stretch a little farther. He was an old man, older than his years, and he fondly hoped that the Hamidian *régime* would end only with himself. Yet surely he must congratulate himself that Hamid did not end with the *régime* that made his name unspeakable, but that, even after intriguing against the Constitution that he had sworn to uphold, he escaped the headsman's block, which had claimed better kings before him, and was permitted to end his days in a safe, if dishonourable, retirement far from the scene of his crimes.

What an inspiration some great historic painter might have drawn from those last furtive council meetings at Yildiz, held at dead of night and with closed doors! There sat the old autocrat, cornered at last like a boar in his lair, and round him his fawning courtiers, only one of whom dared to breathe the forbidden word "Constitution," and he an aged astrologer whom, true to a lifelong hankering after the occult sciences, Abd-ul-Hamid held in reverence. Only a few hours earlier, news had reached the palace of the revolt at Monastir and Resna. Once the dread

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word had passed those privileged lips, the others admitted that it was the last hope of saving the Palace from the People. But he knew it already ; he, the cleverest statesman in all that assembly, knew he must either put himself at the head of the popular party, or be put beneath its feet. With curious success, he did both, for, though nominally the foremost champion of the new *régime*, he was henceforth, to the moment of his deposition, nothing else than a puppet in its hands, retained temporarily for the sake of his profound knowledge of foreign affairs and diplomatic chicanery. A small price was this insignificance for his bodily safety. He who, all his life, had killed and tortured, reckoned no price too high for the guarantee of his life. He was cruel from boyhood. His father is said to have expressed the conviction that if he should ever come to the throne, Turkey would suffer, "for," said Abd-ul-Mejid, "when the lad has nothing better to do, he goes into the stables and sticks pins in the horses." Of enemies he had as many as he deserved, and many of them regret that he got off so easily. The Young Turks knew better. Europe, never friendly to regicides, would have resented his execution or assassination.

Yet he displayed all his customary cunning in

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posing as the champion of the new *régime*. Already, in August (1908), when offering to contribute out of the Civil List to the cost of erecting new Houses of Parliament, he had said : “ The whole nation belongs to the Committee of Union and Progress, and I am its President.” A little later, in September, at a reception of the Diplomatic Corps after a Selamlık, he unhesitatingly referred to the Constitution as his own work. The master-stroke, however, of this *soi-disant* reformer was his speech to the deputies, at a banquet given in their honour at Yildiz on December 21. These were his words :

“ Gentlemen,—

“ May the All-powerful increase your happiness ! In all sincerity, it affords me the deepest satisfaction to sit at table with the representatives of the Ottoman nation, my patriotic subjects. I think that this evening is indeed the happiest augury ever recorded in the annals of my empire, and I congratulate you on having supported this result. This happy gathering is the first outcome and proof of the prosperity which our Constitution gives, and which, with the help of God, it will continue to give, to the Empire, the Nation, and the Fatherland. It is thus that we must celebrate the occasion.

“ Deputies,—

“ Know that the Guardian of the rights of the Sultanate, the Empire, and the Country, is God,

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and after Him, the Nation and the Parliament. (Loud applause.) There your duty is most important and most sacred, and I pray that your energies and objects shall realise this sacred character. As your Emperor and Khalif, I assure you and, with God's permission, declare that I have vowed my person to the support of the Constitution. As Guarantor and Guardian of your sacred rights, I shall show myself the enemy and opponent of every act directed against the Constitution. The Sultanate is Constitutional and liberal. May the All-powerful God help us in our efforts to assure the safety and prosperity of the Empire, the Nation, and the Holy Fatherland!"

The July Revolution, swift, peaceful, national rather than Mohammedan, from which both the pachas and the proletariat held aloof until success was assured, had long been hatching abroad. A French writer has suggested that it was Napoleon's soldiers who first sowed the seeds of revolt in the Near East, but the real inspiration of nationalism in the Balkans was the emancipation of Italy. Garibaldi has had many imitators between the Adriatic and the Euxine, and in fact, during the last crisis between Servia and Austria, the streets of Belgrade rang with cries of "Long live the Nation! Long live the Servian Piedmont!"

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The part played by Niazi and Enver in the revolution has been graphically told in Mr. E. F. Knight's *Awakening of Turkey*. Niazi, convinced of the hopelessness of the old *régime*, and incensed at the inevitable foreign interference in his country's affairs which resulted from its rottenness, had joined the Young Turks. Matters reached a critical condition when, in July, palace spies flooded Salonika and Monastir, and when a number of officers, including Major Enver, were denounced, it was felt that the moment for action had arrived. Niazi fled to the hills and raised the standard of revolt. Abd-ul-Hamid, whom the gods had determined to destroy, had, in his madness, alienated the army, hitherto the mainstay of his tyranny. A telegram was sent by the revolutionaries to Yildiz, demanding a Constitution. The Sultan must have realised that this was the end, yet he replied with another telegram that lacked originality. In it he invited Enver and the other officers implicated—Niazi was not of the number—to Yildiz, with the promise of pardon and promotion. The hospitality of Yildiz has not, in similar circumstances, always been above suspicion, and the royal command was on this occasion declined. Had it been accepted, Enver's body might by this time have been carried by

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the swift currents of the Bosphorus out of human ken.

Events now moved so swiftly that the Chancelleries of Europe, and even prominent members of the Young Turk party, were wholly unprepared for the finale.

This came when the General of Division at Uskub joined the Resna revolutionaries. Yildiz sent six detachments to annihilate the mutineers, but Yildiz moved too late. The Uskub garrison had mutinied to a man. The men of Resna occupied Monastir, and Osman Pacha was put under arrest.

At the palace itself all was confusion. The wires burnt with messages, each of them a fresh nail in the coffin of tyranny. Ferid, the Grand Vizier, said to be in the pay of Germany, and by birth an Albanian, was dismissed from office at the first news that his countrymen had declared for the Constitution. The support of the Fried-richstrasse availed him nothing. "Little" Said, a man of no pronounced European leanings, became Vizier in his stead. Kiamil, the friend of England, also joined the Council of Ministers.

The Sultan held out until the last moment. Those around him urged that the Constitution alone could save them all from destruction. He knew it himself. Yet not until the artillerymen

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of Chatalja were training their guns on the palace windows did Abd-ul-Hamid give way. He seemed to have no inkling of deposition. True, his nephew, Sabaheddin, had made no secret of his own wish to see another on the throne, but Abd-ul-Hamid thought that he knew his subjects better, and he felt that the throne was his until he drew his last breath. So, perhaps, it might have been but for the counter-revolution of the following spring, in which, if not he himself, at any rate, his favourite son, Prince Burhaneddin, was deeply implicated. He was too shrewd to attempt any repetition of his fraud of thirty years earlier, for not only had his spies and eunuchs kept him well informed of the unanimity of feeling in the capital, but he had the woeful plight of a neighbouring Mohammedan ruler to warn him of the folly of such a breach of faith.

Thus the Constitution was proclaimed amid frantic rejoicings throughout the empire from Bagdad unto Barbary, from the sands of the Sahara to the foothills of the Carpathians. Mufti and Metropolitan, missionary and *Ulema*, embraced in the streets, and everywhere the jubilant mob maintained the same law and order. Prisoners poured forth from the gaols, including, unfortunately, thousands who should have been

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kept inside. Yet it was no time for discrimination. In moments of wild rejoicing we are apt to see consequences through the wrong end of the telescope. The press, freed from a long intolerable censorship, plunged into the opposite extreme of licence. Firearms were sold by the million. Letters came through the post unopened. Spies were no longer seen in every restaurant. Men's lives were their own. There was freedom of speech, of thought, of action; a little too much freedom, if the truth must out. Strikes were chronic in those days: the railway employés, the employés of the Tobacco Régie, the stevedores and the porters, all went on strike for higher wages.

Europe took this extraordinary revolution in an attitude of benevolent expectation. If some other nations, notably the English, did not at the first hail the Turkish renascence with glib enthusiasm some excuse must be pleaded in the suddenness of the change which was accomplished sooner than realised. When at length the welcome truth of a new era in Turkey was forced upon them, leading statesmen and others in England were not slow to rival one another in panegyric.

"We have," said Mr. Asquith, "been witnesses in Turkey of one of the most amazing

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revolutions in the annals of history. . . . We recognise to the full the magnitude of the difficulties which had to be faced—the tact, judgment, prudence and consideration with which they were successfully encountered and overcome; the happy absence of the violence and vindictiveness with which changes so far-reaching and so fundamental have as a rule been accompanied; the sagacity, patience, and tolerance which have so far distinguished the new *régime*.”

Sir Edward Grey was, if anything, even more enthusiastic when he said :

“Hatred, strife and oppression have been swept away, and they have been replaced by fair play, peace and goodwill—goodwill which is the surest guarantee of peace; more sure than any treaty or constitution or anything else. Not in history, I think, has there been a change more sudden and so beneficent. It would have been incredible if it had not occurred, and a profound impression has been produced upon all who have been in contact with it by the upright character, the purity of motives of the men who have brought this change about. This has been patriotism in the best sense of the word—a patriotism which was peaceful and unaggressive, desiring nothing but the good of their own country without designs upon any other.”

These are significant words from two English Ministers, both of them political pupils and

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legatees of him who declaimed against the "Great Assassin." Mr. Noel Buxton, Chairman of the Balkan Committee, and at one time an enthusiastic hater of Turkey, has more recently been the honoured guest of the Young Turks, and has spoken warmly of their programme. Few men abroad saw the possibility of reform from within, and as recently as 1905 Mr. Bryce favoured Carlyle's project of driving the Turk back into Asia. But now all was changed. The joint project agreed upon by Russia and England for the further pacification of Macedonia was spontaneously withdrawn. Turkey was to be given a free hand.

If, on the whole, Europe received the promises of the Young Turks graciously, it is a matter for regret that, true to tradition, Austria should, with what the *Temps* called "jesuitical casuistry and political cynicism," have chosen the moment of their difficulties for seizing Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Bulgaria also took the opportunity of declaring its independence. But for Germany, Russia might have opposed Austria's flagrant breach of treaty rights, but Berlin held the strong hand and forbade Petersburg to move.

Yet, while frankly recognising the courage of the Young Turks, Europe, with longer and sadder experience of the cost of such changes,

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saw some difficulties which they are only just beginning to realise. The mere sweeping away of old abuses involved the bitter enmity of those who had profited by them, not only the arch enemy, but all his creatures thrown out of work by the new order. The Committee of Union and Progress, though powerful enough in 1908, and even more secure at the present moment, must always reckon with the hostility, open or otherwise, of the Liberal Union, or *Ahrar*, a well-organised body which includes among its members men like Prince Sabaheddin, Said Pacha (a son of Kiamil), and Ismaïl Kemal, an Albanian, deputy for Berat, who has already been mentioned. These men, some of whom are more disinterested than others, regard the tyranny of the Committee as no improvement on that of Yildiz. They view with alarm the tendency to a military dictatorship and to government by pronunciamiento. Kiamil, at the time of his downfall, bitterly declared that the country was returning to the rule of janisseries, and his words contained a melancholy half-truth. History furnishes no parallel for a constitutional dictatorship under military law, though as a temporary expedient a state of siege, as proclaimed in Constantinople after the *coup d'état*, may be welcome. Once, however, law

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and order are restored, the assembly elected by the nation should neither require nor brook constant reminders of the armed force behind it. During the February crisis a military deputy informed the House that the bayonets of the army and the guns of the navy would know how to safeguard the Constitution. Such fan-faronades, instead of being received with acclamation, should be ruled out of order by the President. They appeal to very youthful Parliaments, but are not permitted in national assemblies of maturer age. The army is a good servant but a bad master, and politics should be kept distinct from militarism, particularly in so electric an atmosphere. Great soldiers have not as a rule distinguished themselves in the Senate, and both Wellington and Macmahon, to take only two familiar examples, illustrated the truth that, in the councils of peace, arms should yield to the toga.

The Committee of Union and Progress, being now master of the situation, and no longer in exile and hiding, closed the Paris offices and removed the *Mechveret*, its bi-monthly newspaper, to Constantinople. The Sultan gave it an official headquarters at Salonika. Henceforth it could work out the salvation of Turkey on Turkish soil.

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II. 1909

For the first eight months of its existence, the Turkish Parliament talked. It did little else. Indeed, it looked as if this bantling among Parliaments was already modelling itself on the Mother of them. Unfortunately, the Turkish nation was more impatient for deeds than some others longer accustomed to parliamentary institutions. This discontent was encouraged in some sections of the newly emancipated press. It was fed by malcontents among the Palace party and by the many enemies of the Committee. To all of these it was obvious that the new leaders of Turkey had more zeal than experience. This could not be denied even by their friends. Their programme was even a little more ambitious than their resources warranted. They took the paid advice of experts from Europe and did not act upon it. They were impatient of criticism and even more impatient of control. The Treasury, though not actually empty, was low, and the economies thereby entailed on the Young Turks necessarily made them unpopular with those who had battered on the extravagance of their predecessors. The case of Macedonia stood, thanks to the forbearance of Europe, adjourned, but it awaited settlement.

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Syria was not friendly to the new order. The Revolution had been matured in Europe. Asia had no part in it. Discontent simmered in the provinces, from Albania to Arabia. The Liberal Union, or *Ahrar*, found a powerful ally in the League of Mohammed, or *Jemiyet-i-Mahomedieh*, otherwise those of the *Ulema*, whose former prestige was menaced by a more enlightened régime. They represented the Government as unduly influenced by the Giaours and authorised the ignorant soldiers and fanatical mob to rally round the Khalifah, who stood for the old order of things. It was subsequently admitted at his trial that Daghestanli Mourad, editor of the suppressed *Nizam*, had disguised himself as a *softa*, or religious student, and had inflamed the troops against the Committee of Union and Progress. A score of cold-blooded murders, some of them apparently committed on the wrong victims, were the immediate result of this sedition. Its indirect outcome was the deposition of Abd-ul-Hamid and the firmer establishment of the Committee in a position virtually unassailable. These were the circumstances known as the *coup d'état*, or counter-revolution, of April 1909. The inner history of the affair is still somewhat of a mystery, but it looks as if it was a

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case of Islam and reaction fighting in their last ditch.

The ostensible cause of the outbreak was the murder, on the Galata Bridge, of Hassan Fehmi, editor of the *Serbesti*. That journal had been among the bitterest of the anti-Committee organs and had never missed an opportunity of attacking that body. It has never been proved that the deed was actually instigated by the Committee, but in any case the murdered journalist was far more dangerous dead than alive. Abd-ul-Hamid ingeniously provided the honours of burial, and the enemies of the Committee did not hesitate to lay the blame at its door.

In spite of the praiseworthy efforts that have been made to prove it otherwise, the Turkish Revolution was essentially a military movement. This does not imply that its details were not hatched by civilians, in Paris or elsewhere, but they would have been powerless to give effect to their dreams of liberty without the aid of the army. Parliamentary institutions, as we understand them in England, if not actually distasteful to the majority of the Turkish nation, are at any rate unintelligible to them. The rabble of Galata shouts "Liberty!" when it merely means Licence. Its stomach determines its political

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attitude, and the slightest rise in the price of bread would create a revulsion of feeling against the Constitution, which would be held responsible for this and every other evil. The crowd of Constantinople is a cowardly one. During the street fighting on April 24, shortly after poor Bonham, Graves (of the *Times*) and some others had gone by, carrying Booth to the French Hospital, the present writer saw an immense crowd held in check by a single cavalry officer, who, with drawn sabre, drove them back like sheep. In one of our Lancashire towns, they would have walked over his body to get a better view of the beleaguered barracks. If, in its respect for force only, the mob of Constantinople is a fair epitome of the whole nation—this, by the way, would probably not apply to the fiercer populations in Asia—then it is at least evident that none but a military revolution has any chance of popularity in that land. Hence the wonderful success of 1908-9 was not the work of subtle statesmen, of fiery orators, of cunning lawyers, of cloaked conspirators, but of simple, honest, unsophisticated soldiers like Enver and Niazi, the right men in the right place, where only the sword can hold that which the sword has won.

Taking this view of the movement as a whole,

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it is easy to realise that the violent affair of April was the logical sequel of the peaceful affair of the previous July. Europe was premature in its praise of a bloodless revolution. Turkey had not yet reached the millennium. Blood, spared one year, had to be spilt the next. The *hojas* and *softas* had done their nefarious work only too well. They had worked on the susceptibilities of one of the most ignorant nations in Europe and had persuaded it that Islam was in danger. A leaflet, generously distributed broadcast in the bazaars, set forth how an officer from one of the military schools had told his men that, to maintain discipline, he might even order them to fire on the *hojas*. Such a contingency was at the time conceivable, but much would depend on how the order was given and how read. Like the flames amid the wooden buildings, the reaction against reform, against "Christian" ideas, against the Young Turks in general and the Committee in particular, spread among the ignorant thousands of the city. The First Army Corps was tainted. There was a loud outcry for the Law of *Shéri'at*. Fanatical Moslems preached the overthrow of the new order. Soon after midnight, on April 12, several battalions of Chasseurs, the very men whom the Young Turks had thought

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loyal to the Constitution, occupied the square before the old Parliament House. One Colonel, who remonstrated with his men, was shot on the spot. Another officer was pulled off a tramcar and deprived of his sword. The mob applauded, and the mutineers grew more daring. The bazaars of Stamboul were closed ; the shops of Pera followed suit. Panic reigned throughout the capital. In Asia Minor, the consequences of reactionary preaching were much worse, for in the Adana massacres thousands of Armenians lost their lives, and the flame of hatred was only extinguished just in time to prevent a general conflagration.

In face of these disturbances, the Cabinet met at the Sublime Porte and resigned. Hilmi Pacha and Ahmed Riza left the capital. The Minister of War, threatened by the revolted troops, made good his escape. The Ministers of Marine and Justice (the latter apparently in mistake for the Minister of War) were shot by the mutineers. These then marched to the Arsenal for more ammunition and there shot down an officer who courageously attempted to hold that building against them. A deputy was shot, also in mistake for some one else. Mahmud Moukhtar Pacha, Commander of the Guards, eluded his pursuers and found asylum in

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the house of an English resident of Moda, being finally smuggled out of harm's way on board his host's yacht. The fleet was equally disaffected with the army. The captain of the *Assar-i-Tewfik*, a loyal supporter of the Constitution, was marched up to Yildiz by his men. They arraigned him under the windows of the palace, and the ex-Sultan looked down upon them.

"What do you want, my children?" asked the paternal Abd-ul-Hamid.

"Here," they replied, "is one who would have fired on Yildiz. What shall we do to him?"

"Send him to the Second Division!" was the Padishah's injunction, which sounds innocent enough, but which, as most of the officers of that Division had been murdered, could have had only one meaning. The marines, acting on the royal hint, bayoneted the unfortunate man on the spot. We were subsequently edified by the spectacle of their corpses dangling from gallows in the public streets, a punishment which they perhaps richly deserved, yet assuredly not more so than the coward who instigated the crime.

Tewfik Pacha, who had been appointed Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, now formed an interim Cabinet, with Edhem Pacha as Minister of War. Rifaat Pacha retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and Ziaeddin Effendi re-

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mained Sheikh-ul-Islam. Nazim, whose appointment as Minister of War had led to the downfall of Kiamil two months earlier, was now put in command of the First Army Corps. It looked as if the Committee had lost ground, and such was the view of the situation taken by some of the newspaper correspondents. Meanwhile the mutineers signalised their triumph with a terrific fusillade on the 13th and 14th, a demonstration which, so thickly did the bullets rain in the city, cost many lives.

The unholy revelry was, however, short-lived. While the frenzy was still at its height, every post brought news of the Roumelian army concentrating under the leadership of Mahmoud Shevket Pacha (the strongest general in the Turkish army, since appointed Minister of War) and preparing to march from Salonika and from Adrianople on the revolted capital and there avenge the outrage on the Constitution. A few affected to ridicule the possibility of retribution so swift. The foreign correspondents and military attachés were equally at fault, and predicted that the Salonika army could not reach Constantinople in less than three weeks. Yet within a week, it was an investing army and had drawn its lines across every exit from the capital. The mutineers must already have seen that the

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end was near, and it is not a little to their credit that they respected the lives and property of Europeans, and took every precaution to keep the Kurd *hamals* and other ruffians from loot. This was particularly praiseworthy on their part, as not only were their officers either dead or in hiding, but they had nothing to lose, and something perhaps to gain, if they could have embroiled their country with the Powers.

Many of them have since had leisure to reflect on the error of their ways in exile. If all reports are true, they have not been treated particularly well. I heard from a private source that, in August (1909), the Vizier received a disquieting letter from the father of one. In it, the writer admitted that, assuming the revolt of April to have been an offence (a proposition which he evidently regarded as open to discussion), his son had been properly punished with exile, but he also threatened serious trouble with the natives of the provinces unless something were done to ameliorate the condition of the deported mutineers.

That they deserved some mitigation of the full penalty for their singular moderation when the capital was at their mercy was generally admitted. Yet their shrift was short. Enver Bey, the darling of the Constitution, was hurry-
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ing from Berlin as fast as steam could bring him. The mutinous regiments, once the certainty of punishment could no longer be ignored, wore a less jubilant aspect than in the first flush of victory. They had shot down their officers and caused the downfall of the Hilmi Government. When the time drew near for them to pay the price of their treason, their friends fell away from them. The press, not unskilled in such quick changes, went over to the other side. True, the newly won freedom of the press was at a discount during that week of terror, for the offices of more than one newspaper friendly to the Committee were sacked by the reactionaries. The beginning of the end was apparent to all when the advance guard of the avenging army occupied San Stefano, a seaside suburb on the Marmora, thus for the second time brought into historic fame.

To San Stefano, then, the interest shifted on the 19th, and the next afternoon some of us found the little station in the hands of gendarmes, who kept back a surging crowd. So great, indeed, was the rush to this otherwise homely resort that a notice was posted in the Sirkeji Station, in Stamboul, to the effect that only those with business at San Stefano would be allowed to leave the trains there, a measure actually enforced the following day, though we

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got through the guard without much difficulty. Two episodes that we witnessed are worth mentioning. A little group of mutineers, who had tramped from the city to make their peace with the avengers of the Constitution, were being sworn on the Koran by an officer who, judging from their sheepish demeanour, was admonishing them roundly. Hundreds of repentant rebels made their way out to the camp every day on the same errand, and were sent back to the city with messages of reassurance for all who would lay down their arms, a course no doubt responsible for the comparatively prompt surrender of many of the barracks, where the Sheikh-ul-Islam was at the same time administering a new oath of allegiance that only a few companies refused to take. On another platform that afternoon we saw two ragged, ill-conditioned fellows go sidling up to a group of four officers, to whom they hesitatingly offered papers. These one of the officers read, with the result that he called up several gendarmes, who handled the couple roughly, and put them under arrest. They were emissaries from Yildiz.

We then drove out into the country not far from the nearest tents and found some officers at a farm-house. One of them spoke, excellent German, and with him we had some conversa-

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tion. When told that the city expected everything to be over in forty-eight hours, he shook his head and replied: "We have something to do, and this time we are going to do it thoroughly. Wait rather until the end of the week and then you may see." Subsequent developments lent peculiar significance to the promise. We waited—and we saw.

San Stefano now assumed political importance, for many deputies repaired there and Parliament sat at the Yacht Club, at first under the presidency of Ebuzzia Tewfik, deputy for Anatolia and director of the new paper the *Courrier d'Orient*, the first issue of which, in a single sheet only, appeared on the 21st. Next day, Ahmed Riza, who had wisely taken flight on the downfall of the Hilmi Cabinet, resumed the duties of President of the Chamber and was accorded a warm reception, though nothing like the ovation given to Enver, who, less interested in politics, went straight to headquarters and is credited with having directed the final operations against Taxim and Tashkishleh. The San Stefano Parliament deliberated in secret, though the adoption of a proposal to depose Abd-ul-Hamid leaked out, not, however, to be taken seriously in the city. In fact, all that week, each hour brought fresh rumour and contradiction, and the authorities

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issued almost daily proclamations of reassurance to the panic-stricken populace.

The second issue of the *Courrier d'Orient* (April 22) provided sensational reading for, in addition to an open letter to the Sultan, a rancorous and not particularly brilliant production, and news of the flight of Prince Burhan-eddin, who was supposed to have escaped to Corfu, where the German Emperor was at the time staying, it gave a black list, with the names of thirteen ringleaders in the late rising, which purported to come from Abd-ul-Hamid himself. As a matter of fact, this proved to be a daring invention, for the Sultan had not, as afterwards transpired, given up the names at all. It was significant of the power of the new Turkish press that, in addition to the name of Said Pacha, son of Kiamil, the list included no fewer than four journalists, the most important of whom were Ismaïl Kemal, the Albanian, and Daghestanli Mourad, who subsequently admitted having incited the troops to mutiny.

The Selamlık of April 23 was generally considered likely to be Abd-ul-Hamid's last. Some, indeed, predicted that he would die a violent death on that morning. There was a rumour—goodness only knows where such rumours originate in Constantinople—that a small band of

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desperate officers, weary of inaction, had determined to attend the Selamlık in the guise of civilians and to assassinate the Sultan. The Embassies even warned all and sundry not to be present, though the judge of the British Consulate was present with his wife. Yet the warning had a depressing effect on the visitors' enclosure, in which there were not on this occasion more than fifty Europeans and a single Japanese. Yet the ceremony passed off without episode of any kind, and those of us who heard the vociferous cheering of the troops, both before the prayer in the mosque and when, after driving back, Abd-ul-Hamid appeared at the palace window, could with difficulty have believed that within a week he would have ceased to be ruler of Turkey.

All that Friday, Constantinople was in a state of "nerves." The writer was in the Grande Rue, Pera, during the afternoon, and saw a runaway horse opposite the Galata Serai cause a hopeless panic. In a trice, the shutters came down with a rattle along both sides of the street. Cabmen whipped up their horses. People leapt from the cabs that they might run away, from heaven knew what and heaven knew whither, faster than the horses could take them. Down at Tophane, an hour later, a small body of unarmed cavalry tried

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to rush the Arsenal and arm themselves, but the guard turned out with fixed bayonets and repelled the mutineers. Meanwhile, just before sunset, a regiment of Salonika cavalry had occupied the Sweet Waters of Europe, the police surrendering without a shot being fired on either side; and the day came to an end with a general impression that a settlement would be arrived at and that nothing further was contemplated than the punishment of the ringleaders in the late rising.

Late that evening the writer met Sassoun Effendi, deputy for Bagdad, at the Club and he, though hopeful that the disturbance was over, spread his hands with the familiar Oriental gesture in token that there could be no certainty of anything. Nowhere, in fact, is prophecy more dangerous than in Turkey. Yet surely few who were not in the inner councils of the Young Turks, and particularly of Mahmoud Shevket, the genius of the hour, could have foreseen, when the sun went down in a red sky, that it would rise next morning on the booming of guns from the heights and the rattle of musketry in the streets. Such, however, was the music to which we awoke next morning, when the Taxim and Tashkishleh Barracks held out for several hours. The writer was afterwards told by fugi-

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tives that they had no idea of fighting that morning. Their non-commissioned officers told them to turn out, as they thought, for a drill, and the next thing they knew was that they were under a hot fire, from which they scampered back into barracks and put up the best resistance they could. Three of us made our way up the Grande Rue shortly after six and found the shops barricaded, the middle of the road clear, and an excited crowd hugging the walls. A couple of hundred yards from the barracks our further progress was barred by Salonika troops, and we found ourselves close enough for ordinary ambitions, as they were exchanging shots with the defenders, bullets were knocking dust out of the walls around, and a man opposite us went down with a bullet in his leg. Only five minutes earlier Frederick Moore, the energetic correspondent of the *New York Sun*, had been shot through the shoulder while trying to rescue the camera dropped by Mr. Booth, of the *Daily Graphic*, who had just fallen with a bullet through his head and another through the arm. They were carried into the French Hospital, but some little time elapsed before they could receive attention. The writer went to see Moore an hour or two later, and he was then sleeping quietly, but, as a matter of fact, he remained in

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hospital for some weeks, though the other patient was about again in a few days. For an hour or two there was casual firing, and the three of us managed to get close to an angle where half a dozen sharpshooters were firing at the barracks, while a Krupp gun was being served from the tram-lines. One after another, after a short but plucky defence, the mutinous barracks hoisted the white flag, and by lunch time an immense crowd was staring at the breaches in the masonry made by the guns at short range. The casualties were many, and all the afternoon the tramcars were busy removing the dead and wounded. There was desultory firing down to a late hour. In one side street, a single Albanian, mad with the lust of battle, was firing out of an upper window and he contrived to hold up a score of Salonika men for over an hour before they could shoot him. Even late in the afternoon a few cavalrymen held out in a cemetery, but they also were shot down. With the exception of the few accidents recorded, Europeans were singularly lucky. A shell passed close over the deck of the *Imogene*, the British *stationnaire*, while a man on the deck of the Italian gunboat was killed by a stray bullet. That was all.

It looked as if we were to have peace at last. Yildiz, it is true, had not surrendered. Rumours

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continued to circulate, and, as is usual in Constantinople, none could be too preposterous for belief. One had it that a thousand of the Yildiz garrison had laid down their arms, while three or four times that number had got away, with a number of guns, in the direction of Therapia, a fashionable summer resort up the Bosphorus. A later report added that the fugitives had the Sultan with them, and half a dozen times during the preceding week he had been represented as now taking refuge at the German Embassy, now stepping aboard his yacht, regardless of the fact that the yacht lay above the bridges, in the Golden Horn! According to a still wilder account, the great barracks at Scutari, on the Asiatic side, refused to surrender, and had even intimated to the Salonika leaders that if they dared to fire a single shot at Yildiz they would retaliate by shelling the European quarter of Pera, thereby compelling the embassies to intervene. That the available guns in Scutari could hardly reach Pera counted for nothing, so ready were people to believe the worst.

Sunday passed quietly. Yildiz was reported to be surrendering gradually, not without pour-parlers. To prevent disturbance in Stamboul, and possibly also to facilitate the reduction of the garrison at Scutari, the Bridge was held by

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Chasseurs and closed to the public. I drove round the defences and found that the Taxim barracks had borne the brunt of the artillery, though those at Tashkishleh had also suffered damage. Early that afternoon a large body of troops marched down the Grande Rue in the direction of Stamboul, and there was a general rush from the tables at Tokatlian's restaurant to see Niazi, after Enver the most popular hero of the people, who bowed to right and left, not without a touch of the dramatic genius which goes for a good deal in the Near East. There was some little trouble in Stamboul, and not even that historic building, the Sublime Porte, escaped paying tribute, a gun having made a breach in the corner of one of its windows. All that Sunday, too, fugitives were stealing away from the city in tens and twenties. Hundreds made their way across the Bosphorus. An English resident of Candilli, a pretty village opposite Bebek, told the writer that they came across in caïques and other craft, packed like sardines, and the keels had hardly grated on the shore when they tumbled out and ran in terror for the woods. Some of the less panic-stricken swore to him that those who had surrendered had been *deprived of their feet*, but, although such was formerly the punishment of deserters

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in Turkey, this was surely the figment of unhinged minds. They were bitter enough then, these poor misguided wretches, against those who had misled them. What, they asked, had the First Army Corps gained by the turn of the wheel? Last summer they had upheld the Constitution, without in any way bettering their condition. Then, with the promise of better things, they had struck a blow for the Faith, still without profit. Now the Committee was once more top dog and wanting their blood. Surely these blunt tools of those in high places were more sinned against than sinning. History has by now unravelled the mystery of this army within an army, but in the excitement which then prevailed a judicial estimate was out of the question. The Salonika army mobilised with a secrecy and despatch that won the well-deserved praise of military experts throughout Europe. Yet their task, in scotching these rats in a trap of their own setting, was no very difficult one; and it is not easy to withhold a little sympathy from these ignorant fighting animals, even though their treason met with no more than its just deserts.

On the Monday, a considerable flanking movement was thrown out with the object of cutting off the retreat of these fugitives, but it was not

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wholly successful ; so the city and surrounding district, as far as Ismidt, were proclaimed in a state of siege. Mahmoud Shevket Pacha was in supreme military command and kept admirable control of the situation. The recapture of the deserters was only gradual, and for several weeks batches of them surrendered to country garrisons. The reign of martial law in Constantinople, however distasteful to the unruly element, made that city a far more pleasant place of residence than we had known it since the early days of January. The street roughs vanished as if by magic, and the slight inconvenience of applying to the police for a permit to be out after dark was more than compensated by the security and order prevailing in the streets. The bridge was reopened for traffic on the Monday afternoon ; steamers plied merrily up and down the Bosphorus, and it looked as if the excitement was over.

Yet those earnest men who had made themselves responsible for the last effort to reform Turkey from within knew that one thing remained to be done. Without that one thing, there could be no question of peace and prosperity for the country. On the Monday morning, some of the chiefs of the Roumelian army repaired to Yildiz, and were introduced by the

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First Secretary into the presence of Abd-ul-Hamid. He, the arch-conspirator, he for whom simple soldiers had been shot down by their countrymen forty-eight hours earlier, emphatically protested his innocence of all share in the recent reaction. Yet, at last, he was talking to deaf ears. A maxim gun, mounted on a motor-car, commanded the gate of Yildiz at short range, and a guard of Salonika troops held the grounds, so that there was safety in the lion's den. As a matter of fact, the Sheikh-ul-Islam had already written out the *fetva* of deposition, and Ahmed Riza had quietly appropriated the historic pen, with the ink still wet upon it.

On the Tuesday, a deputation of deputies went to Yildiz and informed Abd-ul-Hamid that he was no longer Padishah. The Chamber had originally named only Mohammedan deputies, but one at any rate of these begged to be excused, and his place was readily taken by Carasso Effendi, the deputy for Salonika. In this, and perhaps also in the presence among their number of an Albanian (from *Northern* Albania, always regarded as a stronghold of loyalty to the "Shadow of God"), there was a peculiar appropriateness, which, we may be sure, was not missed by the sardonic humour of the fallen tyrant.

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At noon, on the Tuesday, there was such a booming of guns and cracking of rifles that nervous residents in the suburbs, as far as Candili, jumped to the conclusion that the Palace of Yildiz had closed its gates and was being shelled. But Yildiz was no longer a palace, and the guns were firing in honour of the new Sultan, Mehmet V. The fourth Mohammed ascended the throne the year before Charles I. was beheaded, and he reigned longer than any Sultan since his time.

Thus fell Abd-ul-Hamid, as ingloriously as he had reigned. A special train conveyed him the same evening to Salonika, a city in which not even his genius for intrigue could make further mischief. He begged piteously for the company of his favourite son, Burhaneddin, but it was considered more advisable to keep them apart. To the ex-Sultan a number of women were allotted as distraction for his solitude.

Abd-ul-Hamid was the third Sultan in succession to be deposed. His uncle either committed suicide or was murdered. His brother languished for thirty years in prison, a real or alleged lunatic. To Abd-ul-Hamid the fates were kinder, and, in spite of sinister rumours to the contrary, there is every likelihood of his dying a natural death in exile.

CHAPTER VI

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

“The notion that a man’s liberty consists in giving his vote at election-hustings, and saying, ‘Behold, now, I too have my twenty-thousandth part of a Talker in our National Palaver’ . . .”

Is the Turkish Nation fit for Parliamentary Government? : First Two Parliaments of Abd-ul-Hamid : Parallel between him and Charles I. : Diversity of Languages in the Turkish Parliament : A French View : Ahmed Vefik : His Treatment of Deputies : A Patriotic Kurd : Arbitrary Dissolution of the First Parliament : Patriotism of its Successor : Post of Grand Vizier Abolished : Russian Intrigue : Attack on the Minister of War : Parliament Prorogued *sine die* : The Third Parliament : Analysis of the Deputies : Comparison with that of 1877 : Tampering with the Ballot : Debates : Poor Accommodation : Memorable Sitzings of Feb. 13 and 14, 1909 : Fall of Kiamil : Excitement in the Capital : Full Report of the Debate : Eloquence of the Arab : Oratory in the House : Parties : Elections : “Bagmen”

THE question as to whether the Ottoman nation is fitted for parliamentary institutions is one which it should be given a chance of answering for itself, a chance hitherto denied. It is true that thirty years ago Abd-ul-Hamid granted a

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Constitution and convened a Parliament, practically at the point of the sword. At the first opportunity, however, he suspended the one and prorogued the other *sine die*. There are broad-minded Turks who concede that the nation was not then ripe for constitutional government, and that the great reformer, Midhat Pacha, lived before his time. There are foreign residents in Constantinople who declare that, even to-day, the temperament of the Ottoman nation is not adapted to "government of the people, by the people, for the people," but the developments of the past twelvemonth, though not altogether reassuring, cannot be said to compel so pessimistic a view.

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The career of the first two Parliaments of Abd-ul-Hamid was brief, but not lacking in interest, if only because they furnished a useful precedent of the possibility of Mohammedans, Christians, and Jews working in unison for the public good. In those days, the burning questions were three: the relations with Montenegro, the law of the *vilayets*, and the adoption of the Turkish language by all Ottoman races. The last alone remains in the front rank of present-day problems, and we have not heard the last of

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it. Those curious in such historic parallels may find a striking analogy between those early Parliaments of Abd-ul-Hamid and those of our own Charles I. Making the necessary allowance for the different views of royal prerogative, the attitude which was taken towards the representatives of the people by Abd-ul-Hamid and his creature, Ahmed Vefik, President of the Chamber, was precisely that which brought about the downfall and execution of Charles and Strafford. Charles endeavoured to arrest five of the members who had incurred the royal displeasure by their independence in the House. Abd-ul-Hamid, happier in his generation, seized and banished ten members of his second Parliament, who had declined his command to withdraw to their constituencies. The Near East was in those days a congenial field for such procedure, and whereas the English king was first an outcast in his own realm, and eventually came to the block, the Turkish Sultan embarked on a period of thirty years of absolutism. In this tolerance of tyranny, indeed, the Turkish nation was hopelessly retrograde, for Ibrahim I., a contemporary of Charles, met his death just a year earlier at the hands of the public executioner because he had misgoverned his people.

It is not proposed to give any detailed account

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of those early Parliaments. All that will here be attempted is to draw attention to some of the difficulties which, left unsolved by them, still confront the assembly now sitting at Stamboul.*

The question of language no longer exercises the Turkish Parliament. However repugnant to the Arabs, Turkish has been adopted as the only practical solution of the difficulty. Education and greater facilities of communication have doubtless done something to lessen the impediment. At the time of the first Parliament, it was computed † that, outside the House, deputies conversed in no fewer than fourteen languages, including Turkish, Persian, Arabic, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, Bosnian, Slavonian, Albanian, Kurdish, Vlachian, Syrian, Hebrew, and, lastly, a bastard Spanish used by Jews at Salonika. Louis Rousseau, with a fine contempt for this National Assembly, which arose from his partiality for Abd-ul-Hamid, says :

“Parliament would embrace, independent of a minority of Turks, an overwhelming majority

* Those who desire a documentary account of their sittings, transcribed from contemporary accounts in the *Temps*, may be referred to the ninth chapter of Fesch : *Constantinople aux derniers jours d'Abdul Hamid* (Paris : Marcel Rivière).

† See Louis Rousseau : *L'Effort Ottoman*.

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made up of savages from Kurdistan, with unknown idioms, Arab Sunnites or Wahabites, Skipetars (dwellers among the rocks), Albanians (Catholic, Orthodox, or Mohammedan), Bulgarians, Greeks, Kutzo-Vlachs, Servians, Nestorians, Maronites, Jews, United Armenians, Jacobites, Protestants, &c., all with different ambitions, and all with centrifugal tendencies based on their race or their religion, most of them hostile to the Osmanlis, all of them jealous of one another."

It was hardly to be expected that the use of each and all of these tongues could be permitted in the daily deliberations of an assembly not modelled on the Tower of Babel. Unless the result was to be pandemonium, one recognised medium of speech was the only possible solution of the difficulty, and that, for obvious reasons, had to be Turkish. There is a proverb to the effect that "He who speaks not Turkish has not the fear of God in his heart," but this was not the sentiment which dictated the adoption of that language in parliamentary debate. It was, in fact, the only conceivable condition of the orderly conduct of the public business, yet some among the Greek deputies professed themselves insulted by it.

This was, on the face of it, unreasonable, yet it must be confessed that the Government did

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not acquit itself gracefully of the difficult task of reconciling elements so incongruous. The President of the Chamber, Ahmed Vefik, though a scholar, with a European education, was the avowed enemy of Midhat and of the Young Turks, a creature of the Palace and opposed to any scheme of political equality for all races. This man's arbitrary conduct in his high office did much not alone to embitter the feelings of the deputies, but also to make of their labours a farce. He would frequently interrupt the speeches of members with the interjection "*Soussun!*" (i.e. Be quiet!). On one occasion, indeed, when one of the Greek deputies had moved the exclusion of the *mufti* from the councils of the *vilayets*, the President shouted "*Bounou bekordhum!*" (Ah, I was waiting for that!) It seems impossible to picture the quiet Ahmed Riza interrupting deputies in this fashion to-day.

Yet not all the pressure brought to bear by Yildiz through such agents of tyranny could stem the flood of patriotism let loose by the innovation of a Parliament. One of those "savages" from Kurdistan, of whom the French author quoted above wrote in such contemptuous terms, made a noble speech on the humiliating peace which it was proposed to conclude

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with Montenegro. "You speak," he said, looking the President in the face, "of financial difficulties, yet how am I to believe in their existence when I see around me so much luxury, such brilliant uniforms, such splendid palaces, such fine carriages, such costly horses? Come to my part of the world: there you shall see misery, if you like! Like the rest of us at home, I wore only the oldest of raiment. Yet, finding myself here amid all this splendour, I was filled with shame and, at some sacrifice, I bought the ready-made coat in which you see me. Well, if the good of my country demands it, I would gladly, rather than see others always interfering in our affairs, sell this coat and go back to my rags."

The first Parliament, not being sufficiently amenable to the will of the sovereign, was dissolved in July 1877. A new assembly was convoked for the following December. The President dismissed the deputies to their homes, with the frank and flattering behest that on the next occasion they should so arrange their elections as to return "reasonable deputies, who would know what their country needed of them!"

Yet the second Parliament (1877-8) also brought patriotic deputies in direct conflict with Abd-ul-Hamid. The Mohammedan element

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was roused to the white heat of a religious war by the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Gortschakoff. Parliament reflected this warlike sentiment, and when at length the parlous condition of the national defences could no longer be concealed from the public, the deputies, realising indeed "what their country needed of them," criticised even the Padishah himself. The Minister of War, Said Pacha, who enjoyed high favour at Court, was interpellated on the capture of a Turkish transport by Russians in the Black Sea. These disaffected deputies went yet further. Forming themselves into an Opposition under the leadership of Ahmed Yeni Chehirli Zadé Effendi, they next criticised both the Ministry and the Sultan. They were, indeed, about to pass a vote of want of confidence in the Grand Vizier and four of his colleagues, when Abd-ul-Hamid averted a crisis by one of those brilliant strokes which he knew so well how and when to deliver. He abolished the post of Grand Vizier, as Midhat had recommended in his draft of a Constitution, replacing it by that of First Minister, who was also President of the Council and had the duty of submitting for the royal assent such measures as had been voted by the Chamber and approved by the Senate. This timely stratagem post-

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poned hostilities between the Palace and the people, but the deputies, once they had tasted the sweets of free speech, were not easily cajoled into forgoing criticism of the once dreaded sovereign. Dissolution was imminent, and Russian emissaries intrigued to this end at Yildiz, since Russia had good reason for distrusting a free Turkey.

This second Parliament, its fate already in the balance, sealed its own doom by a furious attack on Reouf Pacha, Minister of War. Abd-ul-Hamid summoned certain of the deputies to the palace to discuss the situation. They told him plainly that he sought their advice too late, that their counsels had always been ignored, and that they washed their hands of all responsibility for the pass to which he and his Ministry had brought the empire. Censure, when deserved, is doubly unwelcome to a tyrant, and the Sultan was so incensed by their fearless attitude that he dismissed the deputation, with an expression of regret that he should ever have sought to imitate his father and that he had not rather taken the harsher measures favoured by his grandfather, Mahmoud.

“For,” said he, as he turned on his heel, “I realise at length that force is the only treatment for the nation whom God has entrusted to my

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care." Such was the policy that he followed to the last day of his power, and his apologists have argued that his estimate of the Turkish people was the true one.

On February 14, 1878, assigning as his reason the gravity of the situation abroad, he prorogued Parliament *sine die*, and his next act was to seize ten of the most refractory deputies and send them into exile.

Thus ended the second Parliament of his reign. He had summoned it under *force majeure*, just as he summoned the third thirty years later.

II. 1908-9

The third Parliament of Abd-ul-Hamid II. was a very different affair. Like the new Constitution, it was no makeshift of a crafty tyrant to appease temporary agitation, but it had come to stay at the bidding of a for once united nation. It was opened in December 1908, and an account of this memorable spectacle will be found in an admirable book, *The Awakening of Turkey*, by my friend E. F. Knight, the special correspondent of the *Morning Post*.

The new Parliament consisted of 261 deputies, many of whom, journeying in hard winter weather from the outposts of the empire, did

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not reach the capital until early in the New Year. The proportion of the various races and religions in the new assembly was approximately as follows :

RACE.		RELIGION.	
Turks	119	Mohammedan	214
Albanians	15		
Kurds	8		
Arabs	46		
Syrians	26		
Syrian	1	Roman Catholic	Christians 43
Greeks	23	Orthodox	
Bulgarians	4		
Servians	3		
Kutzo-Vlachs	2		
Armenians	10	Gregorian	
Jews	4		

Comparison with the representation in 1877 reveals a very low proportion of Christians in the present Parliament. Thirty years ago, ten Syrians, of whom four were Christians, were returned, whereas of the twenty-seven Syrians, to-day, only one is of that religion. The large and unexpected preponderance of Mohammedans is open to two explanations. In some districts, no doubt, the Christians were too divided among themselves to head the poll, and, as is often done by political rivals in England, two or more would split the vote, to the gain of the Mohammedan candidate. In the majority of cases, however, Mohammedan successes were secured by pressure

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from the Committee. The elections were not in fact quite free. It is easy to criticise the action of the Young Turks in influencing the ballot, but it must in fairness be remembered that the Constitution is still a plant of tender growth in that poisoned soil, and a strong non-Mohammedan Opposition in the House might seriously have hampered its progress. At the same time, friends of the Young Turks may be excused for regretting that they should have found it necessary to meddle with the elections, thereby giving their critics new cause to doubt their good faith. It is more than doubtful whether any organised Christian political party need have been feared in a land where the sects of the Church live in the kind of harmony which calls for the presence of armed Turkish sentries to keep the peace in the precincts of the Holy Sepulchre.

The debates in the last Parliament, of which I attended several, were for the most part conducted with tranquillity, the habitual phlegm of the Turk being occasionally stirred by the enthusiasm of some Christian deputy or by the fiery denunciations of one or other of the Arabs. The building then in use was admittedly inadequate, and was only more commodious than the temporary premises placed at the disposal of the

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deputies by courtesy of the Yacht Club at San Stefano during the April *émeute*. The accommodation for visitors and the press was of the meanest. Needless to say, Turkish ladies have no place in the House, and the presence of a woman in the diplomatic box occasionally strikes a strange note of incongruity in the assembly. The majority of deputies attend in frock coats, always with the red fez of the country on their heads, but a few are in robes and turbans, lending variety and colour to the company. The speaker mounts the tribune. The reporters apparently have no shorthand, but are directed as elsewhere, by a conductor, who sets each at work in rotation.

The following account from contemporary reports of the memorable sittings of Saturday and Sunday, February 13 and 14, 1909, on the occasion of the downfall of Kiamil Pacha, will give some idea of the procedure, but it is first necessary to give in a few words the circumstances which led to the Ministerial crisis in which the aged statesman was involved.

Kiamil's own version of the affair was that he had detected a plot to seize Abd-ul-Hamid at the Selamlık of February 12, and to put his cousin Yussuf Izeddin in his place. I was at that Selamlık, and, for the last time, saw Kiamil in the royal carriage, facing his master. There

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was no sign of any disturbance. Meanwhile, the Vizier had dismissed the Ministers of War and Marine, both of whom were alleged to be in the plot, and had ordered the removal of a Salonika regiment from the precincts of Yildiz. The two Ministers, one of whom had previously sent in his resignation, only to have it refused, laid their case before the House. The House demanded an immediate explanation from Kiamil. Kiamil, mindful of Mazarin's *Le temps c'est moi*, procrastinated, offering to furnish the necessary explanations during the following week. The true explanation of the crisis seems, as later events have shown, to have been a struggle between Kiamil, supported by the Liberals, and the Committee of Union and Progress. Kiamil went under. He tried to prove that there was a law even above the Constitution and he failed. It is doubtful whether the Sultan could have done anything to save his Minister from ruin ; at any rate, he made no attempt to do so. For several days, the capital was in an uproar. Through a misapprehension of the facts, this was regarded in many quarters as the final struggle between the Young Turks and the old *régime*, whereas in reality the Liberals were no more friendly than the Committee towards the Palace faction. The House sat on the Saturday

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(February 13) until a late hour, vainly waiting the Vizier's appearance to answer to the interpellation. At last, an orderly arrived with a letter containing the Vizier's resignation, with the menace that he would at his own convenience give the newspapers the explanations that he had withheld from the House. As a matter of fact, he did so at the time of the counter-revolution in April, without, however, appreciably enhancing his reputation. There followed a scene of indescribable confusion, which recalled Mr. Birrell's remark about screaming politicians. By a majority of 198 to only 8 of Kiamil's faithful adherents, a vote of want of confidence was then passed, though a further motion for the Minister's impeachment was summarily rejected. The greatest excitement prevailed in the capital. The disturbance in Stamboul was such that the police felt it necessary to close the Great Bazaar, always a centre of disturbance at such times. Troops were hurried up from Adrianople. There was unrest in the fleet. On all sides there was talk of revolution, even of return to the old *régime*. The Young Turks, with the army behind them, weathered the storm. The Ministry fell, and Hussein Hilmi, sometime Inspector-General of Macedonia, formed a new Cabinet. The most regrettable loss to the councils of the empire was

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the Sheikh-ul-Islam, Djemaleddin Effendi, an unusually broad-minded occupant of that post. It is worthy of notice that the sixty Arab deputies voted solid for Kiamil's downfall.

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

AHMED RIZA BEY in the Chair

Feb. 13. 2 P.M.

MAZLIAH EFFENDI, Secretary, read the minutes of the last sitting, which were accepted as they stood.

THE PRESIDENT. The business before the House deals first with the debate on the interpellation over the dismissal of Ministers.

A DEPUTY. The Grand Vizier has not yet replied.

THE PRESIDENT. We have also before us interpellations of the Ministers of Public Works and Public Instruction. The Ministers of the Interior, of Justice, and of Finance, together with the Sheikh-ul-Islam, have resigned their portfolios.

A DEPUTY. We must inquire by telephone whether the Grand Vizier is coming down to the House or not.

THE PRESIDENT. We will do so if the House votes it in order.

SEVERAL VOICES. Yes! Yes!

YUSSUF KEMAL BEY (Castamouni). I beg to move that the House resolve itself into

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permanent session and that, if need be, it sit all night. Also that the opinion of hon. members be taken on this motion and telephoned to the Grand Vizier.

THE PRESIDENT. Depositions have also been handed in by hon. members, one of which bears the signature of twelve of our colleagues.

A DEPUTY. Go to the telephone, President.

THE PRESIDENT. I have sent the Secretary-General. We will now proceed with the business before the House.

Discussion followed. Several deputies were of opinion that the Chamber should suspend all other business in order to enter a protest against the action of the Grand Vizier. Others considered that it should proceed with the ordinary business while awaiting his reply. The scene was a lively one, and the excitement in the assembly increased.

ISMAÏL HAKKI BEY (Bagdad). The Chamber is in a remarkable position. Above all, we must do something decisive.

The reply of the Grand Vizier now arrived. By order of the President, it was read aloud.

“ To the President of the Chamber of Deputies :

“ In reply to your note of January 29, 1321, I had every wish to come in person to your honourable assembly that I might explain the causes which necessitated the changes in the Cabinet.

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As, however, the change in the War Department is closely connected with matters of foreign policy that we are now engaged upon, your honourable assembly will fully realise all the drawbacks which an immediate explanation might have had for the sacred interests of the empire. Convinced as I am that all hon. members will find my explanations perfectly satisfactory, I am none the less compelled to postpone them until Wednesday next. [Loud cries of 'No ! No ! Impossible !'] The removal of the Minister of Marine is merely the sequel of his own resignation, which I shall hand to you. Regarding the appointment of Zia Pacha as Minister for Public Instruction, it was made because the post was vacant. As regards the transfer from the capital of the Salonika battalions, which has been attributed to an order made by the Grand Vizier, it has been rumoured that the Minister of War was removed from office because he opposed their going. This report was circulated solely with the object of producing an unfavourable impression on the deputies and of exciting public opinion. I hereby declare that it is absolutely untrue. The greatest proof of my loyalty to the Constitution lies in the fact of my having given the post of Minister of War to Nazim Pacha. I do not think that a single person can doubt either the military ability or the patriotic devotion of that officer.

“Signed, KIAMIL, *Grand Vizier*.

“21 *Mouharrem*, 1327.

“31 *Kianouni Sani*, 1327.”

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ISMAÏL HAKKI BEY. He answers the interpellation in writing. This shows a want of respect to the House.

DJAVID BEY (Salonika). We cannot read these things. This veiled reply to the interpellation is an insult to the House.

Then followed a great uproar. Talaat Bey, First Vice-President, interposed a remark to the effect that there was no inconvenience in reading the whole communication. Amid constant interruption, the Secretary had read the letter to the end, while members on the extreme left were invited by the others to applaud.

THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will now read a letter from the ex-Minister of War.

The Secretary read the letter.

“ To the President of the Chamber of Deputies :

“ Without any resignation on my part, without my having been informed of the reasons, in fact without my having agreed to the change, the Grand Vizier summoned me to the Sublime Porte last Wednesday in order to inform me that I was appointed to the Egyptian Commissariat, an appointment that he subsequently confirmed in writing. This communication being entirely contrary to the Constitution under which we have taken oath, and also to the usage of a Parliamentary country, I have the honour to inform you that I am unable to accept the new appoint-

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ment, and I look to the House to uphold me in the rights to which I am by law entitled.

“Signed, MARSHAL ALI RIZA PACHA.”

The Secretary then read a letter from Aarif Hikmet Pacha, ex-Minister of Marine.

“To the President of the Chamber of Deputies :

“The resignation which I sent to the Grand Vizier on the 15th January 1327, was not accepted. In response to repeated requests, I continued as head of the Department, attending numerous sittings of the Council and furnishing explanations to the House when interpellated. In spite of this the Grand Vizier removed me *proprio motu* and appointed another in my place. This was an unconstitutional act, and I protest against his unlawful proceedings.

“Signed, AARIF HIKMET, *ex-Minister of Marine.*”

The concluding sentence of the letter was greeted with loud applause.

DJAVID BEY. Long live the Constitution !

A DEPUTY. Down with absolutism !

These cries were met with protests from the minority. Every one shouted at once. The President, visibly affected, as well he might be, could not make himself heard. At length he succeeded in restoring order, and the Secretary then read out the following letter from the

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Commodore and officers of the squadron anchored opposite the city.

“To the President of the Chamber of Deputies :

“ It appears from yesterday’s protocol that the Ministers of War and Marine have been changed by force and that the latter portfolio has been entrusted to a person of doubtful antecedents. As this action is contrary to constitutional law, we ask for satisfaction. As up to the present this arbitrary act has not been revoked, and as the press declares that it has agitated public opinion, as well as opinion in the navy, we have no further recognition for a Ministry which has lost the public confidence. Consequently the Turkish navy, finding itself without a leader, will look only to the Chamber of Deputies for orders until the portfolio of the Admiralty is entrusted to some one approved by the nation.

“Signed, the Commodore and Captains of the squadron anchored off Bechiktache.”

The vote of want of confidence in Kiamil Pacha was then discussed at length, but the House was in such an uproar that the President was compelled to adjourn the sitting.

Discussion continued in the lobbies, and hon. members took their seats again at 5.15.

Ali Riza Pacha, ex-Minister of War, was present on the Senators’ benches.

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The PRESIDENT. Acting on the decision of the House, we begged the Grand Vizier to come down to the House. His reply has just been received.

The Secretary then read the reply :

“ I have just received the note in which you invite me to come down to the House to-day. The rumours which have been circulated being unimportant, and the situation being free from danger, I shall take the necessary time in preparing the proofs and shall answer your invitation on Wednesday.

“ KIAMIL, *Grand Vizier*.

“ *Jan. 31, 1327.*”

The debate reopened. All the party leaders spoke in turn. The House was once more in an uproar. A vote of censure was next read, signed by 102 deputies, and at this moment an *aide-de-camp* of the Grand Vizier was introduced to the House and handed the President a folded letter. This the President read, and then handed it to the Secretary to read aloud.

It was a third note from the Grand Vizier and ran as follows :

“ I understand that on receipt of my second communication in which I gave my reasons for not coming down to the House until next Wednesday, hon. members were still unconvinced and that they continue to protest. In

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the event of Article 38 of the Constitution * not being respected, the consequences of any disturbance over home or foreign affairs must be on the heads of those responsible, and I shall feel obliged to place my resignation in the hands of His Majesty, and to publish in the press the statements which I had prepared for the House. I have the honour to await your reply.

“Signed, KIAMIL.

“*Jan. 31, 1327.*”

TALAAAT BEY (Adrianople). The House should proceed with its vote.

The rest of the sitting was stormy. Habib Bey, a captain of artillery, made an inflammatory speech, in which he declared that “the sharp bayonets of the army and the guns of the fleet would know how to frustrate any attack on the rights of the nation.”

At last, after a scene of indescribable confusion, a vote of want of confidence in Kiamil Pacha was carried by 198 votes to 8.

The House then adjourned.

Feb. 14, 12 noon. The House does not, as a rule, sit on Sundays, but it met to-day to discuss the change of Ministry. The chief feature of

* Kiamil was within his rights in availing himself of this Article, which expressly provides for a Minister postponing his appearance before the House in answer to interpellations, if he should deem it necessary.

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the proceedings was an almost unanimous rejection of a motion for the impeachment of Kiamil, proposed by Carasso Effendi (Salonika).

AHMED RIZA BEY, President.

The PRESIDENT. Yesterday, after the House rose, I went to the palace and acquainted His Majesty with what had happened. The Sultan then summoned Hussein Hilmi Pacha to the palace and appointed him to the post of Grand Vizier.

The Secretary then read a letter from the First Secretary of the Sultan to the President of the Chamber.

“The posts of Grand Vizier and Minister of the Interior have been entrusted to His Highness Hussein Hilmi Pacha.

“The post of Sheikh-ul-Islam has been given to Ziaeddin Effendi, and Hussein Hilmi Pacha will form the new Ministry.”

The communication was greeted with prolonged applause.

Mazliah Effendi, Secretary, then read the minutes of the previous sitting, which were adopted.

Seyid Bey, Secretary, then read a letter from Kiamil Pacha, dated January 30,* in which he

* *I.e.*, Old Style, corresponding to February 13, New Style.

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announced to the House that His Majesty had been painfully impressed by an article in the *Serbesti*, containing attacks on His Majesty.

SEVERAL DEPUTIES. His Majesty is right. He is our Sovereign.

The Secretary then read depositions from deputies, and a discussion was held on the subject of one from the deputy for Lazistan, who communicated to the House the text of a document from the old *régime* denouncing Lieut.-Colonel Muhieddin Bey, a professor at the Military College. It was dated April 27, 1321, and signed by Marshals Rechid, Edhem, and Tahir Pachas. In it he was accused of being in league with the heir presumptive, and of talking about him to the cadets. The House received the communication with signs of disgust and decided to send it up to the Commission then sitting on the State prisoners at Prinkipo.

CHEKIB BEY (Magnesia). If we are to send every case of this sort before the Commission, it will have its work cut out. Many of these people are still in high places, such as Nejmeddin Molla, Vali of Bagdad, the President of the Criminal Court, and so forth. Will these men remain unpunished? It cannot be merely a question of one or two individuals.

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CARASSO EFFENDI (Salonika) then defended Nejmeddin Molla, because, as former member of the Commission of Inquiry at Yildiz, he had, when investigating the affair of the bomb thrown from a house, discovered that it was the work of the Committee of Union and Progress and had failed to report.

Several members protested against such personalities and voted the closure.

CARASSO EFFENDI then moved the impeachment of Kiamil Pacha so that he might be punished as he deserved, since, without consulting them, he had removed the Ministers of War and Marine from office; he had then excused his act by circulating false reports; he had wished to re-establish the old absolutism; and he had estranged the Sovereign from his people. In short, he demanded the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry, in conformity with Article 32* of the Constitution.

The House rejected the motion for impeachment almost unanimously.

Not all the debates in this youngest of Parliaments are marked by the same excitement. I have heard long and prosy discussions on the Bagdad Railway, and even the new Press Law,

* This provides for the impeachment of Ministers under a special law.

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though evoking more than one emphatic expression of opinion, was debated in detail without any semblance of animosity. The oratory of the Turkish Parliament should reach a high standard. The Arabs, in particular, are born public speakers. They are in many cases gifted with an extraordinary memory, and it is on record that, even during the lifetime of Mohammed, several of his followers could recite the whole of the Koran. In Morocco, eloquence is found among all classes, and, from viziers to horsedealers, men speak with honeyed tongues. The Turkish Chamber has not yet grown weary of that classic form of oratory which pleased an English House of Commons in the days of Burke, but to which hon. members of the present House of Commons would listen with their hats over their faces. At one sitting, Emroullah Bey (Kirk-Klisse), in a speech on the higher education of Turkish youths (February 24), quoted the work done by Fichte in raising the standard of education in Prussia that had so long groaned under the heel of Napoleon.

The present division of parties in the Turkish Parliament is not so complex as is sometimes represented. They may, for practical purposes, be regarded as two ; the Committee of Union and Progress, or Nationalists, with a solid

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majority in the House; and the Liberal, or Decentralising party, under, or at any rate supported by, Prince Sabaheddin. The Liberals, though at present in the minority, can generally count on the support of the Arabs, Albanians, Greeks and, in fact, the representatives of every nation which nurses dreams of self-government. The followers of Sabaheddin, who are not, as has been alleged, actually equivalent to our Irish Home Rulers, regard the liberalism of the rest as a farce. The hostility is reciprocal, and it was shown early in 1909 on the occasion of a banquet given by Sabaheddin in honour of Kiamil Pacha. The Young Turks declined the invitation. Moderate Liberals have more recently been under the leadership of Ismaïl Kemal Bey, the Albanian, of whom something has already been said. The last considerable demonstration of the *Ahrar*, or Liberal party, was in July (1910), when Dr. Riza Nur, who had first fled to Egypt after the "affair of April" and then been re-instated, was implicated in a plot to overthrow the Committee by assassinating some of its members. The plot, hopeless from the first, was easily frustrated.

In course of time there will doubtless be parties within parties, as at Westminster. There are already signs of such groups. First, we

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
have the small but solid independent party calling itself the *Tirka-i-musshire* or "Party of Helpers," pledged, under the leadership of Loutfi Bey (Dersim), to help any other party that upholds the rights of the nation. Then, of more recent formation, comes the *Ahali Firkasi*, or "People's party," under Ismaïl Hakki Bey (Gumuljina), openly hostile to the Committee of Union and Progress, but with no other clearly defined programme.

At any rate, there is not so far a Palace party. The extreme Conservatives, who include in their ranks the supporters of Kiamil, do not favour a return to the old *régime*, but merely view unchecked Radicalism with apprehension. They are as firmly pledged as the Committee and the Liberals to uphold the Constitution and to oppose any reactionary plot which aims at restoring absolutism. At the time of his downfall, Kiamil was openly accused of favouring Abd-ul-Hamid, from whom he had, no doubt, received many favours in the past. Yet men lost their heads during that eventful week, and the very deputies who, while honourably rejecting the motion for his impeachment, clamoured all but unanimously for his dismissal, were the same men who, only a month earlier, had cheered him to the echo, and had gone into

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the lobbies still cheering, for the patriotic speech in which he had outlined his future policy.

Turkish elections are conducted in an indirect manner. The electors, who will in future include every male over twenty years of age, not otherwise disqualified, choose other electors (one to every two hundred and fifty) and these in turn elect the deputy. According to the Constitution of 1876, every deputy had to be either a native or a resident of his constituency. This precluded the election of "bagmen." The Young Turks have removed this restriction, and there will henceforth be no obstacle in the way of a smart lawyer of Stamboul representing the Arabs of the Yemen if he can secure their vote. East and West are joining hands more closely every day.



AGRICULTURE

CHAPTER VII

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL TURKEY

“Nihil est agricultura melius . . . nihil homine,
nihil libero dignius”

Decline of Turkish Trade : Comparison with Neighbouring States : Statistics : Necessity for Encouraging Immigration : Possibilities of Acclimatisation : Work done by the United States Bureau of Agriculture : Californian Figs : Resources of Anatolia : Duty on Dried Fruits : Silk and Tobacco : Opium : Otto of Roses : Cotton Seed : The Pastoral Life : Deficient Rainfall and Effect of Military Service : Mining : Fisheries : Other Industries : Need of Public Works and Better Communications : Contempt for Commerce

SOME figures given in the Statesman's Year Book should be printed for circulation among members of the Turkish Parliament, for these, more eloquently than any words, would demonstrate the terrible success with which the late *régime* conspired to ruin the Empire. Compare, for instance, the trade of the Ottoman Empire for 1862 (£48,000,000) and 1907 (£45,934,000) ! Here is incontestable evidence of the withering policy of the last thirty years, while the British view of that period has been succinctly stated by

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Sir Adam Block, perhaps the greatest living authority on the subject, in these words: "Thirty-three years of British indifference have allowed the population of Turkey to become accustomed to the methods and goods of countries other than Great Britain." Perhaps indifference during a period of such misrule was a pardonable attitude: what we have to look to is that it should not be maintained under the new conditions.

COUNTRY.	YEAR.	EXPORTS.	PRESENT VALUE (INCLUDING BULLION)
Roumania . . .	1860	2,750,000	19,500,000
Servia . . .	1860	500,000	3,250,000
Egypt . . .	1859	4,750,000	22,000,000
Algeria . . .	1861	3,000,000	13,000,000
Tunis . . .	1874	1,125,000	4,000,000

In comparing Turkey's present trade with that of thirty years ago, account must be taken of the territorial shrinkage of the Empire. The boundaries have been readjusted more than once, and trade has followed the flag. Yet the expansion, during the same period, of neighbouring countries, once under the Turkish flag, must be a sore lesson to those who have the welfare of the country at heart. Thus, Greece in 1860

The following Table (compiled from the Statesman's Year Book, 1901) will give at a glance the commercial position of Turkey and her neighbours :

	AREA, SQ. MILES.	POPULATION.	ANNUAL REVENUE.	IMPORTS.	EXPORTS.	TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS.
			£	£	£	£
Turkey	1,157,860	24,813,700	22,664,740	28,229,000	17,705,000	45,934,000
Roumania	50,720	6,684,270	16,440,440	16,884,560	19,654,410	36,538,970
Greece	25,020	2,632,000	5,465,700	5,935,730	4,641,980	10,577,710
Servia	18,650	2,688,000	3,809,560	2,823,300	3,259,700	6,083,000
Bulgaria	38,080	4,035,620	5,089,500	4,985,560	5,023,790	10,009,350
Egypt	400,000*	11,189,978	15,521,775	25,727,907	21,848,564	47,576,471
Algeria	343,000	5,231,850	5,084,804†	18,422,240	13,032,480	31,454,720
Tunis	50,000	2,000,000	2,786,842	4,114,410‡	4,134,440‡	8,248,850
Persia	628,000§	9,500,000	1,800,000	8,168,685	6,341,614	14,510,299

* Only 12,013 cultivated.

† No charge for Army or Navy.

‡ These include gold and silver.

§ Vast amount absolute desert.

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had an export and import trade amounting to 1½ millions sterling: to-day it is 10½ millions sterling.

Attention may in particular be drawn to the commercial expansion of Roumania by way of illustration of what can be done by a stable and judicious government.

The resources of Turkey, and more particularly of Asiatic Turkey, are so enormous that there need be the less hesitation in bringing these reproachful figures to the notice of those who, with none of the responsibility for the inglorious past, have set themselves the task of assuring, so far as lies in their power, a prosperous future. It is merely a question of immigration and development.

The problem of immigration is one of immense importance. Cannot something be done in the way of relieving the pressure on India and at the same time remedying the pressing need of Turkey?

Thanks in great measure to the late *régime*, which made the peasant's life a burden to him, any suggestion for encouraging immigration would have been futile. It is not, perhaps, generally appreciated how woefully under-populated Turkey is by comparison with her neigh-

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bours, but the following figures indicate the proportions :

	POPULATION.	SQ. MILES.	AVERAGE PER SQ. MILE.
Turkey	24,813,700	1,157,860	21
Roumania	6,684,270	50,720	131
Greece	2,632,000	25,020	105
Servia	2,688,000	18,650	144
Bulgaria	4,035,620	38,080	106

Now the Mohammedan agriculturists of India are an industrious, law-abiding class belonging for the most part to the Sunni sect, and to these at any rate the preference should be given. The congested population of India, already averaging 184 to the square mile (and in some districts as many as 700 to the square mile!), is one of the gravest problems of our administration, and the annual increase of one and a half millions is not reassuring. All sparsely populated countries are quick to encourage immigration of the right sort. Canada and Australia may not want immigrants of the trading class, but they are anxious to welcome agricultural labourers. Already the British Government has had its attention drawn by Sir Henry Hesketh Bell* to the desirability of colonising Uganda with Indian agriculturists.

* See the *Times*, June 16, 1909.

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Not 5 per cent. of the arable land of Uganda is at present under cultivation, while at least 40 per cent. of the whole area of the protectorate is capable of producing all manner of crops, with many of which the Indians are already familiar.

The advent of new population would be attended by another benefit, for the revenue, of which Turkey stands in such pressing need, would obviously fall more lightly on the greater number of taxpayers.

The following Table shows the comparative burden which falls on the various populations of Turkey and her neighbours :

	POPULATION.	REVENUE.	AMOUNT OF TAXATION PER HEAD.
		£	£ s. d.
Turkey	24,813,700	22,764,740	0 18 4 *
Roumania	6,684,270	16,440,440	2 9 2
Greece	2,632,000	5,465,700	2 1 6
Servia	2,688,000	3,809,560	1 8 4
Bulgaria	4,035,620	5,089,500	2 1 7

* It should be remembered that such averages must be regarded as only approximate. In view of the fact that there are thousands of Ottoman subjects, in the outlying districts of Asia Minor, Arabia and Mesopotamia, who pay no taxes at all, it is probable that the taxpayers of the Empire contribute not far short of £1 5s. per head.

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It must not be hastily inferred, however, that smallness of contribution per head is any measure of prosperity. In fact, just the contrary deduction is correct, for the higher rate of taxation may, and generally does, imply greater order and security and greater productivity of the soil. A similar comparison of some greater States furnishes an instructive parallel :

	POPULATION.	REVENUE.	AMOUNT OF TAXATION PER HEAD.
		£	£ s. d.
Great Britain	44,538,700	156,537,690	3 10 3
France	39,252,250	156,433,300	3 19 8
Germany	60,641,300	139,242,000	2 5 10
United States of America	83,941,510	125,214,570	1 9 10

It may, for the present, seem a far-fetched dream, this picture of Indian Mohammedans settling in Asiatic Turkey and helping to develop its wonderful resources ; but meanwhile there are thousands of Mohammedans in neighbouring countries only needing the least encouragement to migrate from their present homes and establish themselves under the more congenial government of those of their own faith.

The development of Anatolia, Mesopotamia,

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and other regions of Asiatic Turkey opens up possibilities that verge on the marvellous. The Young Turks should keep before their eyes the wonders that have been done elsewhere. They should be shown that the wool at present shipped from Australia to the annual value of £20,000,000, may be traced back to a score of Spanish merino sheep which Captain Waterhouse brought out from the Cape of Good Hope in 1797, on H.M.S. *Reliance*. The original home of coffee was in Abyssinia; yet in 1907 Brazil alone exported coffee to the value of £28,360,000 !

There is, however, another case which should particularly appeal to the statesmen of Turkey, the home of the fig. For many years, it was regarded as impossible to cultivate the fig in the United States. In consequence, figs had to be imported in large quantities from Smyrna. An expert was then sent by the United States Department of Agriculture, of which mention is made elsewhere in these pages, to Smyrna, and there he found that close to the edible fig-tree the Smyrniotes planted another tree, the capri-fig, on which a certain wasp bred freely. Branches of the capri-fig were attached to the edible fig-tree, whereupon the wasp conveyed the pollen of the capri-fig, which so enriched the

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edible fig that a perfect fruit was the result. The wasp, introduced into the United States, gave marvellous results. Climate, soil, and a market were already favourable ; it needed only the help of this wasp, which had been doing its work for centuries in Asia. To tell the truth, the go-ahead American was a little longer than usual in finding out this process of caprification, which some of us have known of in the East for many years, but which America discovered only sixteen years ago. These wasps, no doubt, played their part in perfecting the samples of figs which Cato the Censor brought back with him from Africa on the historic occasion when he told the Senate that, if Rome was to be saved, Carthage must be destroyed. The results, however, have been amazing. In 1891, California produced only 360,000 lb. of figs of inferior quality. In 1906, the output reached 7,000,000 lb., and the fruit was declared superior to that grown at Smyrna. The cactus is a sad vegetable which strikes the dominant note in every desert, yet Mr. Luther Burbank has succeeded in producing an edible cactus as food for man and beast. Here is a transformation for the Turkish Government to introduce.

Agriculture, live stock, mining and fisheries,

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all offer the most promising field for development under expert advice.

The products of Anatolia, a wonderful list, are here given, approximately, in the present order of their importance, whether for export or local consumption :

HARD AND SOFT WHEAT.—Hard wheat only is exported to the Mediterranean. Of soft wheat, the whole is practically used in the country, and there is no export trade. Being deficient in gluten, the soft wheat of Anatolia does not command a high price in European markets, though a small quantity may be sent abroad in years of exceptionally large crops.

HARD, SWEET MALTING BARLEY.—The hard barley, for which there is always a ready demand among Munich brewers, is from the highlands of Anatolia, soft barley being grown in the lowlands.

DRIED FRUIT (FIGS AND RAISINS).—These are grown chiefly in the Smyrna district, the bulk for export.

SILK AND TOBACCO.—The best qualities of tobacco are grown (outside of Macedonia) round Samsoun. Silk, in which there is a rapidly increasing trade, may eventually become the chief article of export in the Province.

OLIVE OIL.—This is produced in the western

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districts of Asia Minor, and in the islands of the Archipelago.

OPIUM, MOHAIR AND CARPETS.

HAZEL NUTS.—These come from the country round Trebizond and Kerasund.

OATS, WILD WHEAT, MAIZE, LINSEED, MILLET AND CANARY SEED.

SHEEP-SKINS, GOAT-SKINS AND KID-SKINS are growing in importance for export.

WOOL.—This is less exported than formerly, practically the whole output being required for the manufacture of Turkey carpets, the greatest industry in the Empire.

COTTON.—This is grown in the Adana district and round Smyrna (and Salonika), and the output is capable of great increase in the future.

Anatolia has mountains with untapped mineral resources; elevated plateaux for the agriculturist and stockowner; running water for power installations and for the irrigation of orchards; everything necessary to the development of an unparalleled prosperity. Yet the region does not produce enough to keep its peasants from starvation. The late Government strangled industry and discouraged commerce. It built no roads, and it ground the taxpayer under its heel. So jealous were the authorities of modern improvements that it is only seven years since an

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imperial *irade* permitted the introduction of electric light into Salonika, Smyrna and Damascus.

Among the products which Turkey exports to Europe there are some of which an increased output cannot be desirable. Thus the present supply of fruit (dates from the Persian Gulf and raisins and figs from Anatolia) appears to be equal to the demand, and any substantial increase would lead to a fall in prices. Dates pay no import duty in Great Britain, but dried figs and raisins have to pay seven shillings a hundredweight. The duty on currants from Greece, which, until a few years ago, was also seven shillings a hundredweight, has now been reduced to two, to the profit of growers in Greece. The duty of seven shillings presses unduly on the natural figs imported in bags, as it represents from 50 to 70 per cent. of their value.

In the case of cereals, however, there need be no fear of over-supply, as a ready market will always be found for them, and particularly for wheat, the price of which remains high. There is the same elastic demand for such articles as wool, silk, raw cotton, skins, olive oil and all oil-bearing seeds, coffee and eggs. Great Britain alone imported eggs to the value of over £7,000,000 in 1907, of which Asiatic Turkey contributed the value of only £10,000. Of

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almonds, for the same year Great Britain imported £660,604, of which Asiatic Turkey sent only £3,194.

Silk and tobacco are important articles in Anatolia and elsewhere. The silkworms are reared in every village throughout the country, and the cultivation of the mulberry follows as a matter of course. In many villages in the *sanjak* of Ismidt, in May and June, the greater part of the native houses, both Greek and Turkish, are given up to the worms, and the cocoons are then sold, at an average price of a shilling the pound, to French buyers for Marseilles and Lyons. The wound silk, which fetches about half a crown the pound, is taken up largely by Damascus. Tobacco is grown all over the country in various qualities. Much of it is bought up by the *Régie*, but most of that exported from Samsoun is bought up by an American Trust.

Opium, an important product in Anatolia, is obtained from poppies grown particularly in the lowlands of Smyrna, as well as in the Kara-Hissar and Koniah districts and Central Anatolia. Malatia, in Armenia, produces opium of high grade, which commands a higher price than that commonly obtained at Smyrna. The poppy-seed has many difficulties to overcome. The spring

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sowing runs the risk of summer droughts, and the autumn sowing suffers from winter frosts. The commercial position of opium is somewhat peculiar. Owing to the restrictions placed on its growth and consumption by the Governments of Great Britain, China and the United States, a surplus stock, difficult of realisation, must inevitably bring a fall in price. The drug will always be required for the extraction of morphine, in which the Turkish quality is particularly rich; but the chief reason for the continued cultivation of the opium poppy is the oil, largely used in Turkey as an article of food. Scratching the poppy-heads for the juice is tedious work, and a serious fall in price might render the returns inadequate for so much labour.

Soft opium is bought chiefly for Peru, Japan and Cuba, where the finest grades of opium are in demand. The opium grown in the Malatia district, containing a larger percentage of morphine, is more valuable than the grades sold by druggists. Poppy-seed, a by-product of opium, is exported in great quantity to Europe, the surplus being crushed in the country for the sake of the oil, which is much used in cooking.

Otto of roses is chiefly supplied by Bulgaria, but Anatolia also produces it. As this is essentially a peasant industry, the Ottoman Govern-

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ment would do well to encourage it by a more extended distribution of the rose-plants; and a penalty imposed on its adulteration with geranium oil would soon create a preference for Turkish otto over that derived from other sources. The demand for the natural article has necessarily been affected by the synthetic otto of roses from the laboratory.

The present system of distributing cotton-seed should also be extended by way of encouraging the production of raw cotton. Great efforts are being made elsewhere to increase the supply of cotton. Uganda, which has been mentioned on an earlier page, did not export a single pound of cotton as recently as four years ago, yet to-day the export has already reached £60,000.

The tragacanth bush might with advantage be more extensively cultivated, as Turkey contributes very little of this valuable gum as compared with the quantity exported from Persia.

What has been said of agriculture applies equally to other industries. To the average peasant in Syria and Palestine, and particularly to the nomad Arab of both countries, the pastoral life is more attractive. This preference is partly a matter of temperament, for the natives of these regions are not passionately addicted to hard or regular work, and find the loving care of

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acres less congenial than leaning on a staff and watching flocks. In part, however, it may be attributed to the discouragement of agriculture by both natural and artificial obstacles, by drought and by taxation. The nomadic tribes are all devoted to the pastoral life, and it is no small part of Turkey's future prosperity to induce these wandering hordes to settle on the land, first removing their dread of the tax collector, and then offering encouragement by making it easy for them to acquire small holdings and helping them to buy agricultural machinery. A story was told in a companion volume which illustrates the difficulty which these Bedawin have in realising the existence of private ownership in land. This is what they have to be taught, preferably by giving them land for themselves. The advantage of encouraging Mohammedan immigrants from Russia and Roumelia into the sparsely populated districts of Anatolia has already been alluded to, but it is not less desirable to keep the homeless wanderers of Syria and Palestine on the land. This should be one of the first results of such irrigation work as, on the expert advice of Sir W. Willcocks, the Government may find itself able to carry out in Mesopotamia.

Two other factors have operated against Asia



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Minor as a great agricultural country. The first, which may in future be removed by irrigation enterprise, is the deficient rainfall, which causes a complete failure of the crops in two years out of every seven, with only one really good crop every five or six years. The other is the effect of compulsory military service. The material for the army is supplied almost entirely by the peasant, who, under the old regulations, gave between six and eight years of his life to it, and who is handicapped even by the shorter service now in vogue.

Mining is an industry practically in its infancy throughout Turkey. Yet the mineral resources of the empire are inexhaustible: coal from Heraclea; copper chiefly from the Arghana Mines, in Central Asia Minor; lead, silver, and zinc from the Broussa and Aidin *vilayets*; petroleum from Mossul and Bagdad; chrome and emery from the west coast; chrome, manganese and magnesite from Turkey in Europe; and mercury from the Koniah and Smyrna districts.

The fisheries are at present in the hands of Greeks, Lazes and Armenians, with Turks in the minority. In the waters round Constantinople, the "Talian" is the chief net, a fixed engine the use of which is farmed out by the holders of concessions which, originally made to

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the Genoese, date back many centuries. The seine and some other nets are also used, and there is a hook-and-line fishery on the shores of the Marmora. Yet the fisheries are capable of immense development, by encouraging which the Government would also acquire valuable material for the future recruiting of the navy.

Of other industries, Turkey has none of first importance, though the swords, brasswork and inlaid furniture of Damascus, the carpets of Smyrna, Broussa and Angora, the silk fabrics of Héréké, and even the mother-of-pearl work of Bethlehem, deserve passing mention.

The future development of industrial and commercial Turkey is a problem which necessarily involves such indirect encouragement as the undertaking of public works, of which something is said elsewhere. With the exception of Salonika, which is the terminus of three railroads and the outlet for Macedonia, and Constantinople, which possesses immense advantages of natural position and political prestige, Smyrna, with the finest quays in the Near East, and Beyrout, the port of Damascus, none of the ports of the empire are properly cared for. Jaffa, the port for Jerusalem and the hinterland, is scarcely a port at all, and Alexandretta, which may have a great future, needs better inland

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communications in order to make it the Mediterranean outlet of Aleppo and Mesopotamia, while both Samsoun and Trebizond are far behind the Russian port of Batoum, which gets practically the whole of the Persian trade. Trebizond, however, has a good road to Erzeroum and Bayezid. Ismidt is the port for the Koniah district, but it is Smyrna which all but monopolises the export trade of Asia Minor.

Since the Constitution, industrial Turkey has taken a new lease. The carpet trade is in a flourishing condition, and the bulk of cotton grown in the country is spun locally into yarn and cloth. A great impulse would doubtless be given to industrial enterprise if the Customs dues were raised a further 4 per cent. The surplus revenue could be devoted to public works, and already roads are being opened up in every direction, so that, with extended railway communication, the immense produce of the interior of Anatolia will in future have access to the Mediterranean.

We must not perhaps expect the Moham-medan world to recover the great position which it held in trade in the days when the Caliph of Damascus owned prosperous vineyards in Gascony and round Bordeaux. There is, indeed, a tendency on the part of the modern Turk to

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despise commerce. Yet he need find nothing derogatory in it, seeing that, in his younger days, the Prophet himself was a successful trader. As for Arab agriculture, he should remember that it was the Saracens who acclimatised many useful fruits in Europe, and who introduced drainage and irrigation, of which bequest traces may be seen in Spain to this day.

CHAPTER VIII

REFORM IN THE PRESS

“Great is Journalism !”

An Early Turkish Newspaper : Press Law as interpreted at Yildiz : Immense Increase of Newspapers : Need of Greater Control : Conversation with the Vizier : Great Influence of the Turkish Press : Importance of Journalists in Recent Events : Character of the Leading Papers : Papers friendly to the Committee : Others antagonistic : Independent Organs : Some Curious Titles of Papers : Provincial Papers : Class Papers : Extracts from Leading Articles : Aims of the new Law : Summary of its Articles

THE daily paper, which Lamartine called a *révélation quotidienne*, has become in Turkey at once a power and a problem. It has, during the past two years, made up for years of repression. The first native newspaper in that country of official standing, the *Takwim-i-we-ka-i* (i.e. Table of Events) was founded by Mahmoud II. (“the Reformer”) in 1832, and is still published at the Sublime Porte as a halfpenny official daily Gazette. Owing partly to the low standard of education, partly also to vexatious restrictions, the number of Turkish newspapers did not

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appreciably increase during the next quarter of a century, for in 1850 those printed in Turkish numbered only two, and even in 1876 there were but thirteen. Then came the rule of Abd-ul-Hamid, and the freedom of the Press was at an end.

The only previously existing Press Law was one of 1865, under which one paper after another was either suspended or suppressed. Among the foremost champions of the Press was the famous native poet, Kemal Bey, an Albanian, who died in exile.

According to Yussuf Fehmi,* however, a far more rigorous Press law was in use at Yildiz. According to Article 12 of the Constitution of 1876, "The Press is free within the limits of the law." It was a happy idea of the ex-Sultan, after he had suspended the Constitution, to respect this particular Article, but to interpret the law in his own fashion. With this object he drew up nine clauses, some of them amazing even under an absolute monarchy. One of these prohibited serial articles, with the customary announcement "To be continued in our next." Another forbade the leaving of blanks or printing of dotted lines, "because they are apt to trouble

* Quoted by Fesch in his admirable book, *Constantinople aux derniers jours d'Abdul Hamid*.

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the reader's peace of mind." A third made it a punishable offence to publish the news of the assassination, or attempted assassination, of a reigning Sovereign, "as it is not good that such matters should be made known to our loyal and peaceful subjects." A fourth of these wonderful clauses interdicted all historical or geographical terms, including (of course) the word "Armenia." Finally, editors of newspapers were commanded not to print the text of the new law in their papers "because it might provoke criticisms or undesirable observations on the part of evil thinkers!" Such was Abd-ul-Hamid's conception of the liberty of the Press, and it can only be said that it was worthy of him. Cervantes could hardly have conceived anything more pleasing for the Press of Barataria.

After thirty years and more of such strangulation, is it to be wondered at that, accorded under the Constitution a fuller measure of liberty than that of any other land, the Turkish Press should have gone to the opposite extreme of licence? Upwards of a hundred newspapers in the vernacular were recently in circulation. It is even said that during the first few weeks of the Constitution the supply of paper in Constantinople ran out and that all manner of unsuitable qualities had to be used pending the arrival of

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fresh consignments from Austria, Germany and Belgium.

If, however, the sudden removal of so long a restraint had its natural result in an era of unbridled licence, it is, on the other hand, not surprising that the Government, both for its own sake and in the interests of peace and order, should have found it necessary to renew, with some necessary modifications to suit the altered conditions, the old Press Law of 1865. There was no thought of once more stifling its voice, or of restoring the terrible censorship exercised by the ex-Sultan. All that the authorities aimed at was to make editors and publishers responsible for libellous statements appearing in their papers and to restrain them, as far as restraint is practicable, from spreading those false rumours, which, at critical moments in a land like Turkey, may always inflame popular opinion and render still more difficult the task of those entrusted with the conduct of public affairs.

I have already in an earlier chapter quoted the opinion of Hilmi Pacha, at the time Grand Vizier, on the behaviour of the worst type of editors, and it was just a week after I had heard this from him that (March 27, 1909) the Chamber voted :

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“That taking into consideration the need of putting a stop to the mischief done by those newspapers which publish malicious articles likely to provoke discord and therefore incompatible with the best interests of Turkey, or venturing to attack the national Parliament, or any of the deputies, it is hereby resolved to invite the Grand Vizier to take immediate action with regard to such newspapers by drafting and publishing a new Press Law in conformity with the provisions of existing laws and of the old Act. This reference of the Vizier's *teskére* to the Commission now sitting on the new Press Law is to be made an order of the day.”

We are apt in England to look with suspicion on any attempt to curtail the freedom of the Press. Yet it has been found absolutely necessary, during the first two years of the Constitution, to suspend a number of newspapers in Turkey, some of them on more than one occasion and for varying periods. The reasons have been various. *Kalem* (the Turkish *Punch*) was suppressed after the April troubles for having published a caricature of King Edward warning Kiamil that he ought to have foreseen his difficulties. This was felt to be discourteous to a friendly Sovereign. *Ikdam* (the name means Perseverance) was said to have a circulation of 40,000, which is abnormally large for a Turkish paper. Yet it also was suspended

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during the summer of 1909 for having criticised the Committee of Union and Progress, and again in the spring of the present year (1910) for publishing an article which offended the susceptibilities of the Arabs of the Yemen. In some cases, previous warning was given. During a heated controversy between the Sheikh-ul-Islam and certain reactionary *hojas*, the Turkish Press was cautioned against publishing inflammatory articles, and at the time of Austria's annexation of Bosnia, it was also, as an act of friendship to England, forbidden to institute comparisons with the position of Egypt.

Those who are disposed to resent this policy of repression should take the circumstances into account. Here is a new-born Press which has acquired a disproportionate influence over a population long deprived of any but the most colourless newspapers. These organs, under the vigorous censorship of Yildiz, gave little news and no comments. The Turks have been so long without papers that they believe everything that they read in print. Disillusion, no doubt, will come later. At present, it is sufficient for the wildest reports to be published in a paper to be believed. This may be productive of irreparable mischief. Even in a country like ours, where discredit of the printed word is not unknown,

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panics are occasionally engineered by the Press. The Turkish public is far more inflammable, to say nothing of the Greeks and Armenians in its midst, and the danger is enhanced by the fact of so great a percentage of Turks being themselves unable to read and therefore at the mercy of interested parties, who do not scruple to misinterpret the actual text of the day's news.

If any one had previously doubted the significance of the Turkish Press in current affairs, they must have been convinced of it during the events which led up to the *coup d'état* of April 1909, when the reactionary newspapers, and indeed most of those opposed to the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, incited whole regiments to murder their officers and to overthrow the Ministry. The dastardly assassination of Hassan Fehmi, editor of the *Serbesti*, was the first episode of the counter-revolution. Another journalist, Daghestanli Mourad, disguised himself as a *softa* and preached sedition among the troops. As further evidence of the importance of the Press at that troublous time, mention may be made of a list, which was published in the second issue of the *Courrier d'Orient* (a daily paper conducted by a prominent member of the Committee, which made its first appearance while the Parliament was temporarily sitting at

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San Stefano), of those whom the ex-Sultan was supposed to have betrayed as having been implicated in the recent revolt. To his credit it may be said that this proved to be a fabrication, but it is none the less significant that it included the names of four influential editors. It was suggested that the journalists who are deputies in the present Parliament should be immune from the Press Law, but this was rejected.

Upwards of one hundred Turkish newspapers are published in Constantinople alone. There can be no object in giving a list of these, but the titles of some of the best known may be of interest to English readers. Before, however, glancing at the Turkish papers, mention should be made of others which circulate in the empire. These are printed in English, French, German, Greek, Armenian, Kurdish and Hebrew. There are even two Turkish newspapers printed in Greek characters, for the benefit of the Karaman Greeks, who speak only Turkish. Among the leading Greek news-sheets, some of which publish the most sensational news in their supplements, which in times of public excitement are issued almost hourly, the chief are *Neologos*, *Proodos*, *Patris*, *Pharos*, *Konstantinopolis* and *Sisyphos*. The Armenian papers include *Puzantion* (i.e. Byzantium) and *Jamak*, the latter being especially

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the mouthpiece of the Armenian exiles. Of the other foreign papers, one of the best edited, bitterly anglophobe, is the *Osmanischer Lloyd*. *La Turquie*, in spite of its French title, is Italian at heart. The *Levant Herald* is printed partly in English, partly in French. *Stamboul* and *Le Moniteur Oriental* are in French, as are also two weekly publications, *Le Bosphore* and *La Patrie*.

The standard of journalism in the native Press cannot be regarded as very high. Papers, like the *Tanin*, *Yeni Gazetta* and *Servet-i-Funoun*, often displaying able criticism and moderation, are in the minority. It is an unfortunate fact that there are many which live not by what they publish, but by what, for a consideration, they omit. Blackmail is not unknown in the Press of countries which call themselves more civilised, but in Turkey it is very common. Were it not so, the number of papers would be fewer, as, in a community so poor and so badly educated, not many can exist by their circulation and advertisements. As a rule, therefore, the chief opposition to the new libel law comes from those papers which have everything to lose, and nothing to gain, by the change. Only here and there a paper of high standing like the *Yeni Gazetta* opposes it, on the ground that it is a retrogression

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towards the old *régime*, under which the Turkish Press was so gagged as to be of no use to the public whatever. The *Yeni Gazetta* published a series of articles criticising the new proposals and pointing out that Parliament should look to the support and approval of the nation as expressed in an unfettered Press.

It is not easy at all times to determine which party is favoured by any Turkish paper. It frequently happens indeed that, owing in part to genuine change of opinion, in part to inducements which do it less honour, a native newspaper will revile to-morrow the man or the measure that it extols to-day. Among the better class of native papers, however, there are a few which consistently support either the Committee of Union and Progress or the Liberal party.

Of the papers which, at any rate for a long period, upheld the Committee almost unreservedly, there were the *Servet-i-Funoun*, founded by Ahmed Ihsan, of whom mention was made in an earlier chapter; the *Tanin*, edited by one of the deputies for Stamboul, with a leaning towards England and a former tendency to condemn Kiamil Pacha; *Siper-i-sa-i-ka* (i.e. Lightning Conductor), *Sabah* (Morning), *Chourai-Ummett* (National Assembly), *Pertevi-Adalet*

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(Light of Justice) and *Courrier d'Orient*. The last-named, edited by Ebuzzia Tewfik Bey, a prominent Young Turk, made its first appearance after the *coup d'état* of April 1909, and was said, with what truth I know not, to have been subsidised by the Committee to the amount of £T.3000 for favourable articles published in the early issues. It was an admirable little news-sheet, though its editorial opinions had to be read in the light of its political creed.

Among the most influential papers opposed to the Committee are *Ikdam* (Perseverance), *Mizam* (Scales), *Yeni Gazetta* (New Paper), which favoured Kiamil, and was even said to belong to him, and *Ikbal* (Prosperity).

The majority, however, are free-lances, agreeing only in their former condemnation of the ex-Sultan, whom they lost no opportunity of lampooning in word and caricature, often with grossness, but in some cases also with humour. The chief of these were *Hurriet* (Liberty), *Djournjouna* (A Lively Tune), *Serbesti* (Independent)—this usually criticised the Committee—and *Ikbal-i-Millet* (The Prosperity of the Nation).

Apart from the urgent need of reforming the Turkish Press, it is interesting to compare the titles with those found in *Sell's Directory*. Of the other political organs, some of which appear

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weekly, only two have any equivalent on our book-stalls at home. These are *Alem* (The World) and *Houkoukie Oumoumie* (Public Opinion). Of the rest some have titles which, though not difficult to translate into English, convey little meaning to any one unacquainted with the circumstances of their birth. Thus, there are three which upheld the rights of those exiled by Abd-ul-Hamid: *Insaf* (Conscience), *Sébat* (Constancy), and *Saday-i-Mazloun* (The Echo of the Sufferers). To the Turkish *Punch*, *Kalem* (The Pen), reference has been made; and, among others, mention may be made of *Sedavi-Haq* (The Voice of God), *I'ti Med* (Confidence), *Tonghidje* (A Low Clamour), *Mouhil* (The Circumference), *Ghévézé* (Gossip), *Dauoul* (The Drum), *Dal-Karwuk* (The Buffoon), and *Musawwer-Medjmou-a* (The Illustrated Magazine).

It would only occupy space unprofitably to enumerate all the provincial papers, but passing mention must be made of two Turkish papers of Salonika, the *Itihad-ve-Terekki* (Union and Progress), and *Zemaan* (Time), and of two published in Smyrna, the *Serbest-i-Ismir* (Liberals of Smyrna), and *E-de-ya-hoo* (A Little Politeness, please!). Another important provincial paper appears at Adrianople, under

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the title of the *Yeni-Edirné* (The New Adrianople).

There are yet other papers, chiefly appealing to the masses, with titles that in some cases call for explanation to English readers. There is nothing perhaps very obscure in that of the *Wolqan* (Volcano), the dervish editor of which was deeply implicated in the affair of April and captured after he had fled from Constantinople. There are the *Mir-at-i-me-arif* (Mirror of Public Education), *Meharsin* (Beauties), *Kyur-ogli* (Son of a Blind Man), *Ahenk* (Tuneful), *Se-a-det* (Prosperity), *I-di-Milli* (National Festivities), *Injili Chaoush* (A Sergeant with Pearls), and *Pus Kyullu Bela* (A Tasselled Calamity). The last of these titles, which can have no meaning in English, is a slang phrase in Turkey, denoting a calamity so great that one could hang a tassel on it. It is sometimes applied to a man who makes himself a nuisance.

Of the many religious publications, three may be named: *Mikyassi-Shéri'at* (The Scales of Legislation), *Bejan-u-Hakk* (The Truth-teller), and *Sitra-i-Muste-kim* (The Straight Road). There is a paper for the army, the *Ordu* (Army), a second for the navy, the *Uman* (Ocean), and a third for the merchant service, the *Jé Ri dé-i-Bahrié* (Nautical Journal).

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There is one for the Universities, the *Darül Fünun* (University), and one for working men, the *Ishji Gazettesi* (Working Men's Paper). Of official publications, one, issued at the Porte, has been alluded to, and another is the *Jé Ri dé-i-Rusumieh* (Customs Taxes). There is even, in this expanding Press, a woman's paper, called *Kadin* (Woman), and the English translation of its motto reads, "The Women of a Nation are the Mirror of its Progress." This, in Turkey! The pathos of it!

In case English readers should be interested in one or two specimens of Turkish "journalese," these are offered with every apology for imperfect rendering in English. The style of the political "leader" is not, as will be seen, very different from that in an English newspaper. For this purpose let us compare the views expressed by papers of rival policy, the *Yeni-Gazetta* and *Tanin*, on the occasion of Kiamil's downfall.

The *Yeni-Gazetta* (supposed by many, though I believe erroneously, to have been the venerable statesman's private property) at the time said :

"In our opinion, the Chamber might well have waited until Wednesday. There was no immediate need for hurry, particularly as the reputation of the newly appointed Minister for War was a guarantee for the safety of the Constitution.

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Had the Cabinet still fallen after he had been heard, the attitude of the nation's representatives would have been more correct and also more impartial. We do not know how far those who have brought about the crisis have cause for congratulation, but we deeply regret his resignation."

The *Tanin* (a pro-Committee organ), on the other hand, said :

"The Chamber of Deputies went through a memorable day yesterday. Given back to the country, after thirty years of bondage, it was confronted with a most serious problem. . . . On one side stood absolutism ; against it was ranged liberty ; which was it to favour ? Had that been all, its course would have been plain, for it would have resisted absolutism and supported liberalism. But enemies of great experience were opposed to it. To ensure their own success, they dangled vain hopes before the people. For this reason, the greatest anxiety was felt as to how the Chamber would emerge from the situation. Had it blundered yesterday, it would have been the death-blow of this unhappy nation. Happily its prompt and decisive action saved both the country and the Constitution."

By way of a more peculiar example of Oriental apostrophe, which will recall the higher flights of the Indian native Press, the following may be cited from the *Servet-i-Funoun*, an admirable paper with a clever editor. Yet it would be

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difficult to fancy a modern English daily, hard pressed for space, giving its hospitality to such a tirade *à propos* the readiness of some among its contemporaries to indulge in malicious comments.

“Son of Adam! You are good, agreeable, unique and witty! You are the force and the lord of creation! You are laborious and you are full of energy! You always seek after the truth! You are not easily disheartened! . . . To increase your knowledge and possess yourself of the truths of science, you dive to the bottom of the infinite sea, you climb to the tops of peaks almost beyond your reach, you even search the infinities of the atmosphere! You cling to anything that can bring you nearer to the truth! The frozen steppes, the burning deserts, the boundless seas, the mountains which reach to heaven are no obstacles to your search. Your will embraces the universe. . . . There is no denying you such virtues and talents. There is no doubting that you are the most perfect work of the creation. But there are two sides to perfection. Although your capacity for good is infinite, you are equally without limits to your power for evil. . . . One moment you astonish the world by your wisdom, the next you show that you have as little equilibrium as a child!”

If Lamartine did not write this, he ought to have!

In moments of crisis, the native Press assumes

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a bellicose attitude in the best style of some newspapers with a great circulation farther West. The impending evacuation of the island of Crete, last summer, gave rise to many expressions of passionate patriotism, two examples of which must suffice.

The *Ittihad* :

“Crete is the tomb of our ancestors. Its soil is littered with the dust of Ottoman heroes. Are we to disturb their last sleep by handing over to strangers the glorious battlefields that are their burial-place ?

“Greeks, Neighbours ! We hope that you will not disturb this twentieth century, that our relations with you will continue friendly, with mutual respect for the other's rights. Humanity demands as much.

“So long as our rights are inviolate, we mean no harm to any one, but we will not permit the slightest attack on them.”

The *Yéni-Tasviri-Efkiair* :

“We Turks know the roads of Crete well enough. Only twelve years have gone since we marched half over the island, putting the great armies of little Greece to trembling flight, and this merely by the glint of our bayonets.

“If that lesson of twelve years ago was not enough, the Greek Government has only to say : ‘Crete is ours !’

“Then we shall see what we shall see ! . . .”

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On the Greek outcry against Government supervision of schools, the *Tanin* (June 13, 1909) had the following leader :

“ Until the proclamation of the Constitution, the non-Mohammedan element were just *rayahs*. They had no political rights ; they lived under the tutelage of the Mohammedan element. They were not masters in the land ; they were merely subjects, slaves. For these reasons, it was possible to accord them certain privileges. But the day came when the Mohammedans said to them : ‘ We open our arms to you ; you who were our slaves will henceforth be our equals by every right. Equality and brotherhood will in future reign between us.

“ Thus the old frontiers were removed. Right ruled everywhere, based on these principles of equality and fraternity. That is why these sections of the nation acquired the privileges of serving in the army, sending deputies to Parliament, and, in short, having a fatherland.

“ They surely are guilty of an injustice if, still dissatisfied, they also continue to claim their former privileges. For the aim of the Constitution is to establish equality for all. To exact more is not right. We will never force our Greek countrymen to renounce their privileges, but we will say to them that the time of inequalities is over and if they want to live with us as brothers, we will open our arms wide and also our hearts. If, on the other hand, they also insist on maintaining the exceptional conditions

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of other times, they must still be *rayahs* in our eyes, for we surely cannot grant them more than we ourselves enjoy, or the Arabs, or the Albanians ! ”

The same paper (June 21, 1909) commented thus on another great reform dealt with later in these pages.

“ As regards the difficulties raised, let us examine them for a moment. How will the Christians in the army observe their religion ? How do they observe it in Austria and in Russia ? Simply, in the churches of the neighbourhood. So, also, they will do in our army.

“ There remains the question of the Sunday and the Friday. Nothing is more simple. While the Mohammedans are at the mosque on Fridays, the Christians will be drilling, and, in the same way, while the Christians are at service on Sundays, the Mohammedans will be performing their military duties. There is no difficulty or problem about this, for such administrative details have long since been arranged and practised in Europe. What of the fifteen millions of Mohammedans who contribute to the Russian army ? or the six hundred thousand of Bulgaria ? Such objections have, in fact, no importance whatever and are devised by the enemies of the brilliant future of Turkey. It is to be hoped that neither the Press nor Parliament will be swayed by them.

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“As for any protest being raised by the heads of religious communities, I confess that I find these inexplicable. Is it to be conceived that, under a constitutional government, any section of the nation is going to refuse to submit to the decision of the National Assembly? Apart from such an absurdity, it is a simple fact that Greeks, Bulgars and Armenians are all anxious to bear their share of the defence of the Ottoman fatherland, and consequently, in spite of such objections as may be made, the institution of military service for all creeds may be regarded as an accomplished fact.”

The text of the Press Law is outlined below. It aims, as will be seen, rather at the protection of public security against disturbance by sensational news than at that of the individual from libel. The debates were long and heated. It was proposed to introduce a clause making it an offence to caricature the Sultan or his Ministers, but this was rejected with ridicule, since it was pointed out that European monarchs are freely caricatured in their own Press. On the other hand, Art. 21 was, after considerable discussion, approved, making it possible to inflict heavy penalties for the publication of inaccurate news, with malicious intent or to the disturbance of the public security. Is it possible that the despised Turk is here showing an example that

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the Press of some more advanced countries would do well to follow ? Would our poor distraught "Man in the Street" be happier if something could be done to lessen these panics of German-made tunnels, airships and waiters ? Or, on the other hand, do such scares serve their useful purpose in keeping the purse of the too apathetic taxpayer open for further contributions to the building of "Dreadnoughts" ? Let us hope that the end justifies the means.

If, however, there is cause to condemn the terrorising of the phlegmatic Briton, whose morning paper makes him apprehensive that even he who punches his suburban ticket may be an emissary of Potsdam, what must be the effect of such scaremongering on an ignorant and excitable people like the Turks, or on the Levantines, who, though less ignorant, are even more excitable ? If the new Press Law also contemplates punishing libel on individuals, it will be for the sake of letting sleeping dogs lie rather than awaken those racial and religious hatreds which so impede the regeneration of the Empire. The Turk loves fighting to-day as dearly as did his forefathers, but he has the wisdom to recognise that a long era of peace at home and abroad is indispensable if he is to take advantage of this last chance of reform.

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It must be remembered that a native Press can exert extraordinary influence on these eastern populations. With the examples of Mohammedan India and Egypt before its eyes, the Turkish Government cannot be blamed for its anxiety to re-establish some form of censorship. Real statesmen in the Near East have never discouraged newspapers. Midhat Pacha established one in Bagdad, which is published to this day, and one of the first in Turkey was founded by that other great reformer, Mahmoud II.

Every language lends itself to venom, but few can give expression to more majestic courtesies than written Turkish. Fed by its three tributary tongues, Turkish, Persian and Arabic, it should flow like a mighty stream, yet it too often creeps like a drain. Some of the recent violence of the newspapers is, no doubt, but natural reaction. It would have been too much to expect that those who had suffered for thirty years from the spies of Abd-ul-Hamid should not have slung their stones at the boar of Yildiz when he was at bay. Nor could every little scrivener be seriously blamed for addressing his impudent "open letters" to the Grand Vizier, at one time the *alter ego* of an absolute Padi-shah, but to-day a mere Government official responsible to Parliament. Yet, in so far as

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these impertinences tend to disturb the harmonious working of the political machine, they should be suppressed. This is now to be done, though not out of regard for the susceptibilities of sensitive individuals, since politicians are everywhere public property and must take the rough with the smooth. The object is rather to keep the peace in a community which cannot for some years afford the luxury of either civil war or hostilities with its neighbours. There is no shame in this enforced period of peace. Turkey has achieved a wonderful revolution, and, once she has strengthened her defences under the new *régime*, those who contemplate meddling with her affairs will be wise to think twice before giving rein to their restless ambitions.

Meanwhile, the rulers of Turkey have learnt that war can be declared in the newspapers, and that sometimes indeed to talk of war is to drift into it. They are determined to arrest this mischief of *gup*, and who shall blame them ?

It would take up too much space to give the full text of the Press Law of July 31, 1909, but an outline of its chief articles may be of interest and will show that it is common sense, moderate, and adapted to the political and religious needs of the country. It contains thirty-seven articles,

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divided into four chapters, of which the first deals with the formalities of publication, the second with pains and penalties, the third with libel and defamation of character, and the fourth with various matters not included under these heads.

The seven articles in the first chapter prescribe that every newspaper must have a responsible editor; the qualifications and disabilities pertaining to that position (*i.e.* no one is eligible who has been convicted as a forger or pick-pocket, and every editor must be familiar with the language in which his paper is printed); certain formalities to be observed in registering a newspaper; the penalties attaching to infringement of these regulations; and various rules pertaining to ownership and copyright.

The second chapter is longer, containing seventeen articles. One stipulates that two copies of each issue be lodged at the Ministry of the Interior, another that the paper must bear the editor's name. An admirable article restricts the activity of newsboys, who are allowed to shout only the name of the paper, its price and the names of the writers or editors. (This restraint would be a boon in our own cities!) Then follow the degrees in which all concerned in the production of the paper are liable for

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
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damages or penalties. It is forbidden to publish the text of laws and decrees before they have been officially given out. Severe penalties are enforced in the case of insult to any of the creeds or nationalities of Turkey, a very necessary provision for the public peace. On the other hand, scientific discussion of religious questions is permitted, in itself a remarkable departure in a Mohammedan country. Other penalties are fixed for inciting to crime, for blackmail, or for publishing indecent text or illustrations.

The third chapter treats of the pains and penalties for libel, with a regular tariff, ranging from the Sultan and the Sovereigns of friendly Powers, down to Ambassadors, Consuls, Members of Parliament, Ministers of the Crown and private individuals. Provision is made in the fourth chapter for Press censorship in time of war and for the suppression, if necessary, of foreign newspapers in the country by the Council of Ministers. There is a separate Law of Printing Presses, but the only article of general interest is one prohibiting reproduction of the Koran, either in whole or in part, without special permission from the office of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, at Constantinople, as well as from the local Committee of Public Instruction and Provincial Governors (*muftis*). The reproduction must

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subsequently be approved by these authorities. Any contravention of this regulation will be punished by confiscation of all the reprints, and the printer is furthermore subject to payment of a fine of from twenty-five to fifty pounds (Turkish).



TURKISH CAVALRY

CHAPTER IX

REFORM IN THE ARMY

“ *Primum militiæ vinculum est religio* ”

Lack of Instruction in the Army : Higher Ideals aimed at : Composition of the Army : General von der Goltz : Character of the Turkish Soldier : New Regulations : Soldiers and Politics : Views of Nazim Pacha : Military Service for Non-Mohammedans : Conscription evaded by Natives : Analogy of the Indian Army : Enver Bey's Mistake : Case of Algeria : Of Bosnia and Herzegovina : Attitude of the Greeks and Armenians : Resolutions passed at an Armenian Mass Meeting : Value of Religion as a Battle-cry : The Thirty Years War : Future Composition of the Turkish Army : Case of the Janisseries : Dangers of the Proposed Change : Authorities Favourable to it : Other Army Reforms

THE Turk is essentially a fighting animal. Of all his critics, none have ever accused him of backwardness in battle. The Turkish nation was born in bloodshed. It won its foothold in Europe with the sword, though it has kept it by diplomacy, or rather perhaps by the jealousies of its neighbours. Hitherto the Turkish army has been composed exclusively of Mohammedan troops. Islam has been its battle-cry. Its efficiency is a matter on which even experts

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differ. Perhaps it fights with bravery rather than with brains. Until recently the standard of education among the officers was very modest. Not only were manœuvres and technical instruction woefully neglected, but many of the non-commissioned officers could not read, and few could write. In proof of their inability to read, I may mention that several foreigners succeeded, on the occasion of the new Sultan's Investiture, in getting into the enclosures by merely showing the passes with which, during the weeks when Constantinople was in a state of siege, we had to be provided by the police to go out after dark !

Latterly, it is true, a number of the younger officers have gone through the Pancaldi School, and have thence been drafted into German regiments to complete their military education, and men of this stamp, many of them in great measure responsible for the overthrow of the old *régime*, have introduced a different standard into the army. Thus Riza Pacha, sometime Minister of War, served for three years with the 4th Regiment of Guards at Berlin, and Ali Riza Pacha was stationed for a similar period with the Field Artillery in Nassau.

Important changes have been introduced under the supervision of General Freiherr von der Goltz, an able and experienced German officer

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much esteemed by the Turkish army. The army formerly consisted of six *Ordus*, or army corps, each nominally numbering sixty-four battalions. One of these, at any rate, fell far below the strength prescribed for the peace establishment, but this has been remedied. The *Nizam*, or standing army, numbered approximately 400,000 men, and the *Redif*, or territorials, some 600,000. Besides these, there were 350,000 men in the *Ylave* battalions, with no military training to speak of, and a further 100,000 in the *Mustafiz*. Military service was incumbent only on Mohammedans, and all of twenty-one years or over were bound to serve. There was, however, exemption for pupils of the ecclesiastical schools (which were therefore extraordinarily popular), for Albanians, Kurds and Bedawin, and for natives of Constantinople, Mecca, Medina, Jedda and the islands. Non-Mohammedans were also exempt, but these paid a tax, which brought the State a revenue of nearly a million sterling.

Even during the first year of his administration, General von der Goltz achieved wonders. He reorganised the General Staff and established a supreme Military Council. He prescribed regimental service and training for the younger officers and a revision of the lax regulations

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affecting seniority and retirement. In all the long line of foreign instructors who have been engaged for the Ottoman army since the time of Bonneval (officially Achmet Pacha), it may be questioned whether any has done such good work as General von der Goltz.

Undoubtedly, he has splendid material to work with. In the late reign it was common knowledge that no officer dared to interest himself too closely in the personnel of his regiment, for fear of being reported by the Palace spies, suspected of intriguing, and transported, without a hearing, to African Tripoli or the Yemen. All this is changed, and, together with a better equipment of Mauser rifles and field-guns, the general efficiency of the army is being raised by training and manœuvres. The Turkish soldier loves fighting, and fights as one to the manner born. He is frugal and abstemious. Now and then, no doubt, the Turkish troops were guilty of excesses in dealing with unarmed Armenians, but it is equally certain that many of these misdeeds were the work of the irregular regiments of Kurds, whom the ex-Sultan used habitually to launch against the race he hated. The army is as democratic as the nation, and many of the soldiers address their superior officers with an easy

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familiarity that would not be tolerated in western armies.

The greatest need of the Turkish army is education for both officers and men, with more rigorous training for all, and thorough reorganising of the reserves, which were recently in a bad way. The age of retirement and the scale of pensions also called for early revision, and have, in fact, engaged the attention of the authorities. So reluctant was Abd-ul-Hamid to part with his older officers that many men of eighty years remained in the active list, while on the other hand, so slow is promotion in the Turkish army that white-haired captains were conspicuous at each Selamlik. At the same time, it was not unusual to find responsible commands entrusted to youths of good family at an age when they should still have been attending the Pancaldi School.

Such comic-opera regulations would be less a matter for regret if the fighting material were less admirable. In view, however, of this, as well as of the fact that the future of the empire must depend on the maintenance of a strong army, the friends of Turkey will feel satisfaction that so experienced a soldier as General von der Goltz should have been appointed to the post of Inspector-General.

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The matter of age limits was dealt with in a revised scale presented to Parliament in June (1909) by Major Aly Wassfy and eventually adopted. The new limits were as follow :

ARMY.	NAVY.	AGE.
Lieutenant		41
Captain	Ensign	46
Commandant	Lieut. of a vessel	52
Lieut.-Colonel	Capt. of a frigate	55
Colonel	Capt. of a vessel	58
Gen. of Brigade	Rear-Admiral	60
Gen. of Division	Vice-Admiral	65
Marshal	Admiral	68

Officers who retire under these regulations are, in time of war, liable to be put back on the active list, receiving in that case the full pay which goes with their rank. Other reforms adopted on the report of the same Commission included a medical examination of the entire army every two months, and the abolition of the rank of Major, which is replaced by the new grades of first and second captain.

The most difficult, and in some ways the most thankless, task of those entrusted with reorganising the Turkish army has consisted in making the younger officers realise that their proper place in a professional capacity is in barracks, not in the lobbies of the Chamber of Deputies. Mr. Roosevelt recently gave the same excellent advice to officers in the Egyptian army : “ Keep

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out of politics ! ” The interests of the army can be adequately looked after by the few military deputies in Parliament. Throughout the past two years there has been a regrettable tendency on the part of officers to interfere in politics. For this, it is true, they had some excuse in view of the part played by the army in freeing the nation and giving it a Constitution. Through circumstances at first beyond their control, young officers, like Niazi and Enver, were thrust suddenly before the footlights, and so well, with the eyes of all Europe upon their every move, did they acquit themselves, with such strength and moderation, that, if they failed to hear the cue for them to leave the stage, they were but human. Enver Bey, a very modest man, as I realised when I met him shortly before his appointment to Berlin, found himself regarded seriously as a politician, tracked by interviewers and cheered by crowds. If, in the circumstances, he expressed some opinions on the political situation, of which time has already shown the fallacy, he cannot well be blamed. Yet many of the leaders of the Turkish army were not slow to realise the danger of this passion for politics. At the time of the April rising, Nazim Pacha told the younger officers quite plainly that politics were none of their affair. Mahmoud

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Shevket Pacha, the greatest figure in Turkey to-day, a superb general, if perhaps a statesman of lesser calibre, in taking over the command of the Salonika army, was careful to insist that he was concerned merely to defend the Constitution, and not with the intrigues of any political party. Mahmoud Moukhtar Pacha also expressed himself on the subject in no ambiguous terms. It is evident that a misplaced interest in politics on the part of army officers not only diverts their attention from their professional duties, but may also prejudice the conduct of parliamentary business. *Silent enim leges inter arma!* It has surely not been left for Turkey to solve the problem of a constitutional military dictatorship.

Of all the projected reforms of the Ottoman army, no other has the same interest for the rest of Europe as the proposal for compulsory service for non-Mohammedans. Hitherto the *rayah*, otherwise Christians and Jews, natives of the Empire, have been exempt, but have paid a tax in lieu of service. It is now proposed to make them fight, instead of paying. Is this likely to succeed? It is already noticeable that some of the enthusiasm, which at first filled Turkish officers at the prospect of non-Mohammedan combatants, has evaporated, and there has for some time been outspoken criticism of the

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proposed innovation, not merely on the part of those concerned, but also from many Turks.

Even Mohammedans themselves, though fighters by instinct, are not wedded to conscription. At the little station of Sesched, between Jerusalem and the sea, I saw a number of ferocious-looking ruffians wearing handcuffs and under a strong guard. These were deserters, who, having been recaptured, would be sentenced to undergo double the ordinary term of service. Some idea may be formed of the abhorrence in which these undisciplined tribesmen hold their military obligations, when it is mentioned that several of the party had actually burnt out their own eyes with quicklime, so as to render themselves useless in the field!

In seeking for analogous cases of conscription in other countries, the only satisfactory standard of comparison that suggests itself is that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where, ever since the occupation of those provinces by Austria, there has been compulsory service for Mohammedans. These form four infantry regiments and thirty battalions of *Jaegers*. They are allowed their proper hours for prayer. They have their own officers, who, whether Moslems or Christians, wear the national *fez*. There is no Mohammedan cavalry, as these are mountaineers, not horsemen. An acquaint-

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ance, an Austrian gentleman, who once officered these Mohammedans, assured me that the scheme answered admirably and produced no friction of any kind.

In this case, as the conscripts are Mohammedans, and the established religion of the country Christianity, the analogy is not absolutely close. Elsewhere, there is, except at first sight, little analogy at all. In the Indian Army, for instance, it is a question of enlistment, not conscription. Even here, however, we do not draft Goorkhas, Sikhs and Mohammedans into the same company, though doubtless in cases of emergency they might serve in a mixed detachment under the senior native officer of the day. Enver Bey, interviewed on this alleged parallel, showed a complete misunderstanding of the state of affairs in the Indian Army, but his mistake has been explained to him. Advocates of the Turkish scheme are also apt to quote the case of Algeria. In the first place, the proposal for universal service in Algeria, which was brought forward in the French Chamber by the deputy for the Seine, is still, so far as I am aware, under discussion. It has already met with much opposition on the ground that it would encourage treachery in engagements with neighbouring Mohammedan tribesmen, and in any

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case it would constitute a flagrant breach of the conditions under which the Dey capitulated, since these expressly precluded the imposition of military service.

In briefly considering the arguments for and against this momentous measure, it is necessary to regard it from the dual standpoint of the non-Mohammedans and of the Turks themselves. Let us first look at it from the point of view of the Greeks and Armenians. The Jews are of less account, since, having no country of their own, and no allegiance other than to Turkey, they are likely to fall in with a suggestion which promises further support to the Constitution, which they have loyally upheld ever since it was first promulgated. Moreover, it is said that many of them are less disposed to cavil at the introduction of compulsory service, as they are better able than Greeks and Armenians to pay the necessary fine for exemption. As regards the others, the Greeks are bitterly opposed to the proposal, and if the Armenians welcome it, it is because they hail the accompanying reduction of taxation, rather than from any military ardour to bear their share of the Empire's defence.

The Greeks are uncompromising in their opposition. When, in the early days of March in the present year (1910), the first summons

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of enrolment was served, they complained of the short notice given to them, and they also clamoured for the service of their own priests in the camps and barracks. The Mohammedans have their *hojas*, and if this omission is a fact, it is one which the authorities would do well to remedy at once if the equality of Christian soldiers in their army is to be more than nominal. No doubt the Greeks would have been more friendly to the new order of things if they could also have been free to levy their own local bands of militia, but the Government is not likely to accord a privilege which, whatever there is to be said for it from the Greek point of view, must certainly tend to favour decentralisation in the military councils of the Empire.

The attitude of the Armenians has been very different from that of the Hellenes. They are not enthusiastic fighters, yet they are impatient to be enrolled among the defenders of the Fatherland. Why? Mainly because they object to pay the tax in lieu of service. This may seem an unreasonable view of the Armenian attitude, but that it is not so will be inferred from the terms of a resolution addressed to Parliament by a mass meeting of Armenians under the chairmanship of Zohrab Effendi, deputy for Constantinople.

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The resolution was worded thus :

Considering that :

1. Military service for the various elements of the nation is the fundamental condition of safeguarding civil equality under the Constitution ;
2. It is the earnest wish of the Armenian people to serve the Motherland as citizen-soldiers ;
3. The disastrous economic condition of the Armenian population renders it impossible for it to pay the onerous military tax ;
4. By general agreement, all political parties in the country have accepted the principle of military service for Ottoman subjects of every race ;
5. Above all, the Government has not only shelved the question of military service, but is also laying before Parliament a measure for the continued levy of the military tax ;

it is hereby unanimously resolved :

to approach Parliament and all political parties, so as to claim the right of military service for Armenians, a claim based on the principle of equality under the Constitution for all Ottoman subjects, a right that can never be withdrawn ;

and to pray that Parliament shall reject such proposals of the Government and shall forthwith sanction the project of military service for Christians, since further to postpone the question might cause discontent in those elements of the Ottoman nation which rightly regard the fulfilment of this demand as a guarantee of the consolidation of the Constitution. The meeting also considers it right to add that the Armenian nation is starving and will never be able to pay this crushing tax, and that it will insist on its sacred right to serve the country with its life and not by a pecuniary compensation which is at once unfair and contrary to the principle of the Constitution. Only the granting of this right can ensure the sincere and fruitful union of Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans.

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This was the voice of the rank and file, and there cannot be much risk of misinterpreting it. Early in 1909, a number of young Armenians of the better class sought admission to the military college. This was refused on the ground that the new project had not yet become law. The applicants, however, chose to take offence and declared that the "military service" so called was nothing but a farce, as it was clearly intended to make them only regimental servants. There was an echo of this episode some months later, when it was intimated to the Armenian Patriarch, that, previous to the ratifying of the new law, Armenians would be free to enlist as volunteers in the army. Indeed, the authorities would have been well advised if they had extended a general invitation for volunteers to all non-Mohammedan races in the empire, so as to observe, for a period of perhaps six months or a year, how the different elements harmonised in the ranks.

While there is some reason to be apprehensive of the success of the experiment from the standpoint of the conscripts, it is not by any means certain that the Turks themselves will be the gainers. It is true that religion is no longer the battle-cry to-day that it was in other ages. Time was when one religion won Joshua's victories in the Valley of the Jordan, while another took

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generations of Crusaders over lands and seas to the rescue of the Sepulchre. Only, in fact, in Islam has the cry of the "One Faith" the same power of inspiration to-day as it had thirteen centuries ago. Yet even this is to be discounted. If the new law be adopted, it will mean that one-quarter of the Ottoman army of the future will attach no importance to Islam. The non-Mohammedans will be enrolled in the following proportions :

Greeks	12½	per cent.
Armenians	4½	„
Bulgarians	4	„
Syrians, Roman Catholics, and Jews	4	„

This alien element may be scattered and dis-united, but it will make a formidable fighting force on which Islam, hitherto the inspiration of the army, has no claim. Unless patriotism is to be substituted for religion—an achievement of which, as we have seen, there is little promise—these non-Mohammedan recruits can only be a source of weakness.

Save as volunteers, in moments of public rejoicing, non-Mohammedans have never served in the Turkish army. The famous Janissaries were Mohammedans at the time of their service in that pampered regiment, which made and

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unmade Sultans until one of them put the whole *corps d'élite* to the sword. Many of them were, it is true, born of Christian parents, but had been forced to embrace Islam when stolen from their homes, and the ferocity with which they fought in its cause at the fall of Constantinople proved that they had renounced all idea of loyalty to the Cross.

The greatest danger which the Turks run in using the services of these Christian conscripts is that of desertion in battle against a Christian enemy. So far as the actual employment of Greek reserves against Greece is concerned, I suggested the risk, not to mention the cruelty, of this to Hilmi Pacha, when he was Grand Vizier, and he assured me that Turkey never contemplated such a step, since it would be easy to draft the Hellene regiments elsewhere if such a war should break out. Yet, even without compelling Greek to meet Greek, there would inevitably be wars against Christian nations, and it would not always be possible under the conditions of modern warfare to oppose the Christian conscripts against Mohammedan antagonists. It is true that these might be present in the opposing army, as in the case of trouble on the Persian frontier, or in war with Russia (European Russia has more than four times as many Mohammedans

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as European Turkey) or with those Balkan States that no longer own allegiance to the Porte, though they have a Mohammedan population of more than three-quarters of a million. Yet it would be impossible to guarantee that the non-Mohammedans should always be opposed to Mohammedan troops. Warfare is not a military tournament.

At first, the Turks were so enthusiastic in support of the scheme that they were ready to renounce the revenue, amounting to nearly a million sterling, which formerly accrued from payment of the tax in lieu of service. Latterly, however, there has not been the same consensus of opinion. At the same time, it is improbable that the whole of that revenue would be forfeited even under the new law, for Christians still have the option of paying a lump sum of £50 in lieu of military service, and, as many are likely to avail themselves of the alternative, the Treasury will in all probability reap the greater part of what it lost by abolishing the light military exoneration tax formerly in force. It almost looked, unflattering though such an explanation may be, as if they based their confidence in the readiness of the Christian troops to do battle with their co-religionists on the disgraceful scenes which occur almost daily in the Church of the Holy

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Sepulchre. General von der Goltz has always been among the warmest supporters of the proposal, as were also a number of Turkish officers of varied experience. One of these, Major Aly Wassfy, at that time deputy for Tachlija, I met on one occasion at the Sublime Porte. In fact, the Vizier referred me to him for detailed information on the subject. Before embracing politics, Major Wassfy had served in the German Army for five years, and had been Instructor to the Infantry in Thessaly. As the result of his experience of all classes, from the raw material of the army to the Staff Corps, he was enthusiastic in his advocacy of the scheme. All that was needed, he assured me, for its success was to impress on non-Mohammedans, including officers in the military colleges, that they were available for the highest posts in the army. He was confident that there was no more efficient crucible in which to fuse the divergent races and religions throughout the Empire. As for the suggested risk of treachery on the frontiers, he dismissed it, as the Vizier had done, with the obvious objection that there could be no difficulty in bringing up less sympathetic defenders of the Empire from the *vilayets* of Anatolia. Even if this embraced a somewhat hopeful view of the transport service, it was a

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reasonable rejoinder. Major Wassfy's passion for universal brotherhood impressed me favourably at the time, and it was with something of a shock that, a few months later, I found, in the reports of the Parliamentary debates, that he was the first to oppose the claim of the gipsies to serve in the army of the Constitution!

Well, if the Turks themselves see no risk of treachery, they should know best. At the same time, so far at any rate as those are concerned who, like the Armenians, have actually petitioned for compulsory service, such treachery would be an eternal disgrace. It is to be hoped, indeed, that so courageous an experiment may be crowned with success, since its failure would reflect little credit on the judgment of the Turk or on the honour of Ottoman subjects of other creeds. Fighting is a job that he has hitherto done better than the majority of his neighbours. He loves it for its own sake better than he loves trade. If he could but continue to do his own fighting, it might be better for him. In the present state of Turkish finance, it is too much to expect that he should forgo both the military service and the tax, so there is perhaps nothing for it but to enrol this new army of patriots, who are to defend not Islam, but Turkey.

The remaining reforms under consideration in

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the army are of purely internal interest, and include the revision of pay with a view to reducing the War Minister's budget. It is nothing short of a scandal that there should be nearly fifty thousand officers in a standing army of less than a quarter of a million, and it is important that there should be retrenchment on a budget of £T.8,000,000. The Turkish troops have nominally been paid higher wages than those of European armies, but it was no uncommon experience for their pay to be six months in arrears. They will be paid punctually, but on a reduced scale, and the proportion of officers to men will also be reduced. This is the correct way to increase the efficiency of the army and effect proper economies, and not by the more favourite device of purchasing cheap forage and inferior war material. The new law has been drafted for a year or more, but only six clauses were passed by the Chamber in April (1910). Further discussion was repeatedly adjourned, though the soldiers have been acting as if the whole were already law. .



ONE PROBLEM SOLVED
(The once-famous dogs of Constantinople, now destroyed)

CHAPTER X

PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE

“Tendit in ardua virtus”

Various Problems for Settlement : The Financial Outlook : Turkish Loans : Customs Reform : Proposal to Raise the Duties : Public Works : Need of Better Communications : Navigable Rivers : The Bagdad Railway : The Hejaz Railway : The Future of the Kilometric Guarantee : Navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates : Post Office Reform : The Education Question : Importance of Expert Assistance : American Colleges : Conflicts among Christian Sects at Jerusalem : The Patriarch and *Confrérie* : The Question of Woman in Turkey : Polygamy : Arab and Turk : Points in the Settlement of Crete and Macedonia : Relations with the Powers : The Capitulations : Example of the Japanese : The Navy : Boycott of Austria : Another Case of Boycott : Limitations of Boycotts : Attitude of Germany : Relations with England : Afterwards ?

THE Young Turks showed their mettle when they pulled down a tottering fabric of tyranny with a swiftness of action and economy of bloodshed that won the well-deserved admiration of the whole world. They have yet to prove that they can build a more substantial edifice on the same site, by far the more difficult task of the two. The obstacles in the way of success are

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equally formidable inside and outside. The question of finance alone is a serious one, yet it should not prove insuperable to the owners of a province like Anatolia. Far greater difficulty lies in the pacification of outlying provinces and of subjects nearer the heart of the Empire. Macedonia must be conciliated and the Yemen settled. The language question is a pressing one from Albania to Arabia. The dreaming millions of Macedonia resent the Constitution because, by removing an old grievance, it has created a new one. The fanatical hordes of Asiatic Turkey regard it with suspicion as a conspiracy of the Giaours against Islam and the law of *Shéri'at*. The internal problems of the future include all these and more: the reform of the army, with the possible extension of compulsory service to non-Mohammedans, the checking of a too exuberant press, the education of all classes, from pacha to peasant, the emancipation of woman from a condition of bondage no longer compatible with the new-born ambitions of the nation, and other reforms, less pressing perhaps, but not to be indefinitely shelved. On the other side of the frontier, there is the importance of maintaining friendly relations not only with the Great Powers, but also with smaller neighbours, since a period of peace is indispensable if

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Turkey is to reform herself and develop hitherto neglected resources.

The chief risk of complications with the Powers is involved in such questions as the future of Crete, the administration of Macedonia, or the recurrence of massacres such as were enacted at Adana at the time of the April revolt. Besides these, minor causes of disturbance may be found in the pretensions of enclaves like Jerusalem and the Lebanon, in the ambition of the Turks prematurely to abolish the capitulations and to raise the Customs duties, and in the indiscriminate use of boycott, a novel and dangerous weapon which, thanks to her unforeseen success in coercing Austria, Turkey, unprepared for the appeal to arms, now regards as an effectual alternative. Some of the problems which confront the Young Turks have been debated in the foregoing chapters. The rest will now be briefly considered.

The future of Turkish finance, a problem to which only experts like Sir Adam Block or M. Laurent could do justice, will lie in a combination of loans, economies, revision of taxation, and industrial development. Turkey's finances have been of material interest to Europe only since the year 1854, when she raised a loan of three millions sterling in London to meet the

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expenses of the war in the Crimea. A second, of five millions, was in the following year jointly subscribed by France and England. The present administration of the Ottoman Debt dates from 1881 (as from January 13, 1882), and about the actual amount of the floating debt opinions differ. Turkey's total indebtedness (including the last Bagdad issue) to the end of 1909 was approximately £87,000,000, the annuity required for interest and sinking fund amounting to about £3,800,000. The sum paid for kilometric guarantees of railways (other than the Bagdad extensions, for the building of which Government bonds were issued) amounts to, roughly, £727,000. The fixed sinking fund, with its numerous accumulations, now represents well over $1\frac{3}{8}$ per cent. of the capital outstanding of the *funded debt*.

The reorganisation of the Customs is a matter on which the Turkish Government enjoys the benefit of advice from Mr. Crawford, a highly efficient expert of the British Customs Service. It is a question of international importance. Even before Mr. Crawford arrived on the scene, many of the old abuses had been removed. Literature was no longer subjected to a Gilbertian censorship. Safes were admitted into the country without the guarantee, formerly

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demand, that they contained no explosives. The extortion of *baksheesh*, if not abolished, is no longer officially countenanced. These and many other vexatious obstacles to commerce were removed by the proclamation of the Constitution. The reforms which called for Mr. Crawford's attention were rather in the direction of improved organisation of the customs service and the revision of a tariff not only bristling with anomalies, but wholly inadequate to meet the need of increased revenue. Foreign merchants had long clamoured for the establishment of bonded warehouses. To Turkey's proposal to raise the existing 11 per cent. import duty on various classes of merchandise, which could only be carried into effect by consent of the Powers, no objection was raised on condition that a portion of the increased revenue from this source should be devoted to financing public works in Macedonia and other parts of the Empire in which the Powers are interested.

This question of public works is an urgent one throughout the Ottoman dominions. On the one hand, the Young Turks, having come into their inheritance, are not unreasonably anxious to build their own bridges, dredge their own rivers, and construct their own railroads. On the other hand, they lack both the capital

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and the experience for these undertakings, with the result that concession-hunters are for ever laying before them schemes for this, that, or the other enterprise. Few impartial critics will blame the Ottoman Government if it should succeed in carrying out these improvements itself. Yet a very unfavourable impression will be created if it should go to the other extreme. Public opinion would no longer tolerate the Yildiz policy of farming every enterprise to the highest bidder, squandering kilometric guarantees and generally encouraging what the Americans call "graft." On the other hand, Europe will grow impatient if the Government should adopt a dog-in-the-manger attitude and, unable to finance public works itself, decline to call in others with the necessary capital and brains. There are some matters which are everybody's business, such as the navigation of the Vardar, Maritza and Euphrates; the improvement of the ports of Jaffa, Haifa and Gaza, Samsoun and Rodosto, all exceedingly dangerous; the building and maintenance of high roads and bridges and extension of the railway system. As matters are now, the railroads are isolated and form no part of a connected system; and, once these are left, the means of communication are hopelessly inadequate. Even some of the roads, which were

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once excellent, have been allowed to fall into decay. Sultan Murad IV. constructed such a road from Stamboul to Bagdad, which at one time was kept in good repair throughout its whole length. Yet at Sabanja, less than a hundred miles from the capital, I found the grass growing over it! Some of the best roads are those which tap no district of industrial importance. That, for instance, which winds from the gates of Jerusalem to the plain of Jericho, and which has no doubt been kept open for pilgrims to the Jordan, is in far better repair than some of those that lead to the teeming and busy city of Damascus. Agricultural areas of immense extent in Syria and Asia Minor languish for want of proper communications. Even for the waggons drawn by bullocks there is no sort of road to any market. It cannot be claimed that the inland waterways of the Ottoman Empire would, with a few notable exceptions, ever be of first importance, but the Vardar and Maritza would, if rendered more navigable, bring the produce of vast agricultural regions in Macedonia and Thrace to Salonika and the eastern ports of the Ægean respectively, and the Euphrates would, if properly dredged, and if also a canal and high road were constructed in the neighbourhood of Bagdad, and a railway

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constructed to Alexandretta from the Euphrates (which is not navigable north of Meskene), empty the harvest of Mesopotamia on the quays of that port. Thus would the Mediterranean be linked with the garden of Western Asia. Here, indeed, is a dream for Turkey to dream true.

Of all the railroads under construction in Turkey, none has been more widely or more warmly discussed than that which we call the "Bagdad Railway." Such a title envisages its ultimate, and still far distant, goal. The official title (Koniah-Angora) was *Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie*, but the extension to El-Helif, and so to Mossul and Bagdad, is controlled by the *Compagnie de Chemin de Fer de Bagdad*. Little by little, in face of great difficulties, financial and otherwise, it is pushing to its destination, the Persian Gulf. In January of the present year (1910) it entered into a contract with the German Steel Trust to supply steel rails and iron sleepers to the value of £750,000, no doubt for the completion of the new extension to Boulgourlou Halif, a little more than a thousand kilometres beyond Koniah. The loans for this extension amounted to £9,000,000, and for these (on the basis of 11,000 francs per kilometre) the Turkish Government is committed to the payment of an annuity of not far short of half a


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million sterling, which includes a kilometric guarantee of 4500 francs per kilometre for working expenses. These payments are secured on the surplus unpledged receipts of the Public Debt and, if necessary, on the sheep tax in Koniah, Adana and Aleppo. It is interesting to reflect that, by linking Paris with the Persian Gulf, this important railroad enterprise will, after all, only bring the twentieth century back to the trade-routes of the thirteenth, since it was through Arabia that the spices and fabrics of the East Indies found their way to Europe in the days before Vasco Da Gama had discovered the Cape route. As far as Ismidt, which comprises the first fifty miles of the line, I know the Bagdad Railway well, having made constant use of it, and it was admirably conducted, though, since railways, like individuals, do not overwork themselves when they have private means, only a few trains were run each way daily. Though the bulk of the shares, and the predominant control, are in German hands, the personnel is a mixed one. Thus the Director-General, M. Huguenin, is a French-Swiss; another high official at headquarters is a native of Salonika; and the station-masters and other employés along the line are mostly Levantines, either French, Austrian, Italian, Greek, Armenian, or Turkish.

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The future of the "Bagdad Railway" is an interesting topic on political, as well as on industrial, grounds. Will it, or will it not, be carried to completion under the existing control? As a partially sound concern, experts pronounce it, even with the 11,000 francs kilometric guarantee, unattractive, as the cost of construction must work out at something like £10,000 per kilometre, and the difficulties of construction must also increase in direct proportion to the distance from the base. Many years ago, Great Britain was free to participate in the enterprise, but an unfavourable report by the British Embassy at Constantinople, as well as a press campaign in England, prompted Mr. Balfour's Government of the day to refuse official support. It had also looked for a time as if a group of English and Italian financiers would secure the concession, but this, thanks to strong support from their Embassy, went to the Germans. The Ottoman Government is now seriously exercised as to whether in future railway enterprise should not be the affair of the State. This enthusiasm for State railways has no doubt been inspired by the equally famous Hejaz Railway, which already runs to Medinah, and will eventually reach to Mecca. For the promotion of this line, the notorious Izzet Pacha



THE HOME OF THE BEDAWIN

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was, to his credit, in great measure responsible. Like that between Jaffa and Jerusalem to the pilgrims of another faith, its chief use is for the transport of the faithful from Damascus to the holy places of Islam. Throughout its construction, particularly at first, the Bedawin proved most destructive, resenting the intrusion of the locomotives in regions in which they had heretofore been free to wander and pillage at their will, but the completion of the last section by a Turkish engineer appears to have reconciled them to the new order of things, and they have not only desisted from their vexatious attacks on the line, but have even shown some enthusiasm in welcoming its extension.

One development of future railway enterprise in Turkey may confidently be anticipated, and that is the disappearance of the kilometric guarantee, the admission of which principle already costs Turkey not far short of £T.750,000 a year. There is a twofold objection to this system: it is a drain on the treasury, and it offers such a sop to the shareholders that the management is encouraged to keep down the receipts, as surplus profit goes to the Government. The basis is a faulty one, though it is only fair to say that the management has never taken advantage of it to discourage trade. With

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the abolition of the guarantee, and the consequent diminution of enthusiasm on the part of concessionnaires, we may also look for a wider application of the *fara da sè* principle to public enterprise; and indeed Sassoun Effendi, deputy for Bagdad, has proposed it also in the case of the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates, the monopoly of which was vested in Ottoman steamers belonging to the Civil List of the Sultan, with three other steamers (between Bagdad and Bussorah) on the Tigris belonging to Messrs. Lynch.

The Turkish Government includes among its fondest ambitions that of doing away with the foreign post offices, but so little is done to encourage the Powers to sanction such a change that, unless the Ottoman Postal Service is promptly reorganised, it will rather be a question of putting the inland department wholly in the hands of foreigners. There is, of course, some sort of native postal service. We have improved on the days in which Napoleon planned that overland post of his from Europe to India, by way of Constantinople and Bagdad, at a cost of 25 francs per letter. But the delays are beyond all reason. As a case in point, from my own practical experience, I may mention that during a residence of two months at Derinjé, which is

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on the main line of the Bagdad Railway, fifty miles (or a four hours run) from Constantinople, I found that, as a rule, my letters and papers took longer to come (in the Turkish post) from the capital than it had taken them to come out from England. From England to Constantinople took them a little less than four days; and these last fifty miles took them in many cases five! A daily newspaper, sent with unfailing regularity every day from home, would arrive in batches of two and three. Yet letters and papers were handed over at once by the British post office at Constantinople to the Ottoman post as soon as they arrived. The fault lies in the general slackness of officials, as well as in the inferiority of the underpaid employés. The only postal official at Derinjé during my stay was a Turk, who could only read his own language with great difficulty (and often, I had good reason to believe, he guessed rather than read) and knew not a word of any other. Even when the address was in Turkish, this good soul would turn a letter round and round half a dozen times before being satisfied that he had mastered the superscription. The Port Master, an Austrian, who had resided there for many years, told me that the last postman had been able to read at any rate proper names in Latin character.

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Unfortunately he had the audacity to ask for an increase in his miserable wage, with the result that he was first put on half-pay and finally dismissed. These are not the conditions to inspire confidence in the public service, and unless the Young Turks give very careful attention to the management of their post office, their proposal to do away with the European establishments cannot go beyond the realm of dreams. The grievance, it must be admitted, is not in respect of foreign letters, but wholly in the case of inland and country postage.

Something was said in an earlier chapter of the great importance of education. At present it may, without offence, be said that probably nowhere else in Europe is the standard of education so low as in Turkey. Unfortunately, it involves political considerations. There is the ever present language question. The Hellenes, the Albanians, the Armenians, the Arabs, all cherish the language of their fathers, and in none of these cases is this Turkish. There can be no reasonable objection to the adoption of Turkish for parliamentary debates and for the transaction of public business generally. Any other arrangement would inevitably bring the curse of Babel on the Government offices. Yet against a similar proposal with reference to instruction

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in all State schools, there is much to be said, and the Greeks and Albanians in particular have successfully resisted it. The Hellenes, indeed, scored a strong point when they demonstrated that no adequate text-books existed in the Turkish language. This, which sufficiently indicates the educational ideals hitherto deemed sufficient by the Turks, effectually disposed of the Turkish language as the medium of instruction. The only equitable principle, if the equality promised under the Constitution is not to be a mockery, is to recognise the language spoken by the majority of residents in each district.

Of the pressing need of a western curriculum of education, in place of the narrow instruction hitherto offered in the Koranic schools under control of the *Ulema*, something has been said in an earlier chapter. This is Turkey's crying need if she is to come in line with other nations: education for the army and navy, for the prince and the pauper; free education, technical education, all under Government inspection. Until a new generation of properly educated Turks can be provided to take over the affairs of the State, foreign experts should be freely engaged to save the situation. They cost money, it is true, but to dispense with their help might cost more. The Arabs of old

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excelled in the science of irrigation, and the Ottoman Government has done well to enlist the services of an expert like Sir William Willcocks to report on the irrigation of Mesopotamia. Experts in other departments have also been retained. M. Laurent was secured from France to reorganise the finances; General von der Goltz from Germany to improve the army. Admiral Gamble, who had been lent by England to advise on the navy, resigned and has been succeeded by Rear-Admiral Williams; and the late Colonel Bonham, who died in the Turkish service while reorganising the gendarmerie, was replaced by Major Holker, late of the Egyptian Service. It would be well to invite an expert from the United States Bureau of Agriculture, admittedly the most advanced and efficient in the world, to teach Turkey the latest methods of growing cereals and the newest processes in the production of silk, wool and cotton. With the assistance of such skilled advice, we might in another ten years see Anatolia such a garden as the Caliphs loved of old. That veteran chronicler of Turkish affairs, Sir Edwin Pears, also made an admirable suggestion in the *Contemporary Review*, to the effect that the Ottoman Government should enlist the services of one or two retired Indian civilians to teach the arts of provincial administra-

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tion. It is a subject on which Turks would be none the worse for a little guidance.


Under the old *régime*, both secular and religious instruction were under the control of the religious bodies, because religion and knowledge were regarded as interchangeable terms. Turkey has now joined the nations in which there is a tendency to take the national education out of the hands of the clergy. For children up to the age of eleven, the curriculum embraced only the Turkish language and the Koran. At a more advanced age, very elementary history, geography, and arithmetic were added ; later still, a little French and geometry. The authorities are, however, awakening to the need of public education on broader lines. In the early part of 1909, Nail Bey, then Minister of Education, drew up a sound scheme for a normal school. A yet more significant sign of the times was an imperial *irade* for the attendance at the *Lycée* of the Galata Serai of princes of the reigning house. As has been the practice in less democratic lands than Turkey, they were to receive precisely the same treatment as the other scholars. The new programme recognises the principle of free education, with all schools under the control of the State, and the establishment of mixed Government schools for all elements of the

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nation. One of the most hopeful enthusiasts on education is Tewfik Fikret Bey, who, when Principal of the Galata Serai, gave me the outline of an ambitious scheme for a new school on the Bosphorus. Here, with the aid of professors from Scotland, Switzerland and other European countries in the van of educational science, he contemplated establishing centres in which Turkish lads might acquire western culture, with holiday tours in those countries that would best help them in any particular profession that they were destined for.

While the native schools were wretchedly inefficient, better education was available in the foreign schools, principally kept by Greeks, as well as at such larger foundations as the American colleges at Bebek and Beyrout, and the English schools at Jerusalem. I visited all three and found the tutors zealous and the pupils apt. There is, however, a distinction which is of some importance. The American colleges prescribe compulsory attendance at Divine Service. They offer education, in fact, on this condition, though Mohammedans at Beyrout endeavoured to evade it. At the same time, there is more to be said for the broader policy of the Bishop's Schools at Jerusalem, where no such clause is in force. The principal told me that all who came to the school

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THE ROBERT COLLEGE, BEDER

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were free to attend their own place of worship and were given free access to their own priests. The two American establishments occupy magnificent sites, that of the Robert College overlooking the famous Towers of Europe and the Sweet Waters of Asia, while the Beyrout college commands extensive views of the coast. At Bebek, I met a very interesting native teacher, grandson of the principal of the famous *Bektash* sect of Mohammedans, who have a college of their own on the neighbouring hill. American missionary enterprise is, in fact, very active throughout Asiatic Turkey. I travelled from Jaffa to Jerusalem in the company of a veteran inspector of American missions, and his enthusiasm for the conversion of the Syrian was proof against all rebuffs. I also visited another American mission to the Armenians, perched up in a little village of the hill on the south shore of the Gulf of Ismid. In dealing with the problem of national education, the Young Turks will have to proceed with much tact if they are to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of the Hellenes and others whose schools have hitherto been free from Government supervision.

In this matter of religious conflict, even the differences among Christian sects in Jerusalem furnish a problem of their own. It is common

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knowledge that the seven or eight Christian denominations that share the precincts of the Sepulchre indulge in disgraceful conflicts and are restrained from bloodshed only by the presence of Turkish guards in the different chapels. As if these conflicts between rival sects were not disgraceful enough, the Orthodox must needs fall out among themselves. On the proclamation of the Constitution, the sixty thousand Orthodox Christians resident in Palestine, inspired by the new spirit of democracy in religious affairs, demanded the appointment of a lay council to take part in administering the church properties of the Greek Patriarchate, by far the wealthiest in Jerusalem. Monsignor Damianos, the Patriarch, at once assented to this demand (whether from conviction or necessity is immaterial), an attitude in which, for obvious reasons, he was upheld by the Government. This did not suit the *confrérie* of monks, who revolted and demanded the dismissal of the Patriarch. They even went so far as to attack him in the streets, whereupon the enraged mob formed itself into a bodyguard and came into open conflict with the monks, who, besieged in their own quarters, poured vitriol from their windows on the angry crowd below, blinding some and disfiguring others. Matters then reached such a crisis that the



A STREET IN JERUSALEM

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Government had no alternative but to despatch troops to protect Monsignor Damianos from further outrage. The whole affair was then referred to Constantinople, and when, in the course of the negotiations, the Patriarch telegraphed to Monsignor Glykerios, who there represented the *confrérie*, the reply, which was pointedly addressed to the "ex-Patriarch Damianos," refused all recognition of a concession extorted by *force majeure*. However, the popular cause prevailed, and the Patriarch retained his high office. Conflicts of a similar nature, between schismatic factions of the Greek Church, then followed at Monastir, and if such shameful episodes are encouraged by the complete liberty of conscience hitherto accorded to non-Mohammedan subjects of the Sultan, it is almost to be regretted that these ungovernable zealots are not brought within the pale of the law.

There is a purely social reform with which the Turkey of To-morrow will be compelled to concern itself, and that is the emancipation of its women. This delicate question is usually discussed on the basis of the veil, or *yashmak*, as the outward symbol of bondage, but the matter, needless to say, goes far deeper than the mere unveiling of the sex. Indeed, in a climate where the sun is often fierce, and the insects venomous,

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the veil must often be a comfort to the wearer. Moreover, it was no invention of Islam, but had been in constant use from ancient times. Mohammed may have advocated, but never prescribed it, although he doubtless knew enough of the Arab temperament to realise the domestic security it would afford. In country districts, in both Turkey and Morocco, it is rarely seen, and I have seen it dispensed with in the Turkish quarter of a town little more than fifty miles from Constantinople. The mere dropping of the veil is, however, a question of secondary importance. The real problem is the social emancipation of eastern women, with a view to making them more capable mothers of the men that Turkey is going to stand in need of. Although "Votes for Women" have actually been proposed (and rejected) in the Ottoman Parliament, the true friends of Turkey have no desire to see the evolution of a shrieking sisterhood, of brazen manners, such as has latterly made political life a burden in some western capitals. Yet it looks as if the time were at hand when women will take their rightful place as comrades, and no longer be regarded as furniture. They need education. They need the freedom of a wider horizon than that which is bounded by eunuchs, sherbet and sweetmeats. Of course, their im-

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patience of restraint has been artistically exaggerated by Loti and other writers on this fruitful subject. It is possible that, looking down from latticed windows on the emancipated wives of foreigners, who sometimes indeed visit them in the harem and instil discontent, they may envy them their liberty; but it is an absurd deduction to assume that they must therefore conceive a grand passion for the first erotic Frenchman who ogles them. As a work of romance, Loti's *Désenchantées* is delightful reading; but as a study of the facts, it is contemptible. True, their present lot is not a high one. Yet, looking at the matter broadly, and without racial or religious bias, it would be hard to prove that the pampered plaything of a pacha's harem is in much worse repute than those women of Christendom whom the genial Chrysostom defined as *radix malorum*. The trouble is not so much that the average Turkish woman is actually disgusted with her empty and purposeless existence, as that she ought to be. In some matters, indeed, though this may be news to English readers, the Mohammedan woman is in better case than her Christian sister. Her property is her own, before marriage and after, and she cannot be divorced without having her *dot* returned in full. On the other hand, her inferiority is somewhat emphati-

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cally established by the fact that, in the Turkish courts, it takes the sworn evidence of two women to balance that of one man. Yet Judge Bacon recently declared (at Bloomsbury) that when a woman goes into the witness-box, she will swear to anything! The Koranic view therefore seems to have some justification. Moreover, though a Mohammedan may marry a woman of any other faith, the woman is deprived of the privilege, for fear that she might be converted. Yet it was Mohammed who declared that a man's paradise is at his mother's feet!

A still more delicate subject for foreigners to discuss, yet one that is the logical sequel of the last, is the practice of polygamy. It is certain that stable government in accordance with western ideals is possible only in a monogamous community. Yet the Harem is woefully, if not also wilfully, misunderstood in western lands. Very pious people, who have never wandered east of Ramsgate, take their inspiration from Byronic phantasies of licensed bigamy and look on the Harem, with unctuous aversion, as the theatre of domestic orgies unfit for mention in the polite circles of Brixton Hill. As a matter of fact, the word (which, at Mecca, has a sacred meaning) merely defines that quarter of the house which is set apart for the womenfolk and

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IS THE HAREM

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forbidden to any man other than the master of the house. There is no doubt much to be said against treating women as caged birds. Is there not, on the other hand, something to be said against the unlimited freedom which, as mirrored in modern fiction and the drama, permits married women to spin down the ringing grooves of change? I do not expect the ladies to acquiesce in this sentiment; but, on the other hand, I do not expect them to honour me by reading this book at all. Mohammed did not advocate polygamy. He countenanced it, which is a very different matter. What else could he do, if his ambition was to convert half-barbarous Arabs from the still worse practice of infanticide? But for this licensed plurality of wives, would they have rallied to his banner? The foolish western idea of the Harem pictures the suffering women as petted one moment and flung into the Bosphorus the next. Since man is vile, this, figuratively at any rate, will probably be the fate of some dear women till the end of time, but these extreme privileges of the husband belong rather to the Dark Ages of a religion which is, after all, only thirteen centuries old. Even Christendom has had its Amy Robsarts. Polygamy is not, as commonly supposed, the general rule in the East. Statistics are unreliable, but

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it is said that less than five Turks in every hundred practise it. They are a poor nation for one thing, and whether, as Plautus said, two women are worse than one, they are unquestionably more expensive.

The future allegiance of Crete and the settlement of Macedonia are questions which lie on the borderland between internal and foreign politics. The trouble in the Yemen, on the other hand, has no interest for Europe, which very properly does not concern itself with such dissensions as may from time to time arise between the Porte and those turbulent Sheikhs who may rise against the new *régime*, to which, however, they appear to be more reconciled of late. The *sanjaks* of Hodeida and Assir are populated by a fanatical horde of Arabs, reactionary by conviction, and in their own opinion immeasurably superior to the Turk. These aspirations rest on a half-truth, for all the intellectual triumphs of Islam, of which something has been said in these pages, belong to the Arabs, not to the Turks. At the same time, the Arab of to-day should reflect that the national intellect has been under a cloud for centuries and that the Turk, even though he was an unlettered barbarian at an epoch when Arab philosophers were the teachers of the world, has of late shown himself far readier

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to adopt progressive ideas and to put science and learning higher than the sword. The eventual panacea for the troubles on both frontiers of the Empire will probably be found in some form of Home Rule, on the basis of Prince Sabaheddin's programme of decentralisation. Yet the Young Turks cannot be blamed if they regard all such projects as premature until the defences and finances of the Empire have been established on a sounder basis. Then, and not before, decentralisation may be seen to involve the principle of strength and not of weakness.

The imminent withdrawal of the troops maintained in Crete by the four Protective Powers in the month of June 1909, caused grave unrest at both Athens and Constantinople, and as a result the troops were left for a further period. This was wholly in accordance with the wishes of the Porte, as publicly expressed by Enver Bey and others on more than one occasion. The political conditions of Crete are peculiar. Only 10 per cent. (or about 30,000 out of 300,000) of the islanders are Mohammedans, and, apart from traditional claims of suzerainty, it is this small enclave that furnishes Turkey with the much-needed lever for pressing the respect of her rights. Crete has long been under a Hellene Governor. The first was Prince George, who

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was succeeded by M. Zaimis, formerly President of the Council. The Governor is assisted by advisers and by the *βουλὴ*, an assembly, part elected and part nominated, consisting of seventy-four members. Religious affairs are under the control of a Metropolitan and seven Bishops, who, together, form the Synod of Candia. For a brief period in 1909 the Greeks looked to Germany and Austria for intervention, but in vain. Early in the present year (1910) Turkey very rightly took offence at the suggestion of Cretan deputies being sent to the new Greek Parliament, or of a Cretan oath of allegiance to the Greek Throne, and the Powers unmistakably intimated that such a breach of treaty would constitute a *casus belli*, and that Turkey would be given a free hand. Yet even the most optimistic must see that the Cretan question is still a deadlock.

The problem of Macedonia is far more serious. Here is no question of the peaceful settlement of a little island of less than 3000 square miles, but an immense continental territory, of which the three *vilayets* of Salonika, Monastir and Kossova cover upwards of 45,000 square miles, or more than two-thirds the area of European Turkey, with a mixed population of three millions, in which Mohammedans are in the minority.

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Since the accord between Austria and Russia at Mursteg, in 1903, these *vilayets* have been policed by a mixed gendarmerie officered by five Powers. Great Britain has charge of Drama; Russia, of Salonika; Austria, of Kossova; Italy, of Monastir; France, of Serres. Germany stood out. An Inspector-General is appointed by the Porte, a post which was once filled with ability by the ex-Vizier, Hussein Hilmi Pacha. The Inspector is advised by two civil agents, appointed by Russia and Austria, and these Governments further drew up a scheme of territorial adjustment with a view to grouping the conflicting nationalities on a sound basis. Other reforms on which they agreed were the improvement of the judicial system, the revision of taxation, the apportioning of 5 per cent. of the revenue to public works, and the suppression of levies of bashi-bazouks. After the usual prolonged *pourparlers*, these proposals were accepted by the Porte. It appointed an Italian general to the command of the gendarmerie, and it directed the Inspector-General to confer with the civil agents as to the best ways and means of revising the taxation of the *vilayets*. As a result of the scheme submitted to the Porte, financial delegates were appointed by four of the Powers. The Porte refused to ratify these

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appointments. The result was a joint naval demonstration off the island of Mitylene. In this, Germany did not take part. Nevertheless, it brought the Porte to terms, and, on their side, the Powers acquiesced in an increase of 3 per cent. on the import duties for a period of seven years.

The Macedonian question is not answered ; it is still open. Many of the reforms contemplated by the Powers have been in abeyance, though the foreign adjutants in the gendarmerie have worked in complete accord with the younger Turkish officers. When, in the summer of 1908, the Albanians rose at Uskub with the object of murdering the Austrians, it was the Turks, with Major Enver Bey, then attached to the Austrian mission, who drove the insurgents off and defended their Austrian colleagues from the rabble. On the other hand, the enlistment of non-Mohammedans in the Macedonian gendarmerie has met with only qualified success. The difficulties in the way of any settlement of Macedonia are enormous. Further reforms in that region were agreed upon by King Edward and the Tsar at that famous Reval meeting (June 1908), which is said (by the Germans) to have precipitated the Turkish Revolution. In view, however, of the honest desire of the Young

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Turks to reform the Empire from within, the proposals were spontaneously withdrawn in order to leave the Government a free hand in carrying out the much needed improvements without coercion.

Reference to Crete and Macedonia brings us to the final problem before the new rulers of Turkey: their relations with the Powers. For more than thirty years Abd-ul-Hamid contrived to play one off against the other, finally concluding an informal alliance with the foremost military Power in Europe. The Young Turks contemplated a more honest foreign policy. Apart from the attractive, if baffling, question of the future grouping of the Powers, there are two other matters, less important it is true, than the settlement of Macedonia, but also equally capable of causing friction. These are the Customs and the Capitulations. The reform of the Customs has been referred to. No increase in the duties can be made without the consent of the Powers. As Turkey is confronted with the daily need of raising increased revenue from this source (the last published deficit was rather less than £7,000,000*), foreign traders therefore have a powerful lever with which to remove the serious obstacles that have hitherto hampered

* April 1910.

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their operations. The abolition of the Capitulations is also among the ambitions of the Young Turks. The Capitulations are those treaties made between the Porte and the Powers, under which foreign residents in the Empire enjoy, among other privileges, the right of trial in their own consular courts. The recent case of a German subject being irregularly tried and sentenced at Salonika was one of the rare infringements of these privileges which the Turks occasionally permit themselves. The British charter dates from 1675. Under the "most favoured nation" clause, the subjects of all Powers with such treaties enjoy practically the same privileges and immunities, though there are isolated cases in which one Power may have put a particular interpretation on some clause. Can the early abolition of the Capitulations be regarded as within the region of practical politics? I doubt it, though I am reluctant to wound the susceptibilities of the Turks. The Young Turks are doubtless imbued with the honest desire to make Turkish justice something better than the by-word it has been for so long; yet, before there can be any serious talk of abrogating these privileges of foreign subjects in the Empire, the Courts of Justice need overhauling, the Judges must be better and more regularly paid to put

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them above the need of bribery, and the evidence of a Christian must be taken as equal to that of a Mohammedan. The Turks must, in fact, emulate the Japanese, who, by promptly reforming their law courts, obtained, in 1894, the consent of the British Government to rescind similar treaties. They already have a great admiration for the islanders of the Far East. I remember travelling on the Khedivial mail boat *Osmanieh*, from Constantinople to the Piræus, in the company of Prince Kouni, a cousin of the Mikado, who had been accorded an enthusiastic reception in the Turkish capital on the occasion of a visit which had for its object the securing for Japan of a "favoured nation" treaty. He was a pleasant little man, who spoke passable German, and who, like all his countrymen, took surprising interest in every one and everything.

The need of a long period of assured peace has already been emphasised. While Turkey will do well to strengthen her forces by land and sea, she must carefully keep clear of war. The bluster over Crete, and the earlier demonstrations of hostility towards Austria and Bulgaria, caused passing anxiety, but they fortunately ended without recourse to arms, which would have been a fatal mistake. So far as Bulgaria is concerned, the visit of the King and Queen to the

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Sultan should have been productive of the happiest results, though there were the elements of disturbance in a possible Slav alliance against Germany and Austria. The *entente* with Roumania, however, engineered by Germany and Austria in the autumn of the present year, put Bulgaria on the defensive and brought the storm-clouds once more gathering over the Balkans. In addition to the afore-mentioned measures of reform in the army, there has, during the past year, been commendable activity in the Turkish navy. The resignation of Admiral Gamble, for motives not perhaps wholly confided to the press, was regrettable from the Turkish standpoint, but at any rate a successor was found, not with the limited powers formulated by the Ottoman Government in February, but as full adviser to the Ministry of Marine. The Turkish fleet was not, as I saw it, calculated to inspire terror in an even moderately powerful enemy, yet there was, so far as the sailors went, excellent material to work with. The squadron consisted in 1909 of four armoured battleships, of which the largest had a displacement of 9000 tons, two armoured cruisers, five despatch boats, nine torpedo destroyers, five torpedo-boats, ten gunboats, and some miscellaneous vessels for coast defence,

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transport and coaling. Whether it was fit for a long sea voyage was very doubtful to those of us who saw the naval review in July. Some of the warships bear quaint names: *Help of God*, *Happiness*, *Banquet of the Universe*, and *Means of Success*.

There is, however, another battlefield, on which neither the army nor the navy is called upon to distinguish itself. In this age of commerce, it is possible to inflict serious damage on a powerful enemy without calling out a single company or coaling a single ship. Europe has lately had evidence of the far-reaching results of a tariff war, and the Turks demonstrated to their own satisfaction and to the discomfiture of Austria the power of an effective boycott. All through the winter of 1908-9 the wares and vessels of Austria sought the hospitality of Turkish ports in vain, and the movement, of which I saw the last stages at Smyrna and Constantinople, was crowned with extraordinary success. Baron von Aerenthal characterised it as blackmail. So, of course, it was. So, as the *Temps* declared at the time, was Austria's seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though it did not alter the map of Europe, a piece of "jesuitical casuistry and political cynicism." There is no need to mince words on these occasions. The boycott of

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Austria did not mark a new era in commercial warfare, since China had already demonstrated its effectiveness against two powerful adversaries. Yet, if only because it introduced a new element into international relations in the Near East, it is worth passing notice.

It was in October 1908 that the Emperor Francis Joseph announced his intention of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria had administered both provinces since 1880, Ottoman suzerainty surviving only in such nominal rights as the mention of the Padishah's name in the *khoutbie*, or prayer, and the official celebration of the anniversaries of his birthday and accession to the throne. As compensation for this flagrant breach of the Treaty of Berlin, Austria spontaneously evacuated the *sanjak* of Novi Bazar, which she had occupied under the same treaty. This compensation was, however, wholly inadequate, and was in fact no more than a long-sought pretext for withdrawing a costly army of occupation from a small district scarcely worth protecting.

Turkey, as was to be expected, protested indignantly against this act of aggression, timed at a moment when she had accomplished an admirable revolution, and when also she was peculiarly unready to mobilise her army. An

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appeal was made to the Powers in vain, but Austria was brought to her knees by the prompt action of the Committee of Union and Progress in preaching a boycott in the columns of the *Tanin*. These were the terms :

“Do not buy the soiled fabrics of Austria, who, at the moment when the Ottoman Nation needs to work in peace, pounces, with her usual insatiable greed, on Bosnia and Herzegovina ! Do not buy the adulterated wares of Austria, who, at the moment when Turkey looked to the civilised world for sympathy and encouragement, strikes this deadly blow at the Nation ! Do not buy the loathsome goods of Austria, who, at the moment when Ottomans are striving to establish their Government and Administration on a basis of right and justice, seeks to restore the *régime* of tyranny, makes trouble for us in the interior, and tries to force war on us, treading under foot the treaties of nations and the rights of the individual. Yes ! Let no Ottoman pay one farthing for the fabrics, the clothes, the shoes, the handkerchiefs, the flannels, or any other goods supplied by Austria ! ”

This stirring appeal met with ready response. Riza Tewfik Bey organised the boycott at Constantinople, and equally zealous and capable agents of the Committee fostered it elsewhere, with the result that the movement spread like

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wildfire. Great merchants and small shopkeepers, with the Guilds of the Porters and Lightermen, gave it their unqualified support. It was thus observed by those who could afford it and by those who could not, in either case with scrupulous allegiance. Its first phase was the tabooing of the red cloth *fez*, the official headgear all over the country, nine-tenths of which were manufactured at Vienna. This was promptly discarded in favour of others of native manufacture, such as I saw being made at the imperial cloth factory at Héréké, or for the *kalpack* of black astrakhan. Then followed a general boycott of Austrian vessels, simultaneously prescribed at Constantinople, Smyrna, Salonika, Jaffa and Beyrout. Ship after ship of the Austrian Lloyd line tried in vain, with bribery or with threats, to discharge their cargo. They were eventually compelled to return to Trieste, not one ton the lighter. In vain, Marquis Pallavicini, the Austrian Ambassador, remonstrated with the Porte. In vain the Austrian consuls at the ports threatened the Turkish authorities, who invariably protested their inability to coerce the traders. Yet, when several months later, a similar boycott was proposed against Greece, during the heated controversy over Crete, the Minister of the Interior issued

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unequivocal orders to the *valis* to suppress the movement at all costs.

Austria was losing five millions of crowns every week. Acts of violence rarely marred this struggle, though at Beyrout I heard of a case in which shots were fired on the officer of an Austrian vessel, who had gone ashore for the ship's mails. It was at that port, also, that the natives flung into the sea a large cargo of German-marked boxes containing Austrian wares. From the seaports, where it was necessarily most effective, the boycott spread to Monastir and other inland centres. The loss to the patriotic Turks themselves must have been considerable, but that of Austria was estimated at upwards of one hundred million crowns. This could not go on indefinitely, and in the end the pride of Austria was humbled. For some reason that has never been explained, she hoped at one time for interference from France, but this was not forthcoming. Austria's surrender was complete. The Ambassador had threatened to leave Constantinople, and had even gone so far as to break off the negotiations in progress at the time. Yet these diplomatic flourishes were no longer acceptable to the merchants of Vienna and the shipping companies of Trieste. In the end, Baron von Aerenthal, finding his popularity at a

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low ebb, had to climb down. Negotiations were reopened, and Austria paid an indemnity of over two million pounds. But for the boycott, she would not perhaps have paid one crown, though British action and influence also, in all probability, helped Turkey to secure this compensation. It even had political results that may be enduring. Making common cause in commerce bound Turk, Greek, Jew and Armenian by stronger ties than the banging of drums and waving of flags. Moreover, had the embargo on the Austrian-made *fez* lasted longer, a new industry might have been established in Turkey. As an efficient weapon in the hands of a weak country threatened by a powerful neighbour, the boycott was a success and won the sympathy of every disinterested country in Europe. At the same time, it is most earnestly to be hoped that their first success may not in future encourage the Turks in the promiscuous use of a weapon which, like some others, is apt to recoil on those who use it unskilfully. An organised boycott by the 270,000,000 Mohammedans in the world might soon ruin the wealthiest of their clients, but fortunately this, like other Panislamic movements, is beyond the confines of practical politics. Yet it is not inconceivable that the Turks may acquire a taste for such tactics, which, if im-

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properly used, might dislocate trade and do them more harm than good. A case in point is that of the boycott of foreign alcohol in the wine districts of Miriofito and Artaki. Turkish wines, which are not of very high quality, have only a limited market, and local growers dispose of their surplus stock to the manufacturers of *raki*, a popular national *apéritif*. In order to compel these manufacturers to buy their wines, the growers organised a boycott of foreign alcohol, of which upwards of fourteen million kilograms had been imported in 1907-8. Unfortunately for the promoters of this ingenious scheme, the desired result was not obtained, for, as it happens, *raki* of equally good grade is made in districts which do not produce the vine, and the manufacturers continued to import foreign alcohol for the purpose. Such boycotts are, in short, to be commended only as a political lever in lieu of resorting to arms. As a purely commercial measure, they should be severely discountenanced by the authorities.

Turkey's relations with the Powers have for the past twelve months been of a friendly nature, though there has been friction with France on the Tunisian frontier; and the competition for the recent loan, in which England stood by France, while Berlin made a successful bid, was

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productive of temporary ill-feeling. The collapse of negotiations with Paris was inevitable in view of support from Berlin, and it is probable that Turkey may, in the not distant future, regret the impulse which threw her into the arms of a Power watchful for opportunities of territorial expansion outside of its own limited area. However, the Young Turks were free to choose their friends, and the issue is still over the political horizon.

In her breach of treaty, Austria undoubtedly had the tacit acquiescence of Germany as well as the connivance of Italy. It is true that, down to the eleventh hour, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German Ambassador, protested his ignorance of Austria's intentions, but his disclaimer deceived no one. The Turkish press clearly recognised the effect which the revolution would have on the real friends and foes of Turkey. The *Servet-i-Funoun* admitted that it would be considered hostile to German interests. The *Ikdam* and the *Terjuman-i-Hakikat* realised that thirty years of British hostility had been directed not against the Turkish nation, but against the autocrat of Yildiz and his camarilla. Gradually, indeed, and in spite of temporary set-backs, for which some of our officials were not altogether blameless, British influence was being re-estab-

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lished at the expense of that which had temporarily overshadowed it. Unfortunately, British prestige has waned again, while Germany is now acclaimed, in Turkey as in Persia, the "Protector of Islam." It is a curious irony of circumstances which has made Great Britain, long the acknowledged friend of autonomous Mohammedan States and the just and upright ruler of others, appear as the perfidious enemy of the Crescent, but for this result our weak and vacillating diplomacy is unquestionably to blame. The Turk loves, above everything, the strong hand and the mailed fist, and for this reason, if for this reason only, the appointment of a distinguished soldier to the Embassy at Pera would in all probability have been attended with the happiest results. Unfortunately, too much was made of his lack of diplomatic experience, and a golden opportunity was lost. The purchase of obsolete German warships, in preference to English, was another indication of national sympathies, though a subsequent order was placed for two battleships and twenty merchant steamers. The contract for building over five thousand miles of roads was to have gone to a French syndicate as a sop for the contemplated loan, but failed of its purpose. To Englishmen was left the homely task of planning the Inter-

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national Exhibition of 1913, and surely exhibition never had a lovelier site than Seraglio Point.

So great are the difficulties of the Young Turks that it is impossible to see what the future may have in store for them. Some who know the Near East predict dismal failure, and regard the Turkish nation as not yet ripe for either constitutional or parliamentary government. Turkey is being given her last chance and she knows it. If she should fail, then there is no longer any hope of averting one or other of those proposals for her partition which Lamartine and others have formulated. At a meeting held in July (1910), the Balkan Committee, still loyal to its admiration for the young Turks, expressed only qualified confidence in the amelioration of the Balkan States under the new *régime*. The interest centres in Asiatic Turkey, where the population is too small, while the industrial resources are extraordinary. The deficiency of population will be better appreciated if the reader compares Turkey's fifteen million Mohammedans to over a million square miles of territory with Morocco's ten millions in an area less than one-third that of the Ottoman dominions.

The Turks are aware of the fatal consequences



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which failure must bring in its train. They know that there must be no repetition of the Adana massacres. They know that there must be no return to the *régime* of *keyeff* and *baksheesh*; that the ruling class must realise its responsibilities as well as its power. Whether they will succeed has yet to be seen, but their honesty of purpose seems beyond doubt. If all should go well, Europe will be grateful for the peaceful solution of a problem which has already occupied too much of its attention. No other nation is so well equipped to guard that wonderful site between two continents, for, as Thiers said of the French Republic, she divides the least.

The hope of success lies wholly in Turkey's adaptability to the new era. "Pride," said a Turkish gentleman to me once, a man who had suffered imprisonment and exile under the old *régime*, "is the ruin of this nation." Well it has been the Nemesis of greater nations. The greatest danger of all lies in a misplaced ambition for military expansion unscrupulously fostered by those who profess to call themselves friends of Turkey. It would be improper to deprecate the supreme authority vested in Mahmoud Shevket, or in the army generally, for the time has not come, if it ever will, in which such a country can be governed without the

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drawn sword. But the military spirit should be judiciously repressed, and Turkey should be content to keep what she has. Any programme which envisages recovery of lost territory will hurry her to her doom. The martial spirit has been growing in a manner which occasions alarm among the true friends of the Turk. As far back as the second anniversary of the Constitution, the Committee, in a kind of speech from behind the Throne, alluded to the need of strengthening the army and navy, a task not made easier by subsequent differences between the Generalissimo and Minister of Finance. Let us hope that the Turks may come out of their shell and remodel themselves on better ideals than have heretofore sufficed them. They might do worse than bear in mind the message which King George, when Prince of Wales, brought back to England from the Australian Colonies :

“WAKE UP!”

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